Exhausted by the time pressure Is Pashinyan delaying peace?

No sooner had the media and expert circles begun to dissect the full text of the peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan than the Armenian armed forces opened fire on Azerbaijani army positions along the conditional border. This incident occurred on March 16, and since then, Armenian provocations have continued unabated. Once again, the question arises: who orchestrated these border provocations—the ruling team or other forces, including external actors?

On one hand, such a move benefits Pashinyan himself. We have repeatedly written that his main goal is to remain in power for as long as possible. Even his bold and audacious effort to dismantle the old nationalist ideology and shape a new one—the concept of a "real Armenia"—is not so much rooted in sincere personal convictions (if he has any) as it is in the realization that without normalising relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, Armenia faces stagnation and depopulation in the medium term. Added to this is Pashinyan’s pride—he wants to go down in history as a breaker of foundations, especially since he failed to do so as a defender of "miatsum" (unification).

At the same time, Pashinyan must reckon with the revanchist sentiments of part of his electorate. Thus, whenever he takes a step towards Azerbaijan, he typically panics and seeks to compensate for it with an action or statement of a revanchist nature. It is quite possible that the latest provocation was orchestrated precisely to slow down the peace process in favour of the revanchists.

It may seem that the provocation was not carried out under Pashinyan’s instructions but rather against him—by elements within the Armenian armed forces influenced by revanchist ideas and aligned with the opposition or even with Paris, which is strongly opposed to peace between Baku and Yerevan. However, I find this unlikely. Firstly, for the reasons mentioned above, and secondly, because Pashinyan has successfully purged the top ranks of the Armenian military, replacing them with loyal figures. Under such circumstances, the likelihood of third-party interference is minimal. That being said, even if external forces were behind the provocations, their interests in this context fully align with Pashinyan’s.

Regardless of the circumstances and despite the border provocations, the progress in the peace process should be viewed positively. Let’s recall that for nearly three months after President Ilham Aliyev publicly outlined Baku’s final two conditions for the agreement, Yerevan attempted to resist their acceptance—until it seemingly realised the futility of such an approach.

However, it is important to remember that agreeing on the final points of the agreement alone does not yet create a solid foundation for a comprehensive peace. Baku has repeatedly stated that Yerevan must meet two more conditions: amending its Constitution to remove territorial claims against Azerbaijan and consenting to the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. These two steps, both legally and symbolically, would signify the Armenian state and society’s formal renunciation of claims against Azerbaijan.

At the same time, it is essential to understand that these steps are the most challenging for Armenia’s current leadership in terms of maintaining the social contract. In this regard, it seems logical that Pashinyan will not call a constitutional referendum before securing (if he does) victory in the elections—meaning not before 2026.

Thus, the border provocations can be classified as an attempt to delay the peace process until the constitutional referendum takes place. In this context, they do not pose a significant threat to the peace process. However, the situation could change if Pashinyan and his team—driven by the need to boost their ratings on one hand and external influences on the other—decide to embark on a "small blitzkrieg" against Azerbaijan. As we have previously noted, this scenario remains quite likely.

That said, such a move would carry even greater risks for Pashinyan. This time, the complete defeat of the Armenian army would undoubtedly come at a heavy cost for him. The question remains: does he have a way out of the time pressure he has trapped himself in?