Expert predicts Armenia's shattering defeat in hypothetical Third Karabakh War Caliber.Az interview with Sergei Markov

Caliber.Az had a conversation with a prominent Russian state and public figure, diplomat Sergei Markov.

- How do you assess Armenia's new military provocation in Karabakh?

- The main purpose of Armenia's actions is an attempt to maintain its control over Karabakh. Yerevan perfectly understands that it is very likely that in two and a half years Azerbaijani troops will enter the Armenian-populated part of Karabakh. That is why the Armenian authorities are trying to attract other countries to the region to fight politically and maybe even militarily with Azerbaijan for Karabakh to belong to Armenia. This would also demonstrate the impossibility of reconciliation between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. So, conflicts, clashes, and incited hatred are the arguments that Armenia uses in the ideological indoctrination of the world community to show that the integration of Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijani society and state is never possible.

- How is Armenia transferring ammunition and weapons to Karabakh?

- The delivery of arms and ammunition from Armenia to Karabakh is carried out as part of the supply of the Armenian military grouping in the region. Armenia carries out the supply in violation of the Trilateral Statement of 2020, it is focused only on establishing its presence in Karabakh by military means. Yerevan realises that the Armenian army is too weak to withstand a direct clash with the Azerbaijani Army - it would suffer a shattering defeat in a hypothetical Third Karabakh War. Nevertheless, armaments are being pumped in.

- How do you think events in the region will develop further against the backdrop of increasing Armenian aggression? Are new military clashes possible in Karabakh?

- I believe Baku will most likely insist on the establishment of checkpoints on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in the area of the Lachin road so that the Azerbaijani state security forces take full control of this road and do not allow the transfer of military forces and equipment. At the same time, Armenia will continue to engage external forces in the region, primarily France and the EU, and possibly other NATO countries. Its task will also be to gradually transform the EU mission from civil-military to military-civil. The Armenian side will try to provoke clashes between the Russian and Azerbaijani militaries, between the EU observers and the Azerbaijani military, to quarrel with Azerbaijan as much as possible - this is its strategic move, through which it is expected to ensure that Karabakh remains under Armenian control after all.

- So the presence of the EU mission in Armenia clearly threatens to destabilise the region?

- Yes, it does. The presence of an EU mission in Armenia has an exceptionally high destabilisation factor. While the process of fully resolving the Karabakh issue is nearing completion, the EU factor gives Armenia hope of retaining control over the remaining occupied part of Karabakh.

- How feasible is it in the foreseeable future to delimit the Azerbaijani-Armenian border and in general to conclude a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan?

- Demarcation and delimitation of the border is actually possible, although there are many serious problems there due to the fact that during the quarter century when the regions were empty under de facto Armenian occupation, there was spontaneous economic development by small economic actors from Armenia. That is, they built a gravel and sand factory there during this period, as well as other infrastructure. Therefore, it is very difficult for Nikol Pashinyan to agree on the delimitation of the border, because then he will have to declare that Armenia must cede some territories to Azerbaijan. Given that many in Armenia already consider Pashinyan a traitor, he most likely fears that if he concedes the issue to Azerbaijan, he will inevitably create serious problems for himself inside his own country. I believe that the Armenian premier is afraid of signing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan because he fears for his own life and power.

On the other hand, Armenia is at least now ready to admit that Karabakh is Azerbaijan, but on the condition that it has a degree of autonomy that will allow international organizations, not Baku, to control the region. It is clear that Baku does not agree to this and offers the Karabakh Armenian community to live in Azerbaijan under the same conditions as all the other national and religious communities of the country. That is, under the conditions inherent in the principle of multiculturalism and national diversity. It is not without reason that the level of multi-nationality in Azerbaijan cannot be compared with Armenia, which is in fact mono-ethnic. So the Karabakh Armenians could, if they wished, benefit from all the rights enjoyed by the huge number of national and religious communities in Azerbaijan.

- Is there any chance of the Armenian-Turkish border opening before the end of this year?

- The likelihood of the Armenian-Turkish border opening before the end of 2023 is slim because Armenia views relations with Türkiye as preferential in order to break its isolation. However, Türkiye sees relations with Armenia as dependent on Ankara's coalition with Baku, its strategic ally and friend, guided by the principle of "one nation, two states". Türkiye will therefore always coordinate its policy towards Armenia with the Azerbaijani leadership. Baku insists that Yerevan finally takes real steps to demarcate and delimit the border and to open the Zangazur corridor, and only after that will it support the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. In the meantime, it is important for Türkiye that Armenia withdraws all claims concerning the so-called "Armenian genocide". This also is a criterion that its leadership will take into account when normalising relations with Armenia. In any case, for Ankara, the most important thing is to maintain strategic relations with Baku.