How US aid cuts provided boost to Chinese, Russian food diplomacy

When the Trump administration froze nearly all US foreign aid in January 2025, the effects were felt almost immediately across Africa. Within weeks, thousands of emergency communal kitchens shut down, and famine conditions that had previously been contained rapidly escalated into full-blown crises.

As American assistance receded, Russian grain shipments began arriving in African ports, while Chinese agricultural delegations expanded their presence across the continent. Decisions taken in Washington not only marked the end of nearly seven decades of US dominance in humanitarian food assistance, but also opened the door for the rise of two powers offering fundamentally different models of food support.

The United States relinquished its role as the world’s default responder to hunger crises for the first time since World War II, according to an analysis published by War on the Rocks. China and Russia have since moved to fill the gap, replacing emergency relief with systems designed to foster long-term dependence. The outlet argues that understanding how these competing approaches function—and what they ultimately cost recipient nations—will determine which countries maintain food sovereignty and which become client states in what it describes as a new era of agricultural colonialism.

The impact of the aid freeze was especially severe in countries such as Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Humanitarian infrastructure that had taken years to build collapsed almost overnight. Aid organizations were suddenly unable to pay staff, transport food, or maintain distribution networks, leaving millions vulnerable.

Helping hand with strings attached

While US food aid has always involved political considerations, it generally maintained at least a nominal commitment to needs-based assistance. The analysis points to the example of North Korea, a long-standing adversary of Washington, which nonetheless received American grain shipments during the famine of the 1990s. In contrast, the author argues that China and Russia are now seeking to replace that system with food assistance explicitly aligned with each country's respective foreign policy objectives.

European countries remain important donors, but the article notes that they lack the scale and coordination required to replace US capacity. In recent months, many European governments have also reduced aid budgets as they prioritize increased military spending, hence why they are not seriously viewed as a force that could step in to fill the newly created void.

Russia’s strategy, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, illustrates how food can be wielded as geopolitical leverage. Moscow has embraced what the article calls “grain diplomacy,” using agricultural exports to reward allies and pressure adversaries. 

In early 2025, Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev announced the delivery of 200,000 metric tons of free grain to six African countries: Somalia, the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea. As the author notes, the timing of these shipments coincided with Russia’s expanding security footprint in the Sahel, where troops have deployed as part of the Africa Corps. 

In the Central African Republic, authorities are reportedly seeking to host a Russian military base in exchange for weapons and training. According to the analysis, Moscow gains access to natural resources, diplomatic support in international forums, and military positions that complicate Western influence.

China, by contrast, has pursued a longer-term strategy centered on agricultural cooperation and trade integration. In October 2025, the China-Africa Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Alliance met in Addis Ababa, bringing together more than 200 scientists and policymakers to focus on technology transfer and climate-resilient crops. Beijing also announced a zero-tariff policy covering all tariff items for 53 African countries, significantly expanding their access to Chinese markets.

Unlike Russia’s finite grain shipments, China’s engagement emphasizes permanent infrastructure. Through demonstration zones, agricultural technology centers, and training programs, Beijing embeds Chinese expertise deeply within local farming systems. The article notes that once seed varieties, irrigation systems, and agricultural education are aligned with Chinese standards, shifting to alternative partners becomes costly and difficult.

War on the Rocks concludes that China’s approach represents a more sophisticated form of dependence than Russia’s transactional model. While African countries often see real gains in productivity and growth, they also enter asymmetrical relationships in which China controls key technologies, financing mechanisms, and market access—dependencies that can ultimately constrain policy choices on issues important to Beijing.

By Nazrin Sadigova