Washington’s new North Korea strategy: From denuclearization to containment Analysis by Matanat Nasibova

Recently, the US president puzzled the international community by declaring his willingness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un before the end of this year. At first glance, there is nothing particularly surprising about the US president’s statement—the leaders of the two countries met in 2018 and 2019, although those encounters produced no tangible results. What is more perplexing is the context in which this proposal was made. To unravel these complexities, it is necessary to examine the sequence of events that preceded it.

Relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have almost never left a zone of turbulence. On the contrary, they have been marked by an extremely high degree of tension and have often crossed the boundaries of the diplomatic sphere.

It all began with the Korean War of 1950–1953, which, although it ended with an armistice, did not bring peace as such. No comprehensive peace treaty was ever signed, the border along the 38th parallel remains a high-risk area to this day, and the two countries still have no formal diplomatic relations. Last year, the United States once again imposed sanctions on the DPRK, adding eight individuals and two companies to its sanctions lists and accusing them of laundering proceeds from cybercrime and illicit financing schemes supporting Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

As expected, North Korea regularly responds with threats against Washington and its allies, flaunting its nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang reacted just as vehemently to the joint US-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, describing them as an overt military threat and stressing that the reduction in their scale and duration at the direction of President Donald Trump “changes nothing.”

The country’s state media went even further, characterising the drills as a rehearsal for an invasion and an offensive provocation. Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, who wields considerable influence in North Korea, said that the North Korean authorities were not interested in Washington and Seoul’s decision to shorten the duration of the exercises, since their aggressive nature remained unchanged. At the same time, Pyongyang did not limit itself to rhetoric and conducted yet another ballistic missile test, launching missiles towards the Sea of Japan.

Against this backdrop, the US president’s stated intention to hold a face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong Un suggests that Washington’s traditional approach to North Korea is gradually beginning to change, and this shift may be attributed to several factors. First, there is a growing understanding in Washington that its previous insistence on complete denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue has run its course.

In other words, the United States has, to a certain extent, accepted the new reality in which North Korea is regarded as a de facto nuclear power. According to estimates by US analysts, Pyongyang’s arsenal stands at around 50–60 nuclear warheads, while estimates by relevant agencies and experts put the number of assembled warheads at between 80 and 120. North Korea also possesses the full range of delivery systems, from tactical to strategic. Similar conclusions are contained in IAEA reports: the agency’s data on activity at the Yongbyon nuclear research centre, including operations at the light-water reactor (LWR) and radiochemical laboratory, confirm that Pyongyang is capable of producing material for an additional 10–20 nuclear warheads annually.

Second, it is impossible to overlook the fact that close cooperation with China and Russia reduces North Korea’s vulnerability to US pressure. In effect, Pyongyang has a strategic “rear” in the form of China’s economic resources and Russia’s military technologies, a factor that clearly does not escape Washington’s attention. China, in particular, plays a pivotal role in this triangle: without taking Beijing’s position into account, any dialogue between the United States and North Korea is virtually impossible, even though China itself has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests and has at times imposed certain restrictions on the country as a result.

This, however, does not prevent Beijing from viewing North Korea as an important security buffer and a strategic partner in the region. This position remained unchanged even after Xi Jinping’s face-to-face meetings with Donald Trump. Beijing has consistently maintained that any positive movement in the Pyongyang–Washington dialogue is possible only if the United States completely abandons its “hostile policy” toward the DPRK.

Third, the unresolved “Iran dilemma” is forcing the United States to take a closer look at the allocation of its military resources, while the US presence in the Indo-Pacific is already coming under a degree of pressure. It is therefore important for Washington to prevent a new crisis on the Korean Peninsula, particularly at a time when the United States is heavily preoccupied with strategic challenges in the Middle East.

On the other hand, such a policy course by the US administration should cause some concern among its allies in this part of the world—South Korea and Japan—especially in light of Trump’s dissatisfaction with Seoul’s decision not to provide assistance to Washington in connection with the Strait of Hormuz. Against this backdrop, the decision to shorten the duration of joint exercises with the Republic of Korea, despite all the diplomatic reassurances from the South Korean authorities, raises certain questions and gives Tokyo and Seoul food for thought.

Thus, summing up all of the above, one could argue that, in the near term, Washington’s key objective will not be the complete denuclearization of the DPRK, but rather preventing any further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and consolidating the status quo.