What France under Bardella could look like Exploit EU weaknesses instead of Frexit

National Rally president Jordan Bardella has emerged as the frontrunner in France’s next presidential election, raising concerns across Europe about the prospect of a far-right Eurosceptic taking office in Paris. However, an analysis published by Project Syndicate argues that Bardella is less likely to confront the European Union head-on, but rather to exploit institutional arrangements that already work in France’s favour.

Recent developments in French fiscal politics underscore how deeply embedded France is within the European Monetary Union (EMU) — and how that position could benefit a future Bardella presidency, according to an analysis published on the Project Syndicate outlet.

After two years without an approved budget, the French government forced a budget plan through in January without a parliamentary vote. Despite the controversial move, markets showed little sign of alarm, highlighting the extent to which the eurozone shields France from financial fallout, the analysis argues.

When the EMU was designed, Germany’s Bundesbank dominated European monetary policymaking. Its replacement by the European Central Bank reshaped that balance, allowing France to enjoy low borrowing costs similar to Germany’s while running looser fiscal policy under the ECB’s implicit protection. As a central pillar of the eurozone, France is effectively insulated from market discipline, enabling it to expand deficits and debt without sharply higher interest rates, the article argues.

This dynamic was evident in the passage of the latest budget. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s government survived two no-confidence votes after the Socialist Party abstained in exchange for spending concessions, despite having pledged not to use decree powers. The manoeuvre all but eliminated prospects for deficit reduction, with France’s shortfall projected to reach 5.4% of GDP in 2026. Still, investors appeared unconcerned, confident that the European Commission would not strictly enforce EU fiscal rules and that the ECB would intervene if needed.

French government bonds rallied after the budget was adopted, reflecting relief that political instability had not worsened. Another collapse could have prompted President Emmanuel Macron to dissolve parliament for a second time in less than two years, further deepening uncertainty.

Attention is now shifting toward the 2027 presidential race. Unless an appeals court overturns a ruling barring Marine Le Pen from running, Bardella — her 30-year-old protégé — is expected to be the National Rally’s candidate. Opinion polls currently show him defeating all major rivals. His youth and distance from the Le Pen name are seen as improving his electoral appeal.

As the article notes, Bardella’s rise has revived a central question for Europe: would his election trigger a eurozone crisis or threaten the EU itself? The analysis suggests the answer depends less on his ideology than on France’s structural privilege within the bloc. Once in office, Bardella would have strong incentives to exploit those advantages rather than challenge them outright.

That interpretation is reinforced by Bardella’s own statements. In an interview with The Economist last November, he called for the ECB to buy French government bonds. His recent book, Ce que veulent les Français (“What the French Want”), focuses largely on everyday economic concerns, proposing measures such as reindustrialization under a protectionist state, cutting red tape, and reducing wasteful spending. Core National Rally positions like immigration restrictions receive comparatively less emphasis, which the article suggests may be an effort to broaden his appeal.

Bardella’s protectionist ambitions would also face clear limits. Trade policy is largely delegated to the European Commission, meaning France could only pursue aggressive, Trump-style protectionism by leaving the EU altogether. Short of a “Frexit,” the analysis argues, Bardella is far more likely to work within existing EU frameworks that already benefit France.

One such framework is the EU’s growing reliance on joint debt issuance to finance defence investment. A significant portion of the bloc’s recent €90 billion loan to Ukraine will be spent on European military equipment. As the EU’s largest and most diversified defence producer, France stands to gain disproportionately well from these initiatives.

Ultimately, according to the article’s assessment, Bardella presents himself not as an arsonist intent on burning down the European project, but as an opportunist seeking to leverage its weaknesses. The concern, it concludes, is that the system he would inherit is already fragile — ensuring that, whichever course he takes, uncertainty will remain a defining feature of France’s political future.

By Nazrin Sadigova