“Do you want me to be killed?” — Pashinyan’s question and Aliyev’s response Azerbaijani FM shares sensational details

A new episode of İTV’s program "Təmas Xətti" ("Line of Contact") featured Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, who provided an in-depth account of key episodes, behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations, and significant developments that unfolded before and during the 44-day Patriotic War.

At the beginning of the interview, Bayramov spoke about the start of his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs. It should be recalled that this was in July 2020, a period marked by clashes in the Tovuz direction.

“To grasp the overall picture — the tension reigned, the disappointment caused by the behaviour of Armenia and its leadership, and the reasons behind all this — one probably needs to make a brief excursion into the background. Because all of this is part of a single process. The negotiations lasted a long time, and I believe that at a certain stage of those talks, the likelihood of achieving real results with the former Armenian leaders was practically zero. The coming to power of Nikol Pashinyan in 2018 gave rise to certain hopes. He was a new person, not part of the old team. Unlike the former war criminals, he was not someone whose hands were stained with the blood of Azerbaijanis. In May, Nikol Pashinyan came to power, and the first contact between the President and Pashinyan took place on September 28, 2018, in Dushanbe — at the CIS Heads of State and Government Summit. There, an unplanned, informal meeting took place, lasting more than an hour.”

“A question may arise: ‘You weren’t a minister at the time — how do you know this?’ But as I said, all these events are parts of the same chain. I have repeatedly witnessed discussions on this topic — both during internal deliberations and at the President’s open and closed meetings with foreign delegations. In those meetings, he spoke in detail about the reasons behind the situation and the steps taken by the Azerbaijani side,” Bayramov said.

The question may arise: “You weren't a minister at the time, so how do you know this?” But, as I said, all of this is part of a chain of events. And I have repeatedly witnessed discussions on this topic, both during internal discussions and at open and closed meetings between the president and foreign delegations. There, he spoke in detail about the reasons for the current situation and the steps taken by the Azerbaijani side," said Bayramov.

“The foreign minister noted that President Aliyev genuinely presented this as an opportunity and showed a willingness to take all necessary steps. During that meeting, the President addressed Pashinyan directly: ‘We must resolve this issue. It cannot go on like this forever — we will not accept it. You can discuss and negotiate everything here, but the occupied territories of Azerbaijan must be liberated.’

Pashinyan’s initial reaction, Bayramov said, was fairly constructive. ‘I’ve just come to power, it’s difficult for me, I need some time. I will take every step to resolve this issue. But I also have problems, including tension on the border, along the line of contact. There is a sniper war. Your army is very active. If you reduce that activity, it will help me a great deal.’

Bayramov added that, right there in Dushanbe, President Aliyev instructed the Ministry of Defence to ensure complete calm and stability in all directions — and even if the opposite side violated the ceasefire, to refrain from immediate retaliation.”

“An agreement was reached with Nikol Pashinyan to establish a ‘hotline’ between the two countries. On the Armenian side, the head of the National Security Service, Artur Vanetsyan, was appointed to oversee it, while on the Azerbaijani side, it was the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Orkhan Sultanov. The hotline was set up in 2018, and whenever ceasefire violations occurred, the two sides would intervene immediately to de-escalate tensions.Even Nikol Pashinyan himself acknowledged that this was the most stable and peaceful period along the border — a development that inspired a certain degree of hope.”

Furthermore, Bayramov recalled that on March 29, 2019 — about six months after their first meeting — the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia met again in Vienna under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co‑chairs. At that meeting, Nikol Pashinyan began to change his tone and stance. He openly stated that he could not and would not resolve the Karabakh issue, even arguing that if he tried, he would be killed. He then asked President Aliyev a rhetorical question: ‘Do you want me to be killed?’ President Aliyev replied that he did not want anyone to be killed, but that this could not in any way mean that Azerbaijani territory would remain under occupation.

In 2018–2020, a fairly extensive document was prepared detailing the provocations carried out by Armenia’s military and political leadership. During the pre‑war period, in the days of the war itself, we shared this document with foreign diplomats and partners during our meetings. The Vienna meeting took place on 29 March, and the very next day, 30 March, the then Armenian Minister of Defence, Tonoyan, stated at a meeting with the Armenian diaspora in the United States: ‘A new war, new territories.’ This reflected a negotiation approach in which Armenia was unwilling to cede any territory in exchange for status or other concessions.

On August 5, 2019, in Khankendi, Nikol Pashinyan utters and puts into circulation the phrase “Karabakh is Armenia, period.” From the 6th to the 17th, all-Armenian games are held in Karabakh for the first time in history, and the Prime Minister participates — at the opening and in other events. This marked the crossing of yet another red line. On July 10, 2020, a new concept of Armenia’s national security was published, in which the consolidation of the results of the First Karabakh War was declared part of Armenia’s national security. Then, from July 12 to 16, 2020, provocations took place in the direction of Tovuz. Immediately after that, there was a demonstrative awarding of the servicemen who had participated in that provocation, including those involved in the killing of General Polad Gashimov. On July 23, the Prime Minister of Armenia puts forward seven additional conditions in the negotiation process. All seven of these additional conditions were unacceptable. I will, of course, note only one of them: if Azerbaijan even wants to discuss this issue, it must negotiate not with Armenia, but with the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh.” What does this mean? It means the destruction of a long-standing negotiation process. Tension was in the air. It was clear that it was only a matter of time. All other methods had been exhausted,” said Bayramov.

 Next, the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke about the pressure on Azerbaijani diplomacy during the days of the Patriotic War.

“If we take this 44-day period as a single segment, it was a dynamic process. In the first days, the pressure and appeals were relatively restrained. This was because, at the beginning, everyone thought it was just another violation of the ceasefire along the line of contact, and that the situation could be stabilized again within a few days. But as time went on, and especially as the successes of the Azerbaijani army grew, we witnessed a geometric increase in the involvement of various forces in this process and an intensification of diplomatic and political pressure on Azerbaijan. Of course, at that time there was an established system in place — the Minsk Group and the co-chairmanship institution. The main role was played by the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. For many years, Russia, the USA, and France held a monopoly over this process. That is why, on October 1, the heads of these three states issued a joint statement — calling for a ceasefire, stopping hostilities, and beginning negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group.”

After that, there were numerous attempts — telephone diplomacy, organizing meetings. Each of the co-chair countries made such an attempt and hosted these negotiations. These included the Moscow talks on October 9–10, the Washington talks on October 23–25, and on October 30 — the talks in Geneva, which were held at the permanent mission of France. We were given promises: “We understand that the situation is tense, we will act very actively, and everything will be resolved in a short time.” For some reason, it had been impossible to resolve this for 30 years, yet now we were being promised: “Stop, cease, negotiations will proceed in a completely different format.”

There were many risks because different countries and different leaders used different tactics. Some relied on diplomatic pressure: “This must be stopped immediately.” Others referred the issue to international organisations. Some leaders openly threatened over the phone. The President of France made numerous calls demanding, “You must stop immediately. If this does not happen, France will recognise Nagorno-Karabakh.” An immediate response came from our president: “You can do that, it will change nothing for us. Rest assured: all diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and France will be severed immediately.”

“During the 44-day Patriotic War and then from 2020 to 2023, there were numerous attempts to bring the issue to the UN Security Council, and the issue was indeed brought there. This was a very dangerous scenario. A completely new reality could have emerged. Therefore, one of the priorities of our diplomacy was to prevent this under any circumstances. At that time, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group played the main role, and all negotiations were held under their auspices. During this period, the co-chairs organised three rounds of negotiations, each with its own characteristics. In terms of tension, the meeting in Moscow probably stood out from the others. No matter how difficult it was, one eventually gets used to even a tough situation. And one also gets used to pressure, although the pressure continued to grow constantly,” said Bayramov.

He recalled that the first telephone conversation between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia took place on October 7.

“President [Ilham Aliyev] called himself. The reason was that October 7 is the birthday of the President of Russia. And for many years, there has been a tradition between the presidents: in December, President Putin always congratulates President Ilham Aliyev. After the first contact on October 7, a new conversation took place on the 8th, and of course, it was impossible not to touch on this issue. Apparently, President Putin, in order to separate these two topics, specifically called back on the 8th to discuss the matter itself. The Russian side persistently proposed holding negotiations and emphasised the importance of achieving a result. On October 8, when we were in Geneva, we were contacted from Baku and informed that the president wanted to talk and would provide instructions. During the phone conversation, the president said that an agreement had been reached — on October 9, a meeting in Moscow should take place to discuss this issue. And that we — I and the Deputy Minister — were to fly to these negotiations. Naturally, he gave us the corresponding instructions and assignments.”

When the negotiations began, an interesting point was that — now, five years later, I think some details can be revealed. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov presented a document to the parties. An initial draft of the document was proposed. We took the document and looked at it — it consisted of only a few points. The essence was that from 00:00 on the night of October 9–10, all military actions would cease. On the eastern part of the line of contact, Russian peacekeeping forces and the Azerbaijani army were to be deployed. On the western part of the line of contact, Armenian armed forces and, again, Russian peacekeepers were to be deployed. In other words, the proposed document already stipulated that as soon as the ceasefire is declared on the 9th, Russian peacekeepers would be deployed immediately on both sides — without any additional conditions, without the withdrawal of Armenian troops, and without the liberation of any territories.

“We had completely different instructions from the president. We acted based on our position and raised entirely different issues. We were ready to negotiate with Armenia: let the Armenian side present a schedule — when they plan to withdraw [their troops from the occupied territories]. In response, the Armenian side, Minister Mnatsakanyan, began to express dissatisfaction, saying that this should not be the case, and that Azerbaijan must return to the situation as of September 27, because supposedly they would not negotiate under pressure. Of course, responses to such statements were straightforward: they were reminded of who had actually occupied these territories,” said D. Bayramov.

According to him, between these two positions, Russia seemed to take a more “neutral” line: “No, you don’t need to withdraw, stay where you are, but the Russian peacekeepers must be deployed alongside you.” And, of course, there were other points: the exchange of prisoners of war, the return of the bodies of the fallen, and other issues.

“The negotiations lasted several hours, and there were no shifts in positions. The Russian side persistently maintained the same line. At a certain point, Lavrov used a tactic. He said: ‘You came from Geneva. Perhaps you are not fully aware of the latest developments. I am fully in control of the situation; I have all the records.’ In other words, our position was deemed insufficiently constructive, and the proposal was good. We replied: we have a concrete position. But we understand that we need to take a pause and receive additional instructions. They agreed. A break was announced, and a neighbouring room was offered for consultations so that we could contact Baku. We thanked them and said that our embassy was nearby; we would go there and return in an hour.”

We went to the embassy. An interesting point is that the Armenian delegation didn’t go anywhere; they stayed there, even though they had stated that they also needed to contact Yerevan. We arrived at the embassy and established contact with Baku — through special channels, of course. The president once again reiterated all his instructions, including which arguments to use — he listed everything. Then we returned to the negotiations. When we entered, all the Russian and foreign press were already waiting — waiting for the announcement of decisions.

 “Their initial expectation was that the ceasefire would be announced exactly at 00:00. But there was no progress. I should note: during the negotiations, President Putin called Lavrov several times. When Putin called, Lavrov would step out. When Defence Minister Shoigu called, he spoke directly from the same room, right next to us. The negotiations continued past midnight, and the calls continued. It became clear to everyone that we had a firm position, and we would not deviate from it. We proposed: if a result is not reached today — no problem. We will pause the negotiations and continue tomorrow. The issue is too serious; we are ready to negotiate as long as necessary. But for them, it was critically important to get a result on that very day,” said the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the same time, Bayramov emphasised an interesting point: while the Azerbaijani delegation was in Moscow, on October 9, news emerged about the liberation of Hadrut.

“The negotiations were already underway. At one point, Fariz Rzayev (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs — Ed.) came up to me and said — since I was leading the negotiations and couldn’t check my phone — that the president had addressed the people of Azerbaijan: Hadrut has been liberated. And roughly 10–15 minutes later, we noticed concern among the Armenian delegation. We saw confusion, and their disappointment became apparent. Naturally, this information had reached them as well. This was also one of the interesting moments of that day. We used it as an argument. Because when Mnatsakanyan began talking about the “5+2” formula and so on, we replied: look, the “5+2” formula no longer works. Because Jabrayil has been liberated, Hadrut has been liberated. He tried to act confidently and said that this still meant nothing, and that in the coming days we would hear completely different news. So he tried to use such arguments as well.

The negotiations were very tense, and ultimately, closer to morning, we reached a document. Many may have already forgotten this, but from the perspective of Azerbaijan’s interests, this was a document that fully satisfied us. First of all, the ceasefire was referred to only as a humanitarian truce. That is, it was not a full ceasefire. A humanitarian truce was for the exchange of prisoners of war and for the removal of bodies from the battlefield with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Second point: there was no mention of peacekeepers or the presence of any third party.

Here, Lavrov used an argument: ‘Okay, you say this, but how will it be ensured? How will the situation be controlled?’ The interesting point is that the president had told us in advance: if such an argument arises, you say — all the co-chairing countries are space powers, all have satellites, cameras, drones — they can already see everything and will be able to monitor who violates the regime. We used these very arguments. How effective it was exactly is another question, but it was one of the memorable details of the negotiations,” said Bayramov.

The head of the diplomatic service noted that, in parallel, the resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group was envisaged.

“And another very important point, which at the time was significant (today it no longer matters): the preservation of the unchanged negotiation format. This point was included at the insistence of the Azerbaijani side. Why? Because before the war, Armenia stated: if Azerbaijan wants to talk, let it talk to the separatists; we have nothing to do with it. And fixing the unchanged format meant that Armenia stepped back from this position and once again recognised itself as a party to the negotiations.

The negotiations continued until the morning, and an agreement was reached that the ceasefire would be announced at 12:00. As soon as the negotiations ended, we immediately flew to Baku. At 12 o’clock, as is known, the truce was announced. Not even half an hour passed before the truce was violated — hostilities continued. About 13 hours after the truce was announced, during the night of October 10–11, around 1 a.m., the first missile strike hit Ganja, where numerous civilians were killed. After that, the hostilities intensified even further,” said the minister.

He also noted another important point — already in the context of the negotiations held on October 30 at the permanent mission of France in Geneva.

“You need to understand the overall situation: by October 30, everyone already understood that if things continued as they were, Azerbaijan would completely liberate its territory in a few days. New reports were coming in daily. And again, during the negotiations, we were insistent: you must present a schedule. There is no other way. A schedule must be presented.

And here Mnatsakanyan used the following argument. He said: ‘Let’s suppose theoretically, even if we are discussing this only theoretically, that we present you with a schedule. Can you, on your side, imagine returning to us the settlement of Gulyustan — the former Shaumyan district?’

During the First Karabakh War, this territory remained under the control of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and subsequently became the settlement of Gulyustan. At first, I did not understand what he meant. Imagine: on October 30, he tells us that if we give a withdrawal schedule for the Karabakh districts, you will return Gulyustan to us? Then I thought — no, they have an absolutely inadequate perception and understanding. And I remembered a well-known joke: Armenians can be defeated in football, but it is impossible to prove it. It was exactly such an inadequate reaction. How it all ended, we saw, but such moments remain in memory,” said Bayramov.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs also touched on the support our country received during those days. He noted that at that time, what mattered to us was not some special support per se. Even simply appealing to international law and the respect for the territorial integrity of states was very significant for Baku.

“As I said, during the discussions at the UN Security Council in October 2020, we worked very actively with the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement. And fortunately, at that time, 7 of the 15 Security Council members were Non-Aligned Movement countries. They supported us. Thanks to their intervention, several attempts were prevented, and not a single document was adopted.”

“I must particularly note one point. With all due respect to all other countries, we have always expressed our gratitude to them and continue to do so: supporting their initiatives, voting for their candidates, joining their projects — nothing is forgotten. But the role of the Republic of Türkiye cannot be compared to that of any other country, including at the diplomatic level. Türkiye’s support was unequivocal, firm, and invaluable for us. And as you know, the foreign policy of every country is determined by its leader. The constant support of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, his statements, his regular contacts with our president, every one of his appeals in support of Azerbaijan — this was indispensable,” emphasised Bayramov.

He recalled that during the 44 days, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye — Ed.) visited Azerbaijan five times. There were visits when he stayed only two to three hours. He would arrive at midnight, stay for two to three hours, and leave again at 3–4 a.m. It was not about coming to discuss something that could not be said over the phone. Even this alone was a demonstration of support — showing that Türkiye was alongside Azerbaijan. The Minister of Foreign Affairs came, stayed here, and sent the necessary signals.

“And I want to note one more point, which perhaps the Azerbaijani public does not know — I have never spoken about this openly. In those days, a single order was sent from Ankara to all Turkish embassies: instructions coming from Baku have the same force as instructions coming from Ankara. That is, everything sent by Baku must be carried out. Of course, there are state rules, diplomatic etiquette, and state culture, and we did not bypass these. We did not address any Turkish embassy directly. If we needed to convey something, we did so through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye. But the very fact of sending such a signal — this is truly a unique case in world diplomacy. And it was not just talk, but a demonstration of real brotherhood in practice.”

“The president used every opportunity to shape the position. His regular addresses to Azerbaijani society, to the people, and almost daily interviews with the global press — perhaps for those inside the process, this was more obvious. But I am sure: if someone studies these statements over the course of the 44 days, they will see a very interesting correlation. Not a single word was spoken by chance. There was a clear line: the territories of Azerbaijan must be liberated, a schedule must be presented to us, no Armenian soldier can remain on Azerbaijani soil, and in a rather firm form — that they must ‘leave’ our land. All of this was built very consistently.

But sometimes, in interviews or speeches, there were also references like this: yes, there are Turkish F-16s on Azerbaijani territory. They are not participating in the combat operations. They are on the ground. But if anyone intervenes — these planes will take to the air. In other words, if one analyzes the contacts during those days, it becomes clear that these words were a response to specific attempts at interference. These were not random statements,” said Bayramov.

He also recalled the final days of the Patriotic War and the processes that were taking place at that time. The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasised that by around November 8, Armenia was already ready to accept Baku’s conditions. However, Armenia refused to discuss the issue of the city of Shusha.

“The position of the president was absolutely firm and categorical: without Shusha, this problem could not be resolved. Shusha is not a subject of negotiation. Therefore, when the Azerbaijani special forces entered Shusha, and the clearing of the city took almost two days, Armenia attempted a counterattack. The Azerbaijani public is aware of this. But everything was already heading toward completion, and it was clear that after the liberation of Shusha, in the bigger picture, there were almost no unresolved or ambiguous points remaining. Although, of course, there were many details. When the news of Shusha’s liberation arrived, it undoubtedly moved the process into its final stage. From the 8th onward, very intensive contacts began, and from the morning of the 9th, negotiations continued until night.

Here, I want to note that the course of the negotiations and their details were discussed directly by the two presidents. Our president communicated directly with President Putin on key issues. Then everything was formalised on paper through the ministries of foreign affairs. These materials were presented to the presidents, followed by the next telephone conversation. That day, there were numerous phone contacts.”

From the perspective of 2025, through this prism, November 8–9, 2020, look completely different. I will list the points that the president managed to include in the final negotiations. First and foremost — concrete deadlines for the withdrawal of the Armenian army from three districts: Kalbajar, Lachin, Aghdam. Second — the duration of the Trilateral Statement. Initially, it was proposed that no deadline be specified. But this was accepted, and the second point was the mechanism — whether this deadline would be extended in the future or not.

Another fundamental point was the parallel implementation of the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the territory and the withdrawal of Armenian armed formations. The terminology used was also deliberate — it did not refer to the “Armenian Armed Forces” but specifically to “Armenian armed formations,” so that later no legal loopholes could be exploited. In the subsequent period, 2020–2023, although the Armenians did not fully comply, this became a serious argument for us. We referred everywhere to the fact that the Trilateral Statement was being violated. You undertook these obligations.

The fourth point was explicitly recorded: the withdrawal of Armenian armed formations would be carried out in parallel with the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. This was an extremely important issue. The precise number of Russian peacekeepers, the types of weapons they would have — it was very clearly specified that it concerned only light small arms,” said the minister.

He noted that Baku’s position was taken into account overall on the issue of communications, and separately — on ensuring unobstructed connections between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. In other words, the result of one day of intensive negotiations was everything that was achieved. Thanks to this, Baku gained room for broad interpretation.

Regarding the monitoring centre in Aghdam, the minister emphasised that everyone that day clearly understood that it was a Turkish-Russian monitoring centre. Everyone understood and accepted this — it was agreed. In the text of the document itself, it was simply referred to as a “monitoring centre,” and the agreement was that within a day Russia and Türkiye would sign a mutual agreement on this issue. This agreement was also reached.

The issue of the width of the “Lachin corridor.” According to D. Bayramov, the topic of the Lachin corridor is one of the most important elements of the negotiation process, which had been discussed for decades. And when the width of the corridor was discussed, much larger areas were always proposed. Establishing the corridor’s width at 5 kilometres meant a multiple reduction of the initial proposal.

The next important point — the construction of an alternative road in a short period and the return of the city of Lachin. This too was included in the document. These points formed the basis for the actions that ensured the return of the city of Lachin in 2022.

The minister also addressed a question that troubled Azerbaijani society at the time: if we are winning, why didn’t we complete the task? In other words, why had the Azerbaijani flag not yet been raised in Khankendi?

“But subsequent developments showed that this was the only correct decision at that moment. I will not hide it: if I said that we were all 100% certain that everything would happen exactly as we planned, that would not be true. Each of us had a certain level of concern. But I can say honestly and openly: in all our internal discussions, in countless meetings, we never once — not even by a fraction of a per cent — sensed the slightest doubt from the president. Not a single hint of hesitation. The confidence was absolute — that everything would unfold as it should, and that we would achieve everything we wanted. This man was so confident, so calm, that this confidence inevitably spread to everyone around him. But at that very moment — the decision-making — it can be said with complete certainty: it insured us against enormous risks. It saved us from potentially massive catastrophes.”

Let me to outline a few scenarios. First: yes, the Armenian army was weakened. Yes, our army had absolute superiority. But at the same time — it was already November. Imagine: even if we set aside the Aghdam direction, which was already one of the most heavily mined, even if we hypothetically exclude it, there were still Kalbajar and Lachin. We all know their terrain, geography, and roads. These are territories bordering directly with Armenia. Their defence could be organised directly from Armenian territory. And if you had to respond, you would be forced to strike Armenian territory. Armenia is a member of the CSTO. The risks were enormous. How many additional losses could we have suffered? That is the military side. And in terms of human resources — what consequences would that have brought us?

Second point: imagine that we had gone all the way, and hypothetically — we did not agree to peacekeepers. Can you imagine what accusations would have been levelled against us from around the world? “Ethnic cleansing,” “genocide.” Provocations could have been organised. And by those who would benefit from them. No third party, no observers. So many dangerous scenarios were prevented thanks to this agreement. And subsequent events proved that this was the only correct and precise decision at that moment.

There is a fact that cannot be forgotten. Very intense work was underway on the text of the agreement. It was already evening, and everything was approaching completion. From the morning — continuous contacts, calls from the president, instructions, we were working on the text, sending it to the Russian side, they would send it back with edits. It was already evening. I was sitting over the text, and Deputy Minister Fariz Rzayev was making changes on the computer. The government phone rang. I picked up. It was the then-commander of the Air Force, Ramiz Tahirov. He said that the Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan was aware, but he understood — at that moment, the minister had an enormous number of tasks. Because the night of the 9th to the 10th was approaching — it is not simply a matter of declaring a ceasefire. This needs to be organised. Combat operations were ongoing. Stopping a war — words make it easy, but in practice it is quite another matter. The Minister of Defence was handling this.

And he said: on the minister’s instructions, I am calling — an incident occurred. What incident? A helicopter was shot down in the direction of Nakhchivan. When the first information arrived, I realised it was bad news, but still — a war was ongoing, a ceasefire had not yet been declared, a helicopter was shot down — such episodes happen during a war. He said: it happened near our border, over Armenian territory. But even this did not create the full picture — we knew that previously threats had come from targets on Armenian territory, including S-300 systems that had been destroyed there. So, this was not something entirely new.

Then more precise information began to arrive: the helicopter belonged to the Russian military base. It was a Russian helicopter. The pilots were Russian citizens. This, of course, was a problem. A serious problem. And it needed to be reported to the president. A phone call with him was requested immediately. The connection was established in about five to seven minutes. I remember this well. The president was already aware. I want to describe his reaction. He learned this information literally a minute or two before our call. Some might have thought: let’s check with the military, let’s wait, don’t rush, let’s figure it out. But the president immediately said: “Yes, I’m aware. Prepare a statement immediately.” And in about 30–40 minutes, the statement was published. It is publicly available, anyone can see it.

And the sequence of points in the statement corresponded exactly to the sequence dictated by the president: the reasons for the incident, the ongoing combat operations, the fact that the helicopter had never flown this route, the tragic accident, apologies, compensation — and everything else. And note: by the time we issued our official statement, there had not been a single public message from the Russian side about the downed helicopter. Perhaps the base already had the information, perhaps they were conducting their own investigation. But in the Russian press, overall, regarding the actual fact of the incident — there was not a single publication.

Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Azerbaijani state, without the slightest delay, without any additional manoeuvres or attempts to conceal anything, clarified the situation, offered apologies, expressed condolences, and stated its readiness to provide compensation. I mention this because it shows the drama of those days and Azerbaijan’s behaviour in that situation,” concluded Bayramov.