US-Colombia ties at breaking point: security, drugs, geopolitics

Relations between the United States and Colombia have plunged to a historic nadir, according to Foreign Affairs, as the two countries clash over deportations, counternarcotics, and regional security.

The crisis began on January 26, days after US President Donald Trump was inaugurated for a second term, when Colombian President Gustavo Petro refused to accept Colombian deportees from the United States. The Trump administration responded immediately with 25 per cent tariffs on imports from Colombia, a ban on Colombian government officials’ entering the United States, and a slowdown in inspections of incoming Colombian cargo and visitors. Colombia capitulated within hours, but the confrontation set the tone for relations going forward.

In the months following, tensions escalated as Petro’s outspoken condemnation of US policies irritated Washington. He failed to distance himself from China and Venezuela, and repeatedly denounced US military strikes on alleged drug trafficking vessels, even calling Trump a “war criminal” and urging American troops to disobey his orders.

In response, the US State Department revoked the American visas of Petro and members of his inner circle and applied sanctions against other Colombian officials, freezing their assets and denying them access to the US banking system.

Petro’s domestic policies also worsened bilateral security cooperation. Foreign Affairs reports that 40 per cent of army generals and over half of police generals have been forced to retire or simply fired by the Petro administration, while military operations in conflict areas have largely ceased under his “Paz Total” plan.

The consequences for drug production and armed group activity have been dramatic. Coca cultivation reached a record 625,000 acres as of 2023, and armed groups now operate in three of every four Colombian municipalities with de facto control of one-third of them.

The article warns that a total rupture with the United States would exacerbate these problems, enabling criminal groups to expand into neighbouring Venezuela and Ecuador and potentially increasing emigration to the United States.

Foreign Affairs highlights that the collapse of bilateral cooperation would also undermine US capabilities to combat transnational crime. Extraditions of Colombian criminals would end, and US law enforcement would lose access to critical intelligence, informants, and operational expertise developed over decades.

The loss of Colombian support would also hinder the US military’s understanding of guerrilla warfare, and weaken efforts to combat organized crime, including international groups such as the ’Ndrangheta and Albanian gangs.

The article notes that global implications are significant as well. China, which has increased engagement in Colombia through trade and infrastructure projects, would likely benefit from a US withdrawal, using the rupture to argue that the US model of friendship and assistance proved unworkable in Colombia.

Foreign Affairs concludes that a reset is unlikely under the current Trump and Petro administrations, but Colombia’s 2026 presidential election offers an opportunity. Candidates from the centre and right have pledged to repair ties, strengthen security, and restore cooperation with the United States.

Even Petro-aligned Senator Iván Cepeda, leading in polls, has signaled a willingness to address the security crisis. The article stresses that any future rapprochement should focus on the critical interests identified by Trump—“drugs, migration, Venezuela, and Chinese influence”—to rebuild what was once a highly successful bilateral partnership.

By Sabina Mammadli