Battle of Shusha: How Azerbaijani forces broke Armenian resistance Analysis by the Modern War Institute

The website of the American Modern War Institute (MWI) has published a study authored by MWI founding director Colonel (Ret.) Liam Collins, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies John Spencer, and Royal Canadian Regiment infantry officer Major Jayson Geroux, dedicated to the battle for the city of Shusha. Caliber.Az brings readers selected excerpts from the material.

The Battle of Shusha took place from November 2 to November 9, 2020, during the final week of the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 10, 2020). Shusha sits within the heart of Karabakh, a region that remained internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but occupied by Armenia following its capture by the Armenians during the First Karabakh War (1988–1994). During the second war, and after six weeks of fighting and steady Azerbaijani advances across southern Karabakh, Shusha became the final and most strategically significant objective. Azerbaijani forces’ victory in the battle for the city ended Armenian control over much of the region and directly led to the war’s ceasefire.

Battle of Shusha

During the first five weeks of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijani forces had steadily advanced deeper into Karabakh. On October 28, they started to prepare for their assault on Shusha. As it had done throughout the war, Azerbaijan’s military task-organized its forces for the specific objective. It assigned the mission to liberate Shusha to Special Forces Command and attached conventional forces for the operation—effectively creating a joint task force—similar to what it had done for the Battle of Hadrut earlier in the war.

This force included four special operations forces (SOF) companies (each numbering approximately 110 soldiers and including a mix of special forces and commandos); one mechanized brigade consisting of four battalions equipped with BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and T-72 tanks; and one motorized rifle brigade consisting of four battalions. Artillery and small tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) also supported the operation. Fog and cloud cover prevented attack aircraft and larger UAVs from supporting most of the operation.

The Armenians defended Shusha with a battalion-sized element within the city and a company plus (roughly two hundred) in Dashalti. These units were equipped with small arms, machine guns, mortars, 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, and a limited number of antitank guided missiles, including 9K111 Fagots, Kornets, and other Soviet-era systems. The defenders in Shusha also possessed at least four tanks and four BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. A mechanized battalion defended near Shushakend. A brigade was located in Khankendi, and other Armenian forces were located to the west in Armenia.

The joint task force, seeking to avoid being drawn into an extended urban battle and to minimize damage to the culturally significant city, planned to draw Armenian forces away from Shusha prior to the battle and to isolate the city to prevent forces from reinforcing it. Thus, the task force limited its use of artillery and heavy mortars inside the city and relied primarily on lightweight mortars (60-millimeter) in direct-lay mode.

The joint task force’s plan called for the mechanized brigade to advance onto Shushakend prior to launching the battle within Shusha with the hope of making the Armenians believe this was the main effort. Concurrently, the motorized rifle brigade would seize the high ground west of Dashalti to prevent Armenian forces within the village from reinforcing Shusha and to secure the joint task force’s western flank.

Armenian commanders later revealed that the battalions designated to reinforce the flanks of Shusha failed to execute their orders. This lack of execution critically weakened their defensive posture around Shusha and allowed the joint task force to approach with little interference or resistance.

At 10:00 a.m. on October 29, the joint task force used a company of commandos to seize the top of height 1553 from a small Armenian element. There, the joint task force headquarters remained with a small security element of eighteen commandos, in a position to command and control the operation from terrain that offered maximum visibility of the area. However, thirty minutes later an Armenian company counterattacked, forcing the headquarters to flee. The joint task force counterattacked a short time later and retook the height, this time leaving a larger commando element to defend the position. At noon, the Armenians conducted a second counterattack that failed. Unable to take the height, the Armenians fired mortar rounds on the position throughout the day but never made another attempt to reclaim the position.

Overnight between November 1 and 2, having had four days to plan and prepare for the operation, the joint task force’s mechanized and motorized rifle brigades began their movements. The mechanized brigade advanced toward Shushakend while the motorized rifle brigade moved to secure the ridgeline to the west of Dashalti.

On the evening of November 2, the joint task force inserted four special forces teams of fifteen soldiers each, who were specially selected for the task to infiltrate into Shusha. Their mission was so secretive that the SOF companies advancing on Shusha’s west were unaware of their counterparts’ mission until weeks later when conducting a formal after-action review of the war. With intelligence support, each team developed its ascent plan up the cliff within its assigned sector. Once the teams infiltrated, they were ordered to occupy positions within the city and wait for the assault to begin.

The southwestern team found a goat trail up the rocky cliff that it had discovered after conducting a detailed intelligence analysis prompted by information about the trail from someone who knew the area. During the climb, the team was compromised by an Armenian observation position and suffered two killed and two wounded after being engaged by mortar rounds and DShK heavy machine gun fire. Nonetheless, the remaining team members continued their advance, despite having to carry their dead, until they reached their position in a wooded area on the part of the plateau where the elevation is the highest.

The teams in the south and east had to scale the roughly one hundred-foot vertical cliffs using ropes. The final team ascended from the north, where the slope of the terrain was much less severe, but it required a much longer movement that started on a hiking trail that paralleled a creek in the valley to Shusha’s east. Due to the difficulty of the climbs and the length of the movement, these teams failed to reach the top of the plateau before daybreak.

That same night, the first two SOF companies started their infiltration. Moving through the heavily wooded mountains, they bypassed Armenian defensive positions, skirting two to four kilometers from Shusha’s outskirts. Their movements carried them deep into Armenian-controlled territory and into their assault positions on the heavily forested slopes just west of Shusha. The terrain on these approaches, with its steep slopes and forested cover, provided excellent concealment that allowed both companies to infiltrate undetected.

At daybreak on November 3, the special forces team scaling the cliff near a parade field on the plateau in Shusha’s east became compromised. Near the end of their climb, the team members had to contend with mortar fire while still climbing in an extremely exposed position. Nonetheless, the team made it to the top and advanced to its position in a building near the edge of Shusha after suffering only two minor casualties. The team in the south that scaled the cliff using ropes reached the top of the plateau without being compromised and then infiltrated into the city.

The team advancing from the north was compromised by Armenian observation positions located several hundred meters north of Shusha, down the more gradually sloping terrain. Believing the team was much larger than it was, the Armenians at four observation positions on Shusha’s north retreated up the hillside and back into Shusha. After a brief firefight with the occupants of one of the observation positions before they fled, the team continued its advance, entering the city by scaling the walls of an old prison in the city’s northeast corner. This team suffered one killed and two wounded, but continued its move to a nine-story hotel, one of Shusha’s tallest buildings, and established a sniper position at its top. The team remained hidden until the start of the battle. When the battle began, the soldiers, like those of the other teams, selectively engaged Armenian troops to create as much chaos as possible and to give the Armenians the feeling that the Azerbaijani forces were everywhere.

On November 3, a severe fog rolled into the area. This fog prevented the Azerbaijanis from employing aerial observation and strike platforms—such as the TB2 Bayraktar UAV—that had been so effective throughout the war. But the fog assisted in concealing the movement of the infiltrating forces. This fog remained throughout much of the battle, getting thicker on November 5 and 6, and then turning into low cloud cover with rain on November 7.

By the end of November 3, the mechanized and motorized rifle brigades had completed their assigned tasks. The mechanized brigade had seized the heights south of Shushakend, allowing it to control the roads leading into the village. The motorized rifle brigade had seized the heights around Dashalti, including the eastern side of the village. After seizing the heights, the units established defensive lines and strongpoints to protect the flanks of the SOF companies that would soon be assaulting Shusha. These offensive actions simulated main attacks with the intent to draw Armenian reserves into both directions.

During the night of November 3–4, on Shusha’s western side, the third SOF company began infiltrating to its assault position west of Shusha. On the morning of November 4, the company dropped off a platoon-sized section of thirty soldiers along the Lachin Road to establish a blocking position before continuing to its assault positions. Throughout the day, the motorized rifle brigade and mechanized brigade continued conducting diversionary combat operations and engaging Armenian forces in Dashalti and Shushakend. 

Around 6:00 a.m. on November 5, the Azerbaijani SOF section at the blocking position along the Lachin Road observed a company-sized Armenian element of dismounted soldiers supported by one T-72 tank and one BMP-2 moving up the road to reinforce the defense at Shusha. Unaware that the Azerbaijanis had reached the road, the Armenians were moving in a march formation as opposed to a battle formation. As the lead element of the Armenian reinforcements turned a bend, the SOF soldiers initiated the ambush with small arms fire, causing the Armenians to flee. While they may not have inflicted heavy losses, they accomplished their task by keeping the reinforcements from reaching and defending Shusha.

During the night of November 4–5, the fourth and final SOF company infiltrated along the same route the other companies had used the previous two nights. This time, however, Armenian forces positioned along the road in Shusha’s southwestern outskirts detected the company’s movement after dawn on November 5. After an extended firefight, the 20–30 Armenian soldiers along the road fled, allowing the company to continue to its assault position west of Shusha.

South of Shusha, a reconnaissance company from the motorized rifle battalion hit mines as it attempted to enter Dashalti, forcing it to withdraw. The joint task force had directed the motorized rifle brigade not to enter and clear Dashalti and to instead control the road from Dashalti to Shusha by positioning themselves in the surrounding hills to prevent Armenian forces in Dashalti from reinforcing Shusha. 

At 3:00 a.m. on November 6, the joint task force issued the order to attack Shusha.

The northernmost SOF company was the first to reach Shusha, entering the city just before dawn from a small hill on the city’s northwest side. After entering undetected, the company immediately moved to its primary objective: Shusha’s old fortress in the city’s north. The fortress dates to the 1750s and was built to protect the city from invaders. Its thick rock walls, two meters deep and five meters high, stretches more than three hundred meters along Shusha’s north side, providing excellent protection and good observation of the road running to Khankendi. The fortress, which in 1795 reportedly prevented a force of eighty thousand from invading the city, remained a significant defensive position; thus, the SOF company invested much of its combat power to secure it. The company advanced through its main gate and then proceeded to clear Armenian soldiers from the wall and nearby buildings. After securing the fortress, the SOF company established defensive positions along its wall to defend against Armenian counterattacks that might emanate from Khankendi.

The three northern SOF companies divided the city into sectors, clearing from northwest to southeast. The fourth company advanced along the road into Shusha from the city’s southwestern corner. This company faced the toughest challenge since the Armenians expected the main advance into the city to come along this road. The company encountered several fortified Armenian positions within the hillside, and it took all morning to eliminate them. When the company was finally ready to advance into the city at noon, it met additional Armenian forces that were trying to flee out of the city in what became a meeting engagement for the two opposing forces.

The two SOF companies in the middle did not have such a particularly difficult target, but their advance was not easy as they faced small pockets of Armenian forces supported by tanks, BMPs, and artillery. They deployed into many small elements in an attempt to put as much pressure on the Armenian defenders as possible. At the same time, the four special forces teams continued to engage Armenian defenders from their positions.

The thick fog added to the chaos of the urban fight. Not only did it prevent aircraft and UAVs from supporting the operation, but it also forced troops into extremely close engagements as visibility was limited to only a few dozen meters or less in many parts of the city. At times close-quarters combat ensued. One French journalist located in Khankendi reported seeing many Armenian soldiers that had been evacuated there with pistol and other wounds that were indicative of “hand-to-hand combat.”

Armenian elements attempting to defend the city felt that the fighting had descended into complete chaos as Azerbaijani forces seemed to be attacking from every direction. Armenian artillery units, including 2S1 Gvozdika crews, were repeatedly repositioned with unclear orders during the Azerbaijani assault. In one soldier’s account, entire Armenian infantry elements retreated along roads even as artillery crews were being moved forward. This operational confusion, coupled with heavy missile strikes, created panic in the ranks and led to uncontrolled withdrawals from areas in and around Shusha.

During the day, the Azerbaijani soldiers at the blocking position along the Lachin Road had to hold off two separate counterattacks, each much larger than the force they had engaged the previous day. In the morning a force estimated to be 150–200 in strength moved along the road and the wooded terrain south of it. They appeared to be Ministry of Internal Affairs troops and possibly cadets from the Armenian Land Forces or Ministry of Internal Affairs, indicating that Armenia was running out of combat power. With the help of the Azerbaijani motorized rifle brigade on the ridge to its south, the blocking position was able to turn back the force.

That afternoon, the Armenian force returned with two tanks and artillery and mortar support. Lacking significantly sized antitank weapons, the Azerbaijani rocket-propelled grenades were ineffective against the tanks and the blocking position suffered significant casualties—eight killed and eleven wounded—mostly due to tank, artillery, and mortar fire. Nonetheless, with the help of the motorized rifle forces and artillery, the blocking position was able to hold and forced the Armenians to retreat a final time.

At the end of a heavy day of fighting, the SOF companies had secured approximately half of the city.

On the morning of November 7, soldiers on both sides woke, if they slept at all, to a drizzling rain that would last much of the day. This put the attacking Azerbaijani soldiers at a significant disadvantage. The SOF soldiers within the city had exhausted their limited supply of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) the previous day. Just to reach their assault positions, the soldiers had had to navigate close to ten kilometers of mountainous, wooded terrain carrying everything they needed for the battle on their backs. As such, they carried only a limited number of ATGMs, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and mortar rounds. These weapon systems constituted the extent of their organic combined arms capability within the city. Thus, they were heavily reliant on the UAVs to support their urban operations. With the weather grounding this important asset, they were left with little more than small arms, crew-served weapons, and their very limited number of lightweight mortars. They could still employ artillery, but they were hesitant to use it due to their desire to minimize collateral damage to the culturally significant city.

Nonetheless, the SOF companies continued their slow advance. The street-to-street fighting continued as small groups of Armenian infantry, at times supported by a single tank or infantry fighting vehicle, continued to resist. Around noon that day, the SOF companies finally received a resupply that included the critically needed ATGMs—and not a moment too soon, as they needed to repel Armenian counterattacks from Khankendi. At 1:35 p.m., after capturing the “Shusha city administration building” (quotation marks – Caliber.Az), SOF soldiers lowered the “Republic of Artsakh flag” (quotation marks – Caliber.Az) and raised the Azerbaijan flag. By the end of the day, the SOF companies had secured much of the city, though several pockets of resistance remained, including a sizeable element defending the road into the city from Lachin and Dashalti.

The SOF attackers had to quickly transition to defenders when they had to repel three major counterattacks from Khankendi over the course of the battle. At 7:00 p.m., more than an hour after sunset, Armenian ground forces launched a massive counterattack from Khankendi consisting of up to one thousand soldiers. Defending from a blocking position along the Shusha-Khankendi road and from fighting positions along the fortress’s walls, the prison’s walls, and other buildings, the SOF soldiers—with artillery support—defeated the counterattack, killing and wounding many and forcing the rest to flee. While this constituted Armenia’s last-ditch effort to hold the city, it was not their last effort to inflict harm on the attacking force.

Starting around 8:00 a.m. on November 8, Azerbaijani soldiers reported that Armenian forces conducted a massive, hour-long artillery barrage into Shusha. The Armenian forces had used artillery for targeted strikes throughout the battle as the Azerbaijanis had, but this one was different in terms of its intensity, duration, and what appeared to be less discriminate targeting. The artillery strikes reportedly included two large missiles fired from Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems. The Azerbaijani attackers hunkered down in buildings during the barrage, commencing clearing operations after it ended.

In the final days of the battle, confusion and disorganization were widespread in the Armenian defense. According to one soldier, after an intense artillery barrage units were moving without clear orders, some retreating while others were caught in missile strikes with no visibility of the enemy. The soldier described sheltering beneath a tank in fear that it might roll over him, illustrating the tactical chaos as discipline broke down within the defensive lines.

On the afternoon of November 8, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev announced the liberation of Shusha and congratulated the “people of Azerbaijan” for the “glorious victory.” While Armenian officials initially denied this claim, the following day Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed the Russian-brokered trilateral ceasefire agreement that took effect at midnight on November 10. The deal included the surrender of all territories in Karabakh that Azerbaijani forces had liberated during the conflict, including Shusha.

Lessons learned

At the strategic level, the first lesson from the Battle of Shusha is that even small urban areas can hold outsized tactical, operational, and strategic importance. Shusha had a population of only 4,064 residents, but its location along the Lachin Corridor made it a key node for sustaining Armenian forces in Karabakh. Its capture severed that lifeline and helped bring the war to a close. Just as important, Shusha carried symbolic and therefore outsized cultural and political weight for Azerbaijan. In modern conflict, such cities often become decisive not because of their size but because of what they represent.

Another strategic lesson is that wars are often won or lost not only through firepower and maneuver, but through leadership, cohesion, and will. The collapse of Armenian defenses in Shusha was not due solely to tactical setbacks, but to deeper failures in command and control. Multiple battalions refused to reinforce key terrain and artillery units operated under vague or conflicting orders. These breakdowns at both senior and junior levels, combined with insufficient preparation for urban and mountain warfare, eroded Armenian resistance from within. 

One operational lesson is the importance of task-organizing SOF and conventional forces into integrated formations. This was also evident in the Battle of Hadrut. Azerbaijan’s SOF were highly trained and well prepared for urban operations, but they lacked the firepower and mass for sustained offensive action. The attached mechanized and motorized rifle brigades provided that firepower, but the conventional forces consisted largely of conscripts with limited tactical proficiency. SOF soldiers had the skill and endurance to make the demanding climb up the plateau and attack the city from an unexpected direction, but they could not secure flanks, repel large counterattacks, or fix enemy units on their own. Conventional forces were critical in isolating Dashalti and drawing Armenian units into engagements at Muxtar and Shushakend. This integration of precision and professionalism with mass and mobility proved decisive in the battle for Shusha.

A second operational lesson is that UAVs are not yet reliable in all weather conditions, and military operations should not be planned with the assumption that they will always be available. Much has been made of the role that UAVs played in Azerbaijan’s success in the war, but for much of the Battle of Shusha—a seminal battle of the war—they were grounded due to heavy fog. 

A third operational lesson is the need for a sufficient portion of a military to be proficient in urban operations. Azerbaijan began training its SOF for urban warfare as early as 2014 and built mock urban terrain sites to support that training. Their ability to navigate complex ground, coordinate UAV and indirect fire, and execute small-unit flanking maneuvers reflected years of deliberate preparation. Armenian forces, by contrast, assumed that combat would remain contained along the line of contact and did not train or equip their units for an urban defense. When the fighting shifted into cities like Hadrut and Shusha, they were unprepared both mentally and materially to defend them.

A fourth operational lesson is the need for a sufficient portion of the military to be proficient in mountain warfare. Azerbaijan’s SOF were highly trained for this environment. One officer described having conducted mountain warfare training in Turkey, Pakistan, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany prior to the war. It is difficult to overstate the physical demands of moving nearly ten kilometers through mountainous terrain while carrying around ninety pounds of combat equipment. To reach the Shusha plateau, Azerbaijani SOF had to climb more than four hundred meters of steep terrain. 

Another tactical lesson is the vital role of sustainment in urban combat. Azerbaijani SOF entered Shusha carrying only what they could on their backs. After a day of intense fighting, they required resupply to continue the offensive. That resupply, delivered despite weather and terrain, enabled them to maintain pressure, complete the clearance of the city, and repel counterattacks. Armenian forces, by contrast, suffered from confusion and inadequate sustainment. Some units moved without clear orders, while others were exposed during disorganized withdrawals. At the tactical level, the Battle of Shusha revealed a series of compounding Armenian failures and corresponding Azerbaijani strengths that shaped the outcome of the fight inside the city.

A final tactical lesson is the necessity of being prepared to defend urban terrain immediately after seizing it. Urban battles are rarely linear. Gains made by assault forces are almost always followed by enemy counterattacks aimed at retaking key ground. In Shusha, Azerbaijani SOF not only had to clear the city but also had to defend it against multiple counterattacks, including one involving up to one thousand Armenian soldiers. If Azerbaijani units had failed to consolidate their positions and rapidly transition into a hasty defense, those counterattacks could have undone their gains and turned victory into defeat. The ability to move seamlessly from offense to defense and to occupy strongpoints, organize fires, and establish blocking positions was decisive in preserving the territorial gains of each day’s fighting. This principle applies broadly: Every urban operation must be planned and executed with the expectation that newly seized terrain will need to be held under immediate and potentially overwhelming pressure.

Conclusion

The Battle of Shusha stands as a defining example of how modern urban warfare can determine the outcome of a larger campaign. Though small in population, Shusha’s location and symbolism elevated its strategic value. Once Azerbaijani forces seized control of the city, it was clear the war was over. Within twenty-four hours of losing Shusha, Armenia agreed to end the conflict on terms favorable to Azerbaijan. On November 10, Russia brokered a ceasefire that brought the war to an end. Azerbaijan had liberated approximately 80 percent of the territories it had lost during the First Karabakh War.

The battle revealed that tactical initiative, preparation, and adaptability often outweigh numbers. Azerbaijan’s use of highly trained SOF, coordinated with conventional units and supported by the selective use of artillery and UAVs, proved critical. Azerbaijani forces’ ability to exploit terrain, move undetected, and sustain forces in a difficult urban and mountainous environment allowed them to overcome a numerically comparable but far less prepared Armenian defense. At the same time, Armenian failures in urban preparation, command cohesion, and defensive planning led to a rapid collapse in combat effectiveness.

Shusha also highlights enduring truths of urban warfare. Cities remain politically, culturally, and operationally decisive. They are often key terrain and symbolically important. Even when militaries invest in advanced technologies, success or failure in cities will continue to depend on leadership, training, and the will to fight. The lessons of Shusha, especially those related to force integration, sustainment, and terrain exploitation, should inform future force design and preparation for combat in complex urban environments.