"We are not involved", Iran insists after Hamas attack on Israel

Iran was not involved in the planning or execution of the Hamas movement’s attack on Israel, informed sources have told Amwaj.media.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a senior Arab security source in Beirut with close knowledge of the inner workings of Iran’s expeditionary Quds Force strongly rejected reports that the Palestinian blitz on October 7 followed a series of secret meetings between Arab and Iranian officials in Lebanon.

In a statement to Amwaj.media, Iran’s Mission to the United Nations also strongly dismissed the notion of Quds Force involvement in decision-making on the Hamas offensive.

“The decisions made by the Palestinian resistance are fiercely autonomous and unwaveringly aligned with the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people,” the Mission said, “We emphatically stand in unflinching support of Palestine; however, we are not involved in Palestine's response, as it is taken solely by Palestine itself.” It continued, “They [Israel] are attempting to justify their failure and attribute it to Iran's intelligence power and operational planning.”

While hailing the Hamas offensive as a “decisive operation” and “a real example of legitimate defence against a criminal regime,” Ali Shamkhani—a political advisor to Iran’s supreme leader who served as national security advisor until May—on October 8 also notably described the “Palestinian resistance” as an “independent movement.”

The vehement denial of any Iranian role in the planning or execution of the Hamas offensive raises eyebrows for several reasons. First and foremost, it stands out given that many observers view a direct role in the bloodshed by Tehran as a possible cause for Israel to enter direct war with Iran—a scenario which could trigger a region-wide conflagration with unpredictable consequences.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on October 9 said, “In this specific instance, we have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack, but there’s certainly a long relationship.” Blinken’s remarks notably followed a series of both implicit and explicit threats against Iran over the Hamas offensive by former Donald Trump administration officials and Republican lawmakers in the US.

Secret meetings in Beirut?

The Wall Street Journal on October 9 reported that Iranian “security officials” allegedly helped plan the Hamas offensive and “gave the green light” at an October 2 session in Beirut. Citing unnamed sources from Europe, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria, the US-based outlet also wrote that representatives from Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Quds Force had met “at least biweekly in Lebanon since August” to discuss the October 7 attack. Of further note, the Journal charged that Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian “attended at least two of the meetings.”

Questioning the Journal’s characterization of the “dynamics between the Quds Force and Iran’s regional allies, a second Arab source in Lebanon derided the idea of an Iranian supervisory role or involvement in planning the October 7 offensive. Specifically, the source noted that Hamas had “not gotten involved” after Israel assassinated multiple top PIJ commanders in Gaza back in May, hinting that close coordination between the two groups was unlikely.

The second Arab source also strongly questioned the notion that Iran’s top diplomat attended at least two of the alleged military planning sessions. “These people are very very cautious not to have any details leaked, including people in the top tier. They won’t risk making their plan known...and the idea of Amir-Abdollahian taking part in several meetings…defies logic,” he told Amwaj.media. Other informed sources additionally questioned how Iran would be able to plan and coordinate a major attack with multiple stakeholders, in different countries over several months, without getting caught—pointing to the Israeli penetration of important defence and nuclear installations inside Iran.

“No one knew about the operation or its details…maybe there was a general idea that something was going on, but even the upper hierarchy—the top echelon—no one knew except a few people in Hamas,” the second Arab source said, citing informed security sources who also relayed that Hamas was “surprised by the lack of resistance from the Israelis.”

Checkered past

While much has been made of the ties between Iran and Hamas, the two sides have gone through significant ups and downs in their relationship over the years.

Rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas—a Sunni Islamist movement—has always been driven by shared interests in its cooperation with Iran. When Brotherhood ideology and related political developments have stood in the way, ties with Tehran have suffered. One clear example of the latter is the dynamics between Iran and Hamas in the years following the eruption of the Syrian crisis in 2011.

Refusing to side with the Iran-backed Syrian government as Arab Spring protests erupted, Hamas ran afoul of both its hosts in Damascus and Tehran. Soon afterwards, then-Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshal quietly left Syria. Observers say this schism was worsened by the political changes in Egypt, which saw the emergence of Brotherhood rule—a development which was initially welcomed by Iran but did not lead to any normalization between Cairo and Tehran.

As the tide turned in the Syrian civil war and as the Brotherhood lost power in Egypt, Hamas found itself diplomatically and politically isolated. In that context, the Palestinian movement’s rapprochement efforts with the Islamic Republic began to take shape in 2014.

Addressing a crowd in Dec. 2014, Izzuddin Al-Qassam Brigades spokesman Abu Obaidah stated, “We thank the Islamic Republic of Iran who provided us with weapons, money and other equipment. It gave us missiles to destroy Zionist fortresses, and helped us with standard anti-tank missiles.” Notably, a video clip of Abu Obaidah’s remarks has in the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas offensive gone viral on Twitter/X as proof of Iranian involvement, overlooking that the comments were made nine years ago. 

Beyond the broader shared interest in confronting Israel, the wave of Arab normalization agreements with Tel Aviv since 2020 has added further impetus to cooperation between Iran and Hamas. Last year, senior Hamas official Bassem Naim asserted that as some Arab countries move towards normalization it is “only logical for Hamas to side with those who choose resistance against the Zionist enemy.” As recently as last week, Iran’s supreme leader warned Arab states against “betting on the losing horse,” saying that normalizing relations with Israel is a “gamble” that is “destined to fail.”

What’s next?

Informed observers have privately noted to Amwaj.media that the current situation cannot be compared to any other in the past. There are of course also many local, regional, and international dimensions to what is unfolding. However, two themes stand out: the game-changing nature of the October 7 blitz, and how its timing likely has to do with the Joe Biden administration’s efforts to forge normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. 

 “Hamas played outside the rules of the game,” the second Arab source said, “Israel is now contemplating its response, which could also well be outside the field of the game. None of us knows what’s going to happen. But if I were to guess, it could be something similar to the killing of [Qasem] Soleimani.” Of note, the source highlighted that the Jan. 2020 US assassination of the former Quds Force commander followed another shock event in the region: the Sept. 2019 attack on Saudi oil installations. The Iran-backed Ansarullah movement in Yemen, better known as the Houthis, claimed the aerial strike although it has been blamed on Tehran.

“The Hamas attack on Israel is far graver than the [Saudi] Aramco attack, and I think they—and it’s not only Israel but also its western parties who believe that the attack was coordinated with Iran and the resistance factions—are now thinking about how to retaliate.” As all sides are faced with wholly different circumstances, many possible scenarios can be mapped out.

However, two key considerations ought to be considered: the potential mobilization of Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement in reaction to an Israeli ground offensive in Gaza, and how such a prospect may relate to Iran. Neither Tehran nor Tel Aviv have much to gain from a costly, direct military conflict. Moreover, the potential impacts on the Israeli-Saudi normalization effort should be assessed. If one aim behind Hamas’s October 7 offensive was to torpedo the latter, it is unclear whether it will succeed—or whether it will simply allow the Kingdom to up its price for normalization with Tel Aviv.