South Caucasus steps beyond Russia’s shadow Article by Commonspace

The South Caucasus is no longer a region under Russia’s exclusive dominance; the recent US-Azerbaijan-Armenia summit in Washington has demonstrated that other actors now possess the capacity to influence developments, says political analyst Simona Scotti, who specializes in the South Caucasus and Eurasia, in her article for Commonspace.

“For decades, Russia has stood at the centre of the South Caucasus’ security order. No peace deal, no war settlement, no major infrastructure project could be imagined without Moscow’s involvement. Yet this year, for the first time in Azerbaijan’s modern history, that assumption has been openly challenged. A series of diplomatic clashes between Baku and Moscow, followed last week by the US-mediated summit in Washington, show that Azerbaijan is willing to confront Russia more directly than ever before, and that the South Caucasus may now be shifting away from Moscow at an accelerated pace,” the article states.

“The initial signs of strain emerged on 25 December 2024, when an AZAL passenger aircraft en route to Grozny crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan. Preliminary Azerbaijani investigations indicated it had been inadvertently struck by a Russian Pantsir-S1 missile system, resulting in the deaths of thirty-eight people. Baku’s reaction was notably more forceful than anticipated: Russian cultural institutions were shuttered, state media adopted a critical stance, and Moscow’s long-held role as the ultimate “arbiter” in the Caucasus was openly contested. “From then on, the spiral of mistrust only deepened.

Cyberattacks against Azerbaijani state web portals conducted in February were later attributed to Russian hackers, an Azerbaijani MP was refused entry to an official event in Russia without warning or explanation, and Aliyev skipped the 80th Anniversary of the WWII Victory celebrations in Moscow in May. Russian authorities arrested and tortured to death Azerbaijani citizens in late June, further exacerbating the crisis; Baku retaliated with its own arrests and expulsions. Russian media began hosting commentators speculating about military pressure on Azerbaijan, a sign of how hostile the rhetoric had become.”

Simultaneously, Moscow endeavored to reinforce its relationship with Armenia, though its influence there was also waning. Disenchanted by Russia’s failure to provide support during the 2020 and 2023 conflicts, Armenian leadership adopted a firm stance towards diversifying its foreign policy. Pashinyan’s historic visit to Türkiye in June 2025 marked a strategic pivot long deemed improbable, while Russian border guards withdrew from Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport earlier that year. “The old monopoly of Russian influence is thus weakening,” the author observes.

Against this backdrop, the Washington summit held on August 8 convened under the auspices of Donald Trump, bringing together Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan. The meeting yielded significant breakthroughs: Baku and Yerevan initialed a peace agreement expected to be formally ratified once Armenia amends its constitution; both parties advocated for the dissolution of the defunct OSCE Minsk Group; and the contentious Zangezur corridor was finally approved. What renders this development especially notable is not only the agreements themselves but the guarantor behind them. The corridor, originally planned to operate under Russian security oversight, will now be managed by an American company and bears the designation “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). “In a nutshell, Washington has carved out a formal role for itself in the domain Russia once considered its preserve.”

Russian responses reflected clear apprehension. Maria Zakarova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated, “The Westerners aim to transfer the reconciliation process of Baku and Yerevan to their tracks.” Others went further, equating TRIPP with the establishment of a US military base. These statements underscore the symbolic weight the corridor now carries. Nonetheless, the article cautions that “it would be misleading to frame this moment as Russia’s ‘loss’ of the South Caucasus.”

The fundamental shift lies in the fact that “Russia’s role is no longer accepted by default.” The convergence of several factors — Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine draining its southern focus, the TRIPP corridor symbolizing a new American economic and security presence, and Armenia’s movement towards a more pluralistic foreign policy — have collectively opened space for Azerbaijan and Armenia to engage multiple external partners, thereby reducing dependence on any single guarantor. In essence, this transformation is less about Russia’s departure and more about the diversification of alliances.

The overarching conclusion is clear: the South Caucasus no longer functions as a single-power arena. While Russia remains present and influential, it is no longer uncontested, and the Washington summit has emphatically demonstrated that other actors now have room to shape the region’s trajectory.

By Vafa Guliyeva