Air power and uncertain outcomes: Trump’s Iran gamble intensifies

While Washington has assembled its largest regional force in over two decades in the Middle East, it remains unclear whether this build-up is intended as coercive diplomacy, preparation for regime change, or groundwork for a sustained air campaign. The risks, as suggested by an analysis by The Economist, are significant and the outcomes far from assured.

According to the analysis, the United States has dramatically increased its military footprint across the region. Airborne warning and control aircraft (E-3 AWACS) have been deployed to coordinate potential operations, while a second aircraft carrier is set to join the fleet. With around 200 fighter jets, cruise-missile-capable warships, missile-defence systems such as THAAD and Patriot batteries, and electronic-warfare assets in place, more than one-third of available U.S. naval vessels are now concentrated in the Middle East. This concentration of force provides Trump with a wide spectrum of military options, from limited punitive strikes to a sustained bombing campaign.

The backdrop to this escalation is Iran’s nuclear programme and Washington’s frustration over stalled negotiations. Talks between American and Iranian officials are expected to resume in Geneva on February 26, but Trump’s envoy has publicly questioned why Tehran has not “capitulated” under mounting military pressure. The Economist notes that maintaining such a high level of readiness is costly and risks diverting resources from other global theatres. The implicit question is whether the build-up is sustainable absent concrete diplomatic progress.

Should diplomacy falter, several military scenarios are under consideration. One possibility is targeting senior Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in hopes of catalysing political change. Another option would focus on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime’s powerful military arm, striking its command centres or leadership. Broader targets could include ballistic missile facilities, nuclear infrastructure, and conventional military assets. Even a limited strike, the analysis suggests, would likely be paired with efforts to degrade Iran’s capacity for retaliation.

Iran’s retaliatory capabilities, however, remain formidable. Though its air force relies largely on ageing American aircraft acquired before the 1979 revolution, Tehran has invested heavily in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and long-range drones. During previous hostilities with Israel, Iran demonstrated its ability to launch sustained missile barrages despite facing superior air power.

The article warns that, if Iranian leaders interpret American deployments as signalling regime-change ambitions, they may conclude they have little to lose by escalating broadly—potentially targeting U.S. bases in the Gulf or mobilising regional proxies such as Hezbollah and Houthis.

Ultimately, The Economist frames Trump’s position as a strategic dilemma. Limited air strikes may fail to compel meaningful nuclear concessions, while a large-scale campaign risks entangling the United States in another protracted Middle Eastern conflict. Although Trump has floated the possibility of regime change, he has also emphasised his preference for a negotiated nuclear agreement. The tension between coercive force and diplomatic resolution lies at the heart of the current crisis.

The analysis concludes that air power alone is unlikely to engineer political transformation within Iran. Without a clearly defined endgame, the unprecedented military build-up may heighten instability rather than secure a decisive outcome—leaving Washington navigating between deterrence, diplomacy and the danger of unintended war.

By Sabina Mammadli