Why countries shouldn’t lift sanctions on Russia despite poor results Scholar explains limits, necessities of measure

Russia’s war on Ukraine has now dragged on for more than 40 months, with wave after wave of sanctions imposed on Moscow. The effectiveness of these measures in deterring or significantly constraining Russia has been the subject of constant debate throughout this period.

Daniel W. Drezner, author of the influential book The Sanctions Paradox, first published 25 years ago, examined why sanctions are used so frequently despite their poor track record as an effective tool of coercion. In a new article for Foreign Policy, he revisits his argument and applies it to the case of Russia.

He recalls the central idea of his book: “Expectations of future conflict help to explain why sanctions are so frequently imposed and why they rarely seem to yield concessions.” The logic is that the more conflict the sender anticipates with the target, the more likely it is to impose sanctions, adopting a tough stance in the present to strengthen its bargaining position in the future.

The paradox, however, is that “these same dynamics incentivize the target to stand firm when conflict expectations are high.” If targets expect repeated clashes, any concessions now would erode their position later. Material concessions weaken their resilience, and reputational ones signal vulnerability, encouraging more pressure in the future. As Drezner summarized, “the sender is usually most eager to employ sanctions in the situations when concessions are least likely.”

How does this framework apply to Russia today? Drezner argues that his theory does hold up, but argues that sanctions should nevertheless be imposed. Western sanctions have driven negative growth, higher interest rates, and rising inflation in Russia, but once Moscow launched its full-scale invasion, the limits of sanctions as a coercive tool became glaringly obvious.

In recent years, US-led sanctions devastated Iran and Venezuela’s economies and fuelled unrest, yet neither government gave way. Russia, Drezner notes, is “a much stronger, more powerful actor than either Iran or Venezuela.”

What about developments in the literature since 1999? Do they offer hope for economic coercion against Russia? “Not really,” he concludes. Targeted sanctions against elites, stronger multilateral cooperation, and clearer demands theoretically improve effectiveness. But none apply cleanly in this case. Russian oligarchs, for example, “fear Putin far more than the freezing of their Western assets.”

The Global South has largely avoided the sanctions regime, which makes it look fragile and encourages Putin to wait out Western unity. Perhaps most damaging, Western demands remain “both vague and ambitious.” Expecting Russia to renounce all territorial ambitions in Ukraine—including reversing its formal annexation of four oblasts—is politically and legally implausible.

Does this mean sanctions have failed? Drezner argues not entirely, pointing to two other purposes they serve.

• First, they reinforce the principle of territorial sovereignty. Even if Russia keeps de facto control of parts of Ukraine, the sanctions underline that such territorial grabs will never be recognized and that violating borders carries steep costs.

• Second, sanctions can weaken Russia’s long-term warfighting capacity. Drawing on the book Trade in War, Drezner notes that sanctions often expand once conflicts prove protracted. In Russia’s case, that could mean further oil restrictions and tighter controls on strategic imports, combined with continued Western support for Ukraine’s military.

In conclusion, Drezner predicts that sanctions will not coerce Russia into concessions—but they can still play a meaningful role by punishing aggression, constraining resources, and signaling norms.

By Nazrin Sadigova