Ukrainian defeat will have serious implications for the South Caucasus Opinion by Vasif Huseynov

The article by Vasif Huseynov, a Senior Advisor at the Centre of Analysis of International Relations (AIR), published on the Commonspace platform, ponders on the consequences Russia's possible triumph on the Ukrainian front may have for the South Caucasus. Caliber.Az reprints the piece.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has unfolded in ways that were likely not anticipated by either party several months ago. Initial optimism in the West about Russia’s presumed defeat and Ukraine’s victory seems to be fading away. The inability of Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive operations to breach Russia’s defensive lines is leading to growing weariness in countries that have been providing military, financial, and other support to Ukraine. Many politicians, experts, and public figures are increasingly expressing dissent against the continuation of aid to Ukraine, especially as this aid has not succeeded in pushing Russia back. This sentiment is reflected in the dwindling supply of military resources to Ukraine.

Simultaneously, Russia seems to have developed a resilience to Western sanctions, solidifying its military positions, and planning to expand its ongoing offensive. While many in the West hope for an immediate ceasefire, Russia may have little incentive to halt operations when it possesses the potential to gain control over even more territories. The repercussions of a Russian victory in this war, and the potential for its resurgence in future developments, extend beyond Ukraine and its allies, profoundly reshaping international politics, particularly in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood, including the South Caucasus.

The South Caucasus benefitted from Russia being distracted

There have been numerous developments in the South Caucasus since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022. The military debacle and economic crisis Russia encountered opened a window of opportunity for the countries of the South Caucasus, particularly, for Armenia and Azerbaijan. This has been reflected in multiple aspects, but in particular, the resolution of the conflict between the two countries over the Karabagh region. Moscow failed to keep the peace process under control, while the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) boosted their engagement with the region.

The recognition of the Karabagh region by Yerevan as part of Azerbaijan was a development that was not planned by the Kremlin, whose representatives were proposing to leave the issue of the status of Karabagh to future generations. For instance, on November 1, 2022, Russia’s Ambassador to Yerevan, Sergei Kopyrkin, told reporters “In our opinion, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is an issue that should be left to the next generations when the conditions for a solution to the problem acceptable and fair to all are in place”.

In September 2023, the Kremlin was unable to impede Azerbaijan’s complete restoration of control over the Karabagh region. Some speculate that Moscow refrained from intervention to safeguard its positive relations with Azerbaijan and its friend, Turkiye. The pivotal role Azerbaijan holds in the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) was seen as an additional deterrent against Russia taking a stand against Azerbaijan. As Russia grappled with distractions and strategic vulnerabilities, Armenia and Azerbaijan edged closer to a peace treaty, anticipated to be signed soon.

A growing fear of Russia to strike back

The possibility of Russia turning the tide of the war in Ukraine and achieving a potential victory is now gaining increased attention and discussion among experts in the South Caucasus. The political leadership in the regional countries cannot but take this likely outcome into account. The policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia since the beginning of the war demonstrate that their governments had included this possibility in their calculations. Georgia, the only country in the South Caucasus with a territorial conflict with Russia, has been reforming its foreign policy stance and seeking a more balanced approach between Russia and the West to navigate the changing geopolitical currents. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has been refraining from antagonizing Russia by pursuing its efforts to restore control over Karabagh in cautiously measured manners

In contrast, Armenia’s leadership appears to have placed its bets on a complete defeat or disintegration of Russia, adopting a pro-Western stance that has drawn criticism and threats from Russian officials. The pro-Western march of the Armenian leadership has been reflected in numerous policies and decisions, including the refusal to attend and host the military exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) while holding such exercises with the USA on Armenian soil, avoiding the high-level meetings with Russia within the CSTO and other regional institutions, etc. These all have enraged the Russian leaders some of whom even threatened the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan comparing him to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan seems emboldened, buoyed by the absence of a direct border with Russia, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia. Nevertheless, Armenia’s multisectoral dependency on Russia and more regional-oriented approach of Azerbaijan and Georgia (e.g., the 3+3 regional cooperation platform, the initiative for trilateral cooperation in the South Caucasus, etc.) will likely induce Pashinyan to re-evaluate his vision.

That said, over the past three decades, the independence of post-Soviet countries has demonstrated that nations adopting a multi-vectored strategy, without overly aligning themselves with a singular geopolitical centre, are better equipped to navigate and address foreign policy challenges effectively. The countries of the South Caucasus implementing this strategy may thus be more successful in their dealings with Russia that wins over Ukraine.