Europe’s defence debate after Rutte: Question of strategic agency

Recent remarks by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte have reignited a long-running debate over Europe’s ability to defend itself without the United States. In an address to the European Parliament, Rutte argued that Europe cannot ensure its security independently and dismissed alternative views as wishful thinking. 

According to Domènec Ruiz Devesa, former member of the European Parliament, and Emiliano Alessandri, affiliated researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, writing for Politico, these comments go beyond a description of Europe’s current military dependence and amount to the articulation of a political doctrine that risks foreclosing Europe’s strategic future.

The authors contend that Rutte’s position frames European defence through a rigid chain of logic: US nuclear deterrence underpins European security, therefore European strategic sovereignty is illusory. In their analysis, this reasoning not only oversimplifies the nature of contemporary security challenges but also underestimates Europe’s existing capabilities and political options.

The authors argue that while nuclear deterrence remains a cornerstone of strategic stability in Europe, most security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area occur well below the nuclear threshold. Hybrid warfare, cyber operations, intelligence contests, and limited conventional conflicts dominate the current threat environment. NATO’s own deterrence posture, they note, implicitly recognises this reality. Overemphasising the nuclear dimension, they suggest, risks diverting attention from the conventional capabilities that are often decisive in real-world scenarios.

These conventional enablers—such as logistics, air defence, intelligence, industrial capacity, resilience, and military mobility—are not areas where Europe is structurally incapable, but rather where political choices and fragmented investment have produced weaknesses. In this sense, Europe’s vulnerability is portrayed as contingent rather than inevitable.

The article also challenges the notion that Europe faces a binary choice between full reliance on the US nuclear umbrella and strategic exposure. The authors point out that discussion of a European role for the French and British nuclear deterrents, while politically sensitive, is increasingly treated as strategically conceivable rather than taboo. By focusing solely on the prohibitive cost of building a new European nuclear force from scratch, Rutte is said to sidestep these evolving debates instead of engaging with them.

The article further argues that Rutte’s skepticism toward a stronger “European pillar” within NATO underestimates Europe’s existing military assets. Collectively, European states field advanced air forces, capable navies, sophisticated missile and air-defence systems, cyber and space capabilities, and a major defence-industrial base. It also highlights the significant expansion of European intelligence contributions to Ukraine’s defence since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

From this perspective, Europe’s core challenge is not a lack of assets but fragmentation—nationally, institutionally, and industrially—alongside underinvestment in key enabling capabilities such as munitions production, satellite systems, air-to-air refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and integrated command structures. The authors cite EU-led initiatives like the Governmental Satellite Communications program and the IRIS² satellite constellation as evidence that meaningful progress in these areas can occur within years, not decades, if political momentum is sustained.

They warn, however, that portraying European strategic sovereignty as an illusion risks undermining precisely the political will required to address these shortcomings. In their assessment, Rutte’s message may inadvertently discourage the reforms and investments that NATO itself increasingly expects from its European members.

The authors also situate Rutte’s remarks within a broader transatlantic context that they describe as increasingly contradictory. US administrations have long pressed Europe to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden, and under President Donald Trump’s second term this pressure has intensified, shifting from burden-sharing to burden-shifting. Yet, telling Europe both that it must take more responsibility and that it can never truly succeed without the United States creates a form of strategic dissonance.

The opinion piece emphasises that US strategic priorities are visibly evolving. With the Indo-Pacific now at the centre of American grand strategy and hemispheric dominance ranking above European defence, the piece suggests that Europe can no longer assume it will remain Washington’s primary security concern. In this context, placing exclusive reliance on US protection appears increasingly risky.

Importantly, the authors do not frame their argument as a call for Europe to abandon NATO or weaken transatlantic ties. Instead, they present European strategic autonomy as a means of strengthening the alliance. In their view, alliances between capable and self-reliant partners are more resilient than those built on structural dependence.

The article concludes by arguing that NATO’s long-term credibility depends on adapting to this changing balance. Rather than dismissing European ambitions as unrealistic, the authors contend that NATO’s leadership should encourage the development of a stronger European pillar within the alliance. For Ruiz Devesa and Alessandri, a more balanced NATO is not a threat to transatlantic unity but a prerequisite for its survival in a shifting global order.

By Sabina Mammadli