West’s three options to combat the Houthi attacks

The Red Sea has been a historical hotspot for imperial and great-power competition, evolving into a crucial trade link between Asia and Europe. Recent attacks by Houthi forces on shipping, particularly those associated with Israel, have introduced a new layer of complexity. An article by the Foreign Policy journal explores the geopolitical significance of the Red Sea, the challenges posed by asymmetric threats, and the potential responses by the international community. Caliber.Az reprints this article.

"The Red Sea might just be history’s most contested body of water. It has been the site of imperial or great-power competition for at least 500 years, from the Portuguese search for the sea route to Asia all the way to the Cold War. It remains the most important trade link between Asia and Europe. The Suez Canal at its northern egress has been displaced by the Singapore Strait as the world’s most important chokepoint, but it’s still the second-most vital; 30 percent of global container ship traffic moves through that canal. Container ships are to globalization what eighteen-wheelers are to the United States—the workhorses of trade. And there are important energy flows here: 7.1 million barrels of oil and 4.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas transit the Bab el-Mandeb [the southern entrance to the Red Sea] every day, per the US Energy Information Administration.

So attacks by Houthi forces on 'Israeli' shipping in recent days have the potential for major disruption. 'Israeli' is in quotes because commercial shipping ownership is complicated and opaque: Ship ownership, ship operation, and flag of registry often differ, and none necessarily has any bearing on the ownership or destination of the cargo on board or the nationality of the crew. What’s more, Houthi attacks have quickly morphed from semi-targeted at ships nominally linked to Israel to more indiscriminate. The world’s most important container shipping firms—including MSC, Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and Cosco—have paused on sending ships through these waters for fear of loss of life or damage.

Enter a new US-led task force with the somewhat on-the-nose moniker Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval coalition to protect commercial shipping from Houthi attacks. It will operate under the aegis of a preexisting mechanism, the Combined Maritime Forces, a counterpiracy and counterterrorism naval coalition [the world’s largest, by far] that operates out of Bahrain. So far, nine countries have signed up officially [though some with very modest contributions—Canada, for example, is sending three staff officers and no ships yet]; there are reports that others have quietly agreed to participate or contribute. India, which has a lot at stake here [especially in the disproportionate number of Indian nationals among the crews of major commercial lines], is not part of the coalition but is independently contributing two vessels to the effort.

The United States and France have long had bases in Djibouti to project power across the Red Sea, recently joined by Japan and China, and the European Union operates out of the French base to support Operation Atalanta, a counterpiracy task force that protects trade in the nearby Gulf of Aden [alongside the US-led Combined Task Force 151, which has the same mission]. But this skirmish is an astonishingly asymmetric fight. With a handful of missiles and drones, the Houthis have succeeded in placing at risk one of the most important arteries of the global economy.

The asymmetry has caused some of the debate to focus on the cost of the drones versus the cost of the missiles being used to defend the ships. It’s the wrong metric. The right calculation is cost of the missile versus cost of the target. If a drone attack succeeds, it could wreck a ship worth anywhere upwards of $50 million and carrying trade goods likely in the $500 million range—and in some cases, roughly double those amounts.

The real problem of volume is a different one. The primary ships being used for these operations—for the United States, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers; for the United Kingdom, the Daring class—sail with an arsenal of roughly 60 missiles that are useful for shooting down drones or missiles. [They carry other types of missiles as well, rounding out the complement of armaments, but not ones germane to this fight.] At the pace at which the Houthis have been conducting attacks, a single ship would expend its relevant armaments in a couple of weeks and need to be rotated out; there’s no way to replenish these missiles at sea. If the Houthis keep up the pace of attacks and have a steady supply of drones and missiles [which seems likely], the cost of maintaining a naval escort operation—including the costs of operating the ships at distance—will rapidly rise into the tens of billions of dollars.

The West faces three options, all with serious downsides.

First, reroute the shipping. For now, until the task force is assembled, shippers are switching routes between the Red Sea and the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope off southern Africa. It’s been done before, when the Suez Canal was closed as a result of Arab-Israeli wars in the late 1960s and early ’70s. But global trade then was a fraction of global trade now. Rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope would add roughly 60 percent of the transit time [and fuel cost] from Asian ports to European ones, not just adding costs to shippers [who would pass those costs onto consumers] but more importantly gumming up the works in global just-in-time manufacturing. While this is an acceptable option for a week or two, any longer and the disruption to global sea-based supply chains would be significant.

Second, attack the missiles and drones at the source, either to eradicate the armaments or deter the attacks. Already there’s a drumbeat of criticism that US President Joe Biden hasn’t yet authorized this course. Easily said but less easily achieved. It would not be too hard for Houthi forces to hide both themselves and a stockpile of drones and missiles from US targeting, so any attacks—from two US carrier strike groups in nearby waters—would have to be pretty wide-ranging and even then are likely to miss pockets of weaponry. Would Iran—the Houthis’ primary backers—be thus deterred? It’s unclear how or why; Iran is surely willing to allow the Houthis to sustain substantial casualties for the 'win' of harassing 'the West' in the Red Sea. Attacking Iran itself is the next logical step and may prove necessary, but that carries its own major risk of escalation while Israel is grappling with the missile threat from Hezbollah on its northern border with Lebanon.

Third, widen the coalition. So far, Germany has not joined in, to some criticism but with good reason. There are mounting demands on Germany’s modest navy in Northern European waters, where the Russians are flexing their subsea muscles. Australia was asked to join but made the counterargument that its modest naval capacity is better deployed in the Western Pacific. Japan could contribute, especially since it has a base in Djibouti. Another potential contributor is China, which has a base nearby and a long track record of contributing to counterpiracy operations in the Indian Ocean. There’s a dilemma here for the West, though: Do the Western powers prefer to [a] pay the price of protecting global sea-based trade, of which China is the largest source and arguably primary beneficiary, or [b] help facilitate China’s growing capacity to project naval power across the high seas?

The entire episode highlights this point: There’s a deepening contradiction between the reality of globalization, heavily dependent on sea-based trade and on China, and the reality of geopolitical contest, in which naval power is rapidly emerging as a central dimension. Tensions and bad choices abound in the Red Sea—but they are also a harbinger of tougher choices and turbulent waters ahead".