Could hatred on social media be a harbinger of a new conflict?

The Karabakh conflict, understandably, generated deep hostility between the two peoples. At the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire, almost the entire South Caucasus — particularly the Yerevan, Baku and Elizavetpol governorates (that is, the territories where the independent and later Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan emerged) — was home to two principal ethnic groups, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, alongside smaller ethnic communities. Very few areas had an ethnically homogeneous population. The overwhelming majority of this territory was ethnically mixed, with Azerbaijani and Armenian settlements interspersed among one another.

Under these circumstances, drawing a dividing line based on the ethnic map that existed at the time — leaving aside the historical narratives of both sides — was an extremely difficult task. There was no border that could have fully satisfied both sides. Whatever line of division was drawn, one side — or even both — would have been left dissatisfied.

The borders established by the Bolsheviks were regarded by the Azerbaijani people as unjust. Indeed, territories such as Zangezur, Goycha, Daralayaz, Zangibasar and Amasia, where Azerbaijanis constituted a clear majority, were transferred to Armenia. Yet the paradox is that the borders imposed from above were perceived as “unjust” not only by us, but by the Armenian side as well.

Nevertheless, Azerbaijanis forced themselves to accept the fact that these were the borders that existed. As the saying goes, there was little point in fighting the map: we had to learn to live with the republican boundaries imposed upon us.

In Armenia, however, they could not bring themselves to accept the same reality. Given that each of the two republics had a substantial population belonging to the other, the most pragmatic solution — particularly towards the end of the Soviet Union’s existence — would probably have been a population exchange while preserving the borders drawn by the Bolsheviks.

Sounds like Captain Obvious, doesn’t it? Yet Armenia chose not to take his advice. Instead, it sought both to remove its Azerbaijani population and to retain its own autonomous region within Azerbaijan. It then went a step further, seeking to annex the region while expelling its Azerbaijani population as well. And, as if that were not enough, it wanted to have its cake and eat it too.

Such audacity was, to put it mildly, not well received by Azerbaijanis as perestroika entered its final years. The Armenians, in turn, were hardly pleased that Azerbaijanis were displeased with their actions. The conflict ultimately ended in 2023 with precisely what Captain Obvious had proposed from the outset: the completion of the population exchange process while preserving the Soviet-era borders.

There was, however, one small difference: the Alley of Martyrs in Azerbaijan and Yerablur in Yerevan. Those, too, might have been avoided.

Who was to blame? Once again, Captain Obvious has the answer.

The conflict may have ended, but the mutual hatred did not. And now, let us take a brief look at it.

Throughout the years of the conflict, the highest point of mutual hatred — its culmination, so to speak — was, in our observation, the summer of 2020, when border clashes broke out in the Tovuz direction. If we recall those days, protests took place around the world and, unlike in previous years, they were accompanied by something that had not been seen before — violence.

It is enough to recall stones being thrown at Azerbaijani demonstrators outside the country's embassy in Brussels, attacks in Los Angeles and Paris, incidents at Moscow cafés, street clashes and mass brawls between groups of Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The situation even reached the point where Russia's Interior Ministry convened a meeting to which the leaders of the two diasporas were summoned.

As for what was happening on social media, we will not even go into that.

The surge of anger in Azerbaijani society led to an unauthorised visit by demonstrators to the building of the Milli Majlis, something that had never happened before either. Incidentally, as we remember, the management of Food City imposed an embargo on Armenian apricots in those days — right at the height of the season.

Throughout the conflict, observers noted that certain representatives of Armenian and Azerbaijani businesses in Russia had maintained a degree of commercial interaction. But when the conflict reached even these circles and those ties were severed, it was reasonable to regard this as an indicator of the very culmination of mutual hatred.

Even during the 44-day war and in the years that followed, the level of hostility never reached the point witnessed in the summer of 2020, during and immediately after the Tovuz clashes.

Why have we suddenly recalled all of this? What has been happening on social media in recent days brings to mind the record level of tension we witnessed six years ago. We all remember what it led to. Back then, Armenian users threatened to reach Baku; today, they are promising to return to Karabakh and insisting that “everything is still ahead”.

We, for our part, comfort ourselves with the fact that, by voting for Pashinyan’s party, Armenian society chose peace over revanche. Yet this is difficult to reconcile with the rhetoric of Armenian social media users, where an overwhelming majority appear to be spewing bile and hatred towards Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis.

Social media is a mirror of society, even taking bots and trolls into account. Judging by the level of hatred on social media over the past week, it is impossible to say that the Armenian people want peace. And a very large proportion of these users are, after all, Pashinyan’s electorate.

This leaves us wondering: is Pashinyan himself skilfully disguising himself as a politician committed to peace while in reality pursuing a long-term strategy of revanche, or does he simply have no influence over his own society? And that, in turn, raises another question: what kind of leader will this Armenian society produce after Pashinyan? And would it not be better to take preventive measures?