Diamonds, microchips and guns: Armenia’s mythical divorce from Russia Article by EU Today

The British outlet EU Today has featured an article by political analyst and editor Gary Cartwright, highlighting Armenia's deceptive actions. In the piece, which we present to Caliber.Az readers, Cartwright suggests that if nations were to compete in a contest of deceit, Armenia would be a strong contender for the top spot. He criticizes the Western media's extensive coverage of Yerevan's so-called "divorce" from Moscow, despite clear evidence that this narrative is nothing more than a façade.

Last week’s episode in the year-long soap opera was very dramatic. The Investigative Committee of the Republic of Armenia claimed that Moscow paid and trained a “ring of insurgents” to overthrow Yerevan’s “pro-Western government” headed by Nikol Pashinyan.

According to the officials, as Politico quotes, “six Armenians were recruited to undergo three months of training in Russia and were paid monthly salaries of $2,377 while learning how to use weaponry”.

Altogether seven people would be charged in Armenia with “preparing to usurp power … using violence and the threat of violence to take over the powers of government.”

Possibly these 7 guys with 3 months of training were some kind of Avenger level super-humans to be able to overthrow the government of a country?

There are over 3500 Russian soldiers stationed at two Russian military bases in Armenia. They monitor the borders of the country.

If 7 can overthrow a government what can 3500 do? Take over the solar system?

But why Moscow should conspire to overthrow Pashinyan’s government? Is he really that pro-Western?

Armenia does not intend to break off relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or with Russia, but the country faces the task of diversifying its economy, Pashinyan stated last week. “Yes, we have increased our trade turnover with the EAEU; we want to increase it with the EU,” the head of government said. Economic diversification is a process in which the Armenian authorities “work with both the European Union and the United States”, he said, adding that Armenia will not miss the chance to become a member of the EU when there is a “more or less real opportunity to join.”

Is this bad for Russia? Is this the much-touted “divorce”?

Let’s see…

Armenia will participate in both the BRICS summit and the unofficial summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which will be held in Russia. Prime Minister Pashinyan will represent Armenia at both events.

This is the same Pashinyan who, on August 31st, stated that “Armenia has no issues regarding the Russian military base in the country.” During a press conference, he was asked whether there is a timeline for Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO military bloc and what the future holds for the 102nd Russian military base in Armenia.

He responded, “I cannot specify a date or time for leaving the CSTO, and regarding the military base, we have no issues at present, so I cannot comment on that either.”

Pashinyan also mentioned that Armenian border guards are now fully responsible for operations at Zvartnots Airport, where Russian FSB-controlled border guards had been stationed for decades.

However, he did not state that Russian forces are leaving Armenia. Despite the talk of distancing from Russia, these units will continue to serve on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran.

Will Russia lose anything due to the increased trade between Armenia and the EU?

In 2022, amid large-scale Western sanctions against Russia, trade turnover between the Russian Federation and Armenia nearly doubled, reaching $5.3 billion.

Armenian exports to Russia almost tripled, growing from $850 million in 2021 to $2.4 billion in 2022 (with imports totaling $2.87 billion). In 2023, Armenian exports to Russia increased by another 38.8%, reaching approximately $3.419 billion.

In the first half of 2024, trade turnover between Armenia and Russia increased 2.6-fold, reaching $8.4 billion. Armenia’s imports from EU countries also saw a significant rise, growing from 757 million euros in 2021 to 1.9 billion euros in 2022, a 149% increase.

The total trade turnover between Armenia and the EU rose from 1.214 billion to 2.487 billion euros during the same period.

Armenia’s limited industrial capacity to quickly scale up production and exports to other countries lends credibility to the widespread belief among foreign experts that Armenia may be involved in re-exporting goods to Russia.

According to The New York Times, Armenian imports of electronic components, including eight highly sensitive categories of semiconductor chips, surged following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Citing data from the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, the report noted that between 2021 and 2022, Armenia’s imports of chips and microprocessors from the U.S. increased by 515%, while imports from the EU rose by 212%. Remarkably, 97% of these products were ultimately sent to Russia, where they were used for military purposes.

The British “Telegraph” mentioned an investigation by the Berlin-based think tank, “German Centre for the South Caucasus”, which found that exports from Germany to Armenia surged from €178 million to €505 million in 2022.

The article noted, “That’s from just one EU country. Exports from Armenia to the EU during the same twelve months doubled from €753 million to €1.3 billion. With a population of barely three million and a GDP per capita less than a tenth of the average Briton, these figures seem implausible, yet they are real.”

The article further explained that imports to and exports from Russia are being “near-seamlessly diverted to the outside world via satellite states.” It went on to say, “Britain must also use its diplomatic influence, which rivals that of any country in Europe, to apply both carrot and stick to countries such as Armenia.”

It also highlighted that, in early March, two American citizens were arrested for bypassing U.S. sanctions by selling advanced aviation equipment to Russia through third-party countries, including Armenia.

“As supplies through Turkey and Central Asia become increasingly scarce, Russia is boosting parallel imports via Armenia. Between January and March, trade between the two countries grew by 2.4 times,” reported the Polish news outlet Salon24.

This growth comes despite Armenian exports to Russia already being valued at $2.4 billion in 2022, a 185.7% increase compared to 2021.

The outlet also noted that, as early as March 2nd, a Trilateral Memo from the U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and Treasury Department identifiedArmenia as one of the “trans-shipment points commonly used for the illegal shipment of (sanctioned) restricted goods to Russia and Belarus.”

As reported by EU Reporter, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Armenia-based companies that are part of a transnational network supplying technology to support Russia’s military-industrial complex.

One such company, Milur Electronics LLC, an affiliate of the Russian firm Milandr, was established to place orders with foreign factories for integrated microchip production and manage overseas sales.

Milur Electronics has been used as a front company for Milandr to conduct business with foreign partners. Another Armenian company, Taco LLC, which deals in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts, was sanctioned for supporting the Russian company Radioavtomatika.

Taco was responsible for importing components and managing the procurement process for Radioavtomatika within Armenia.

The Guardian reported that various types of Iranian drones reached Russia via boats and an Iranian state-owned airline. According to a Polish-based NGO think tank, Armenia played a key role in these deliveries by allowing Iranian cargo planes to land at its airports before continuing on to deliver weapons to Russian forces in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, The Financial Times provided evidence that over $1 billion worth of EU exports targeted by sanctions have vanished in transit to Russia’s economic partners—a “ghost trade” that Western officials believe has helped sustain Vladimir Putin’s wartime economy. This trade network includes Armenia among its participants.

Two months ago, Germany’s DW conducted an investigation into the unusual surge in Armenia’s diamond and gold exports.

Since the start of 2024, the 12th package of EU sanctions has imposed a complete ban on the direct import of non-industrial natural and synthetic diamonds, as well as diamond jewelry, from Russia to the EU.

On March 1st, the European Union introduced a partial embargo on Russian diamonds processed in third countries, and on September 1st, the full ban came into effect.

DW reports that Armenia is exporting gold under the guise of Armenian origin, despite never having produced this metal in such large quantities.

In 2023, official statistics show that Armenia exported $1.8 billion worth of gold and $589 million worth of diamonds. Since the beginning of 2024, Armenia has already exported $2.5 billion worth of gold and nearly $200 million worth of diamonds, with the processing of precious raw materials increasing by 31%.

Lastly, regarding weaponry: it has been revealed that Moscow has begun large-scale deliveries of arms to Armenia, specifically missiles for the “Smerch” multiple launch rocket system (MLRS).

These shipments are intensifying regional tensions, prompting neighboring states, especially Azerbaijan, to closely monitor developments. And these shipments may harm the chances of reaching a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

It is obvious that Moscow and Yerevan are trying to sell their “divorce” to the West, hoping to increase Armenia’s ability to circumvent sanctions. The question is, why is the West buying it?