“Justice isn’t selective, Armenia is responsible” Air Center rebuts ISPI

An article by Mattia Massoletti, a research fellow at the Centre for Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, entitled “Selective justice? Comparing peace efforts in Armenia and Ukraine”, has been published by one of Italy’s leading think tanks, the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI).

From the very opening lines, Massoletti, without any substantial preamble, leads readers to the conclusion that the EU allegedly demonstrates double standards in its approach to Ukraine and Armenia. “Baku’s maximalist stance and rejection of accountability are not only a consequence of its military victory, but also of the broader inaction of the international community – particularly the European Union,” the author writes.

“While accountability for war crimes is portrayed as fundamental to any future peace between Ukraine and Russia, the same logic does not apply to the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since at least 2016, Azerbaijani forces have been committing documented war crimes during clashes with Armenia, including the beheading of military and civilian detainees. Even today, more than two years after Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military victory, at least 23 Armenian POWs remain illegally detained. In recent months, these individuals have been subjected to what human rights organisations and legal experts describe as ‘sham trials’ – proceedings conducted without due process, access to independent legal counsel, or public scrutiny, in clear violation of international humanitarian law.

Despite Azerbaijan’s non-compliance with international humanitarian law, the proactive stance characterising the Western response in Ukraine is largely absent. The international community has confined itself primarily to calls for dialogue and de-escalation, with little tangible legal follow-up. While the OSCE’s ‘Moscow Mechanism’ has been invoked four times to examine Russia’s alleged violations, it has never been activated regarding Azerbaijan. Similarly, unlike in the case of Ukraine, no other ICC state party has submitted a referral concerning Azerbaijan’s crimes, nor has any special tribunal or international joint initiative been established.

This broader pattern of international inaction may have further emboldened Baku in its negotiating posture. As part of the peace talks, Azerbaijan has framed accountability as an obstacle, demanding the mutual withdrawal of all interstate cases before international courts as a precondition for peace. While the Armenian government initially signalled its willingness to accept this demand, a final decision has yet to be made [...] To further underline the discrepancy with Ukraine, the prospect of a peace deal that excludes Azerbaijani accountability does not appear to constitute a matter of concern for the EU either. In their joint statement on the Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, signed in Washington on August 8, EU Council President António Costa and Commission President von der Leyen hailed the deal as paving the way to ‘lasting, sustainable peace,’” Mattia Massoletti wrote, in particular.

Naturally, such an overtly biased approach towards Azerbaijan could not go unnoticed. The Centre for the Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center, Baku) prepared a detailed and well-argued response to Massoletti’s article, emphasising that ISPI’s approach is problematic from both an analytical and a legal standpoint. In particular, it notes that the attempt to place the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict on the same level as the war in Ukraine under the label of “selective justice” creates a false equivalence that obscures generally accepted principles of international law and, more importantly, misattributes responsibility.

“The central weakness of Mattia Massoletti’s argument lies in its implicit suggestion that responsibility for the occupation of Azerbaijani territories and the associated violations is somehow diffuse, unresolved, or contingent upon future peace arrangements. This is incorrect. Responsibility in the Armenia–Azerbaijan case is not hypothetical, shared, or negotiable — it is legally attributable to Armenia. Any analysis that fails to start from this premise risks distorting both the legal record and the political realities of the conflict [...]

These resolutions do not employ conditional language. They do not speak of ‘disputed territories,’ nor do they recognize competing claims of sovereignty. Instead, they explicitly demand the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territory. This establishes two critical facts:

1. The occupation was unlawful under international law.

2. The occupying power was Armenia.

Mattia Massoletti’s attempt to situate the conflict within a broader moral discussion of “selective justice” sidelines this binding legal framework and replaces it with political abstraction. Such abstraction may be rhetorically convenient, but it is analytically misleading.

The second decisive legal pillar is the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia. This case is not peripheral; it is central. The Court found that Armenia exercised effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding occupied territories and therefore bore responsibility for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights in those areas.

This finding matters for several reasons. First, it establishes state responsibility irrespective of formal annexation. Under international law, effective control is sufficient to trigger responsibility. Second, it directly contradicts narratives portraying Armenia as a detached or indirect actor. The Court’s reasoning was based on concrete evidence: military presence, political influence, financial support, and administrative integration [...]

The occupation of Azerbaijani territories was not merely a matter of territorial control. It was accompanied by systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, cultural and religious heritage, and the long-term displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis [...]

From a legal standpoint, this provides Azerbaijan with grounds to pursue claims related to:

• unlawful occupation,

• destruction of property and infrastructure,

•  violations of human rights, and

• damage to cultural heritage.

Mattia Massoletti’s framing risks diluting this reality by subsuming concrete violations under a generalized discussion of peace processes. Justice in this context is not selective — it is specific, evidence-based, and grounded in established legal norms.

A particularly problematic aspect of Mattia Massoletti’s analysis is the suggestion that responsibility may somehow be transformed or neutralized through a peace treaty. This misunderstands the function of peace agreements in international law. Peace treaties regulate future relations; they do not negate past responsibility unless explicitly and lawfully agreed by the injured party.

In other words, responsibility does not “disappear” after peace; nor does it float in a legal vacuum awaiting resolution. It lies with Armenia. The only open question is how that responsibility is addressed — politically, legally, or through negotiated arrangements. Treating attribution itself as unresolved confuses accountability with reconciliation.

The comparison with Ukraine further undermines Mattia Massoletti’s argument. In Ukraine, the international legal order is confronted with an ongoing act of aggression by a state that denies responsibility and seeks to revise borders by force. In the Armenia–Azerbaijan case, the occupation concerned internationally recognized Azerbaijani territory, was condemned by the UN Security Council, and was legally attributed to Armenia by the ECHR.

Equating these contexts under the label of ‘selective justice’ ignores these fundamental differences and weakens the analytical value of the comparison. Justice is not selective when cases are legally distinct; it is selective only when legal distinctions are ignored.

The Mattia Massoletti paper’s treatment of Ruben Vardanyan illustrates a broader issue of selective contextualization. Vardanyan is presented primarily as a political or civic figure, without adequate reference to his financial background or the serious allegations associated with his past activities.

Public investigations, including extensive reporting on the ‘Troika Laundromat’, have linked Vardanyan to large-scale money-laundering operations involving billions of dollars moved through offshore networks.11 These are not marginal or speculative claims; they are well-documented and have been examined by international investigative bodies.

Moreover, Vardanyan’s political role in the post-2020 period was not neutral. His involvement contributed to the consolidation of separatist governance structures on Azerbaijani territory and directly undermined efforts at post-conflict normalization. Any analysis that omits this context risks whitewashing both financial misconduct and political obstruction, thereby distorting the moral and legal landscape.

The Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict does not exemplify “selective justice” in the manner suggested by Mattia Massoletti. Rather, it demonstrates the dangers of selective legal interpretation. International law has already provided clarity on territorial integrity, attribution, and responsibility. Attempts to blur these conclusions — whether through false equivalence with Ukraine or sanitized portrayals of key actors — do not contribute to peace.

A sustainable peace requires legal honesty. In this case, honesty begins with acknowledging that responsibility for the occupation and associated violations lies with Armenia. Any serious discussion of justice, reconciliation, or normalization must be built on that foundation,” the Center writes.