Israel’s Caspian corridor: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan at forefront of diplomatic strategy Article by BESA

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) has released an article examining the growing scope of Israel’s influence across Central Asia and the Caspian region. Caliber.Az presents readers with the most insightful excerpts from the piece.

Since gaining independence, the Central Asian states have maintained a position of neutrality toward Israel. Following Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords on 6 November 2025, Israel may find itself presented with an opportunity to significantly expand its diplomatic presence in both Central Asia and the Caspian Basin.

Israel’s diplomatic activity on the Kazakhstan track

On 10 January 2026, at Israel’s initiative, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a telephone conversation with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan. During the exchange, the two leaders reaffirmed the steady and long-term development of bilateral cooperation and discussed further ways to deepen engagement across a broad range of issues on the bilateral agenda. A central subject of discussion was Kazakhstan’s decision in 2025 to join the Abraham Accords.

Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords makes it the first Central Asian state to join the initiative and extends the geographical scope of the framework beyond the Middle East and North Africa. This significantly enhances Astana’s value for Israel—not only as a partner in bilateral economic projects but also as a key participant in multilateral peace initiatives.

Gideon Sa’ar plans to visit Kazakhstan immediately after his official visit to Azerbaijan on 26 January 2026. The preparation for this visit has been underway since November 2025, when — in the context of Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords — the foreign ministers of the two countries discussed prospects for cooperation in technology, water and agriculture, as well as the establishment of direct air transport links.

Strengthening traditional ties with Azerbaijan

The forthcoming expansion of the Israeli–Kazakh dialogue will unfold against the background of the further consolidation of the Israeli–Azerbaijani partnership.

Azerbaijan is of strategic importance to Israel at present for several reasons:

Israel has become a key supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan occupies a unique position in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Basin as a transit corridor for the Central Asian states — and even for parts of East Asia — bypassing both Iran and Russia.

After its victory in the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s regional role in the South Caucasus increased substantially — to the point where assessments began to describe Baku as a potential new regional hegemon.

Finally, recent years have witnessed an expansion of economic cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, particularly in technology, energy, and tourism.

Let’s analyze Israel’s relations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in a broader diplomatic context. It is clear that the degree of proximity between Israel and these two states is not the same. With Azerbaijan, Israel has developed close military, strategic, intelligence, and economic ties. With Kazakhstan, the relationship remains a form of “soft cooperation,” centered on multilateral diplomacy and economic engagement.

Cooperation with Azerbaijan gives Israel an avenue for deeper participation in Caspian projects and for expanding its soft economic presence in Central Asia. At the same time, Kazakhstan — as the most economically developed country in the region and the source of more than half of Central Asia’s GDP — may serve as a key intermediary target for such gradual penetration. Israel and Kazakhstan have significant room for developing their economic partnership. Moreover, the evolution of this partnership may function as a positive precedent for other Central Asian states, all of which maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Turkic states of Central Asia are likely to take a cautiously positive view of the deepening partnership between their neighbors and Israel. In this context, Kazakhstan’s policy could become a useful precedent. Should Astana’s cautious engagement with Israel prove beneficial, other Central Asian states may eventually line up to explore cooperation with Israel in a similar manner and within comparable formats.

Most positive scenario

If the scenario described above materializes, the question arises as to where Israel’s diplomacy could move next in its relations with the Central Asian region. One plausible direction would be for Israel to adopt, at a later stage, a version of the “Central Asia 5+1” mechanism currently independently employed by the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and India.

The “core” regional format independent of external actors remains the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, often referred to as the “Central Asian Five.” A significant development in 2025—largely overlooked outside the post-Soviet space—was the expansion of this format from a five-party to a six-party framework. At the Consultative Meeting held in Tashkent in November 2025, Azerbaijan officially joined the format, thereby transforming the informal “Central Asian Five” into a regional “Six”.

In this sense, the traditional 5+1 format is becoming insufficient not only for regional actors but also for external partners. The emerging reality suggests that a 6+1 framework is already more relevant. For Israel, such a configuration would be particularly advantageous, as it simultaneously includes two key states with which Jerusalem has developed strong, sustainable relations: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

By Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman, Political analyst, research fellow at BESA