Why US, Russia, China must forge space rules before it’s too late Bloomberg Opinion Piece

In an era where geopolitics has extended far beyond Earth's surface, Bloomberg's recent editorial on the Pentagon’s proposed "Golden Dome" space-based missile defense system serves as a timely and cautionary call for diplomacy in orbit. The piece deftly outlines the high stakes of militarising space and urges the US to transform adversarial concerns into a framework for cooperative space governance.

The article begins with a recognition of the international backlash to the Golden Dome initiative, particularly from Russia and China, stating: “It’s hardly surprising that some of the loudest objections to the Pentagon’s proposed ‘Golden Dome’ missile shield have come from Russia and China, who warn the system will spur a new nuclear arms race.” Rather than brushing off these objections, the author suggests the US should harness them as an opportunity to establish behavioral norms in space—a domain currently governed by outdated or non-existent rules.

A flly functional space-based defence system could destabilise nuclear deterrence, with a truly successful shield could encourage the US to launch a nuclear first strike, confident it could deflect any counterattack. While this scenario may seem extreme, the fear it provokes could lead adversaries to expand their arsenals, triggering the very arms race Golden Dome is meant to prevent.

Beyond nuclear strategy, the editorial broadens the lens to include satellite warfare. Even if interceptors can’t block all incoming missiles, they “could target satellites in orbit,” which play an increasingly central role in military operations. From GPS-guided drones to communication relays, the US's space superiority is not only an asset—it’s a vulnerability. This space infrastructure could be easily targeted through cyberattacks, jamming, or even physical “rendezvous” operations.

These rendezvous maneuvers—ostensibly for inspection or repair—are described as inherently suspicious: “These purported maintenance satellites could just as easily be deployed to eavesdrop on, blind, capture or destroy a rival’s space assets.” With no international norms on how close satellites can approach one another, and no enforcement mechanisms for hostile behavior, the potential for accidental escalation is dangerously high.

The US push for “a code of conduct for such orbital activities,” including bans on close approaches to sensitive satellites, hotlines between military space agencies, and a halt to debris-creating anti-satellite tests. Importantly, the article notes these steps could “provide building blocks to the more binding treaty Russia and China claim they want to see.”

Golden Dome may be more of a strategic bargaining chip than a feasible defence system, with both nations likely know that Golden Dome won’t ever defeat their large and sophisticated arsenals. But precisely because of its limitations, it could become the catalyst for long-overdue space diplomacy.

By Sabina Mammadli