Russia loses influence in South Caucasus as Azerbaijan and Armenia forge new paths BESA article

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies has published an article discussing the diminishing influence of Russia in the Southern Caucasus region following the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Azerbaijani Karabakh region. Caliber.Az reprints the piece.

The war in Ukraine and the conclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highlight the end of Russian influence in the Southern Caucasus. The Russian presence in the region is dwindling. It is hard to find a better sign of it than the sudden Kremlin’s announcement that the 2000 troops would pull out of the Azerbaijani Karabakh region. The troops were supposed to function as peacekeepers, yet they were the remnants of Russian influence in the region.

In the past, the Karabakh issue played a role in expanding Russian ambitions in the region, binding Yerevan’s decision-making to Moscow. This is because the ruling clans of Karabakh relied on people with close ties to Russia, like Ruben Vardanyan. When Armenia’s president, Nikol Pashinian, decided to pivot to the West at the expense of ties with Russia, the importance of the Karabakh ruling clans grew in the eyes of the Kremlin.

Today, it seems that Russia has almost lost its leverage over Armenia, which allows Yerevan to expand ties with EU countries. But Iran likewise realizes the weakening of Russia’s influence in the Caucasus.

Iran’s anxieties

Interestingly, Iran expresses anxiety over the weakening of Russian power in the Caucasus. The reason for that is more understandable than it may seem at first glance. The website Irdiplomacy is a respectable venue in Persian for serious debates on the issues of foreign policy. It is pro-regime, yet it is serious and thought-provoking, beyond the rabble-rousing of the IRGC. Its commentator for Russia and Caucasus affairs, Ehsan Movahedyan (who has had connections with the abovementioned Vardayan), urges a new approach on behalf of the Islamic Republic towards the Caucasus region because it is the only way to cope with numerous challenges jeopardizing Iran.

The resolution of the Karabakh problem and the ascent of Azerbaijan are seen as real threats in Tehran. Naturally, nearly all the Iranian analysts relate the danger stemming from Azerbaijan to Baku’s ties with Israel. However, they tend to omit the basic fact that the tensions between Baku and Tehran date back to 1991, the year when Azerbaijan gained independence. Baku is a threat to Tehran because of its existence, as a secular and pro-Western country. The root problem is the Azerbaijani minority in Iran, which suffers from ethnic discrimination. Iran attempts to eschew this problem and blames the victim, accusing the Iranian Azerbaijanis of separatism. Yet even Movahedyan tacitly criticizes the regime; while reiterating the cliches against “Azerbaijani separatism,” he suggests the regime must adopt another policy towards this minority.

Armenia’s pivoting to the West is likewise considered dangerous by Tehran, fearing that the rapprochement of its Armenian ally with the EU will usher in a NATO presence in the Caucasus.

Iran is also wary of any rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The reports about Armenia’s agreement to return to Azerbaijan’s four villages as a first step raised worries in Iran. The reason for the concern is clear: the Iranian regime realizes that Azerbaijan and Armenia are trying to put an end to the century-long conflict. Tehran needs the conflict to be perpetuated to use it as a pretext for its meddling. Moreover, leading Iranian analysts admit that the Iranian policies in the Caucasus have not yielded the needed results. To that purpose, some of them urge the regime to adopt a combination of both soft and hard power to enhance its presence in the Caucasus.

Dangerous ties between Yerevan and Tehran

In the meantime, Armenia continues to expand its ties with Iran, including in the military domain. Yerevan’s ties with Tehran go much beyond the normal relationship between two neighboring countries. In 2023, Armenia concluded an arms deal with India. It is noteworthy that the weapons are supposed to arrive from India in Armenia via Iran.

Iranian media reported in 2023 that Iranian troops were deployed on Armenian soil in Siunik Province, which borders Azerbaijan. In March 2023, the deputy foreign minister of Armenia, Vahan Kostonyan, maintained that Armenia and Iran deliberated in the military realm as well.

Iran considers Armenia to be an important military asset, whereas its importance lies in various domains. Armenia served as a transit point for Iran to deliver the Shahed-136 drones in use by Russia against Ukrainian civilian targets. In addition to that, Armenia became a hub for smuggling from and into Russia of sanctioned goods.

According to the French intelligence sources, Iranian spy agencies focus their activities in Armenia at the Blue Mosque in Yerevan. The only mosque in the Armenian capital, it was inaugurated in 1755 when Armenia was part of Iran and renovated in the nineties by the Islamic Republic. In 1999 Armenia handed over the management and the factual ownership of the building to Iran. The Iranian body that oversaw the reconstruction of the Mosque was not a usual construction company but the powerful Mostazafan Foundation.

The Mostazafan Foundation (Bonyad-Mostazafan) is an immense conglomerate of some 160 holdings in key sectors of Iran’s economy, including finance, energy, construction, and mining. It is controlled by the supreme guide Ali Khamenei. The foundation is also affiliated with the IRGC. It is under American sanctions.

One of Khamenei’s close advisers Hossein Dehghan, who is also the former minister of defense and a high-ranking officer of the IRGC has overseen the mosque. According to the Intelligence online report, the Blue Mosque serves also as an office of Iran’s cultural advisor. It is noteworthy that Iran’s cultural advisors are not diplomats who work as cultural attaché. They are always members of the Islamic Culture and Communication Organization which is also controlled by the Supreme guide. The staff of this organization is in charge of spreading Iranian propaganda abroad. Very often the post of cultural advisor is a cover for Iranian intelligence.

Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani was previously ambassador to Syria. Iranian diplomats in Syria and Lebanon are never diplomats alone, they are IRGC officers coordinating the interaction of the IRGC Quds force with Assad’s regime and Hezbollah. On April 2 Armenian Foreign Ministry expressed condolences to Iran over the death of 7 high-ranking IRGC officers killed in an air raid in Damascus attributed to Israel.

The recent unprecedented Iranian aggression against Israel showcases the danger of Iranian ideology and the ambitions of the Islamic Republic. As long as Armenia voluntarily provides services to Iran, its pivoting to the West should be checked with a lot of scrutiny.

French weapons to Armenia

At the same time, Armenia considers France as the friendliest European country. The cooperation between the two states is being translated into the purchase of French weapons by Armenia. In October 2023 Paris announced the sale of “defensive” weapons to Yerevan – three Ground Master 200 radar systems, manufactured by the French defence company Thales. It is noteworthy that the system has already been used in Ukraine. French ministers also signed a letter of intent for the purchase of the air defence system MBDA. In February 2024 France signed a commitment to sell to Armenia precision riffles and train its military units. Armenia also purchased French-made night vision goggles. 50 Armored combat vehicles Bastion have already been delivered to the country.

Against the background of the complexities of the geopolitical situation of the region, the weapons delivery in question is problematic, to say the least. First, the definition of the weapons as “defensive” makes no sense; it does not exist in any official military terminology. Second, the French intelligence is perfectly aware of the Russian intelligence activities in Armenia: even if Armenia decided to distance itself from Russia, old ties persist and go nowhere. The Armenian Ministry of Interior announced in January 2024 that 17,000 assault rifles were missing from the Armenian army stocks. It is possible that they were illegally purchased by a third country, namely Iran. Iranian news agency Farsnews, affiliated with the IRGC published a report about the purchase of French weapons by Armenia.

Russian and Iranian intelligence may get access to the French weapons in Armenia. Both Iran and Russia have a good capacity for reverse engineering and post-operational research. They will be more than happy to examine the performance of the French radar that is being used by Ukraine. All the more, the French rush to supply Armenia with weapons whereas Ukraine still needs more weapons is unclear.

Armenia has no other choice but to keep good relations with Iran given its strategic inferiority. However, this relationship should not be more than that. If the US and the EU require other countries to halt their ties with Russia while these ties have nothing to do with security issues, it would be logical to expect a more coherent approach from the West: it should set the same conditions for Armenia if the Caucasian nation wants to pivot to the West.