Russian attempt of scaring West with "dirty bomb" continues ISW assess Russia's willingness to hold negotiations

Russia’s intention of entering serious negotiations with Ukraine likely does not reflect the personal conviction of President Vladimir Putin. Instead, it could be part of a plan by those inside the Kremlin who have lost the internal argument with him to persuade the West and Ukraine to offer concessions in hopes of bringing him around to their point of view.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) published its newest report on October 24 on the recent developments of the military conflict in Ukraine.

The report states that Kremlin officials have begun advocating for negotiations with Ukraine to their Western counterparts, while the Russian military-political command is parallelly plotting missile strikes to scare Kyiv into negotiations.

The ISW refers to the calls by Russian commanders to western military leaders and the press statements of Russia’s Military of Defence regarding Ukraine’s alleged preparation of using a "dirty bomb" as an information operation. For a second day in a row, the Kremlin intensified its accusation of Ukraine about to conduct a false-flag attack.

The American analytical military publication still stands behind its assessment of an imminent false-flag dirty bomb attack by Russia to be unlikely.

The report also recorded a slowing down of Russian forces' air, missile, and drone strikes against targets in Ukraine than in the previous days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 24 that Russian forces conducted 2 missile and 28 air strikes, while Ukrainian forces shot down 16 Iranian Shahed-136 drones on October 23. Analysts argue that the decreased tempo possibly reflects decreasing missile and drone stockpiles and the strikes’ limited effectiveness of accomplishing Russian strategic military goals.

Ukrainian Major General Kyrylo Budanov told the ISW, that Kremlin elites largely did not support Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian districts prior to securing those territories, prompting many officials to contact their Western counterparts to express their disinterest in continuing the war in Ukraine. He further stated that Russian forces have begun a partial withdrawal from northwestern Kherson Oblast even while preparing to defend Kherson City. They have not launched into a full withdrawal from the city or the oblast.

The latest report of the ISW provides their forecast on the battle of Kherson, reporting that Ukrainian forces will likely capture the upper Kherson Oblast by the end of 2022.

They conclude their most recent report with the following key takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts on September 30 ignited a schism within the Kremlin, which will likely intensify as Ukraine liberates more territories according to Budanov
• Putin's War financier Prigozhin continues to accrue power and is setting up a military structure parallel to the Russian Armed Forces, which may come to pose a threat to Putin’s rule – at least within the information space
• Russian forces are likely preparing to defend Kherson City and are not fully withdrawing from upper Kherson Oblast despite previous confirmed reports of some Russian elements withdrawing from upper Kherson Oblast
• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured Karmazynivka, Miasozharivka, and Nevske in Luhansk Oblast and Novosadove in Donetsk Oblast
• Kursk Oblast Govenor Roman Starovoit announced the completion of the construction of two reinforced defence lines on the border with Ukraine on October 23 — likely an act of security theater designed to target a domestic Russian audience since there is no danger whatsoever of a Ukrainian mechanized invasion of Russia
• Prigozhin acknowledged the slow pace of his Wagner Group ground operations around Bakhmut as Russian forces continued to lose ground near the city
• Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian force concentrations near the Zaporizhia Oblast front line on October 23–24 and struck a Russian force and equipment concentration in the vicinity of Enerhodar on October 22
• Hurried Russian mobilization efforts to fix personnel shortages on the front lines have cannibalized the Russian force-generation staff and diminished Russia’s ability to effectively train and deploy new personnel and to staff domestic industries
• Occupation administration officials have taken down communications systems in Kherson City in an attempt to limit civilian reporting on Russian positions to Ukrainian forces ahead of anticipated Ukrainian advances