Unravelling the “real Armenia” and shadow of history Following Pashinyan’s Statements

In recent days, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has made a series of notable statements, some of which could even be described as significant—though not always in a positive sense, if you’ll pardon the wordplay. Among these, one statement stands out for its tone of distress: “So, to rephrase your words, are we glad that these people are there? No, this trial will be used against the Republic of Armenia. By using banned psychotropic substances on these people, they may very well be coerced into giving statements that will then be used in various ways against Armenia. We fully understand this and are aware of it.” Pashinyan made the remarks while commenting on the trial in Baku of individuals of Armenian origin accused of committing serious crimes against Azerbaijan.

He further claimed to possess intelligence indicating that such drugs would indeed be used and that the resulting testimonies would be weaponised against Armenia. Pashinyan made these remarks during a recent interview with Armenia’s Public Television.

It is interesting what additional testimonies need to be “extracted” against the Republic of Armenia, given that it has long been no secret that Armenia supported a separatist entity on Azerbaijani territory, stationed units of its armed forces on Azerbaijani soil, and allocated state budget funding to the now-defunct "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic."

It seems that Pashinyan is deeply unsettled by Arayik Harutyunyan’s revelations, particularly his claim that he did not order the shelling of Ganja. In reality, no one has ever doubted that the orders to target peaceful Azerbaijani cities came directly from Yerevan. Proving this does not require the testimonies of a group of separatists.

Pashinyan appears increasingly anxious about the possibility of a wave of revelations exposing the issuance of criminal orders. While Western elites have historically turned a blind eye to Armenia’s actions, the situation may be shifting. In response, Pashinyan seems to be preemptively dismissing the testimonies of those involved as fabrications.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan has already issued a response to this controversial statement. In a comment from Aykhan Hajizadeh, head of the Press Service Department, it was noted: “Obviously, such a statement from the Armenian side demonstrates how nervous are the political establishment of Armenia about the ongoing trial against the people accused of war crimes once they openly supported by all means to sustain the act and policy of aggression against Azerbaijan.”

However, if we set aside the aforementioned psychedelic statement by the Armenian Prime Minister, we can generally note the progressive message in the sum of what he said. The core of this message lies in the continued formation of the image of the "real Armenia." Though, even here, there were some twists. "If it weren’t for King Artashes, our other kings, Pap, Trdat, we wouldn’t have an identity today. That’s why we can say that Homeland is the state. If we want to have a state, we must focus on strengthening our state," said Pashinyan.

Here, it seems he is trying to reconcile the "mythical Armenia" with the "real Armenia." Understanding that the Armenian consciousness cannot so easily rid itself of figures like Pap and Trdat, he attempts to show that the mere existence of Armenia as a state on a given territory is already a valuable "gift from the ancestors." We, of course, know that these were not the "ancestors" but rather external forces that granted Armenia lands of historical Azerbaijan. Yet, we cannot expect the Armenian Prime Minister to acknowledge this fact!

It is striking that this time Pashinyan’s reflections on the inadmissibility of territorial claims towards neighbors seemed more directed at Türkiye than Azerbaijan. "Around the discourse of Ararat (referring to the depiction of Mount Ağrı on Armenia’s coat of arms – Ed.), we cannot buy modern weapons, we cannot have a combat-ready army, we will only be offered used weapons. We say that this is our sovereign territory, we are not setting other goals, and we are ready to take on international obligations around this thesis. Because if we ask for weapons with the image of Ararat, no one will give them to us, because, for example, no one wants to have problems with Türkiye."

It’s certainly a somewhat muddled statement. It seems as though Pashinyan is implying that modern weapons are not flowing into Armenia via the European Peace Fund (and other channels), which is clearly not the case. Furthermore, the fact that he does not mention his country’s constitution—seemingly pretending there are no issues—suggests he is avoiding the territorial claims problem with Azerbaijan.

On the other hand, there is a noticeable renewed focus on territorial claims against Türkiye. It’s possible that this issue is now being incorporated into Armenia-Türkiye negotiations aimed at normalizing relations. Ideally, these discussions should address not only the depiction of Mount Ağrı on Armenia’s coat of arms but also the reference to "Western Armenia" in Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, which, as is well known, is enshrined in the country’s fundamental law.

However, the most interesting statement within the discourse of the "real Armenia," and once again related to Armenia-Türkiye relations, was made not during the interview, but the day before in Zurich, at a meeting with representatives of the Armenian diaspora in Switzerland. "We must also revisit the history of the ‘Armenian genocide’. We must understand what happened and why it happened, how we perceived it and through whom we perceived. How is it that in 1939 there was no ‘Armenian genocide agenda’ and how is it that in 1950 the ‘Armenian genocide agenda’ emerged?"

This statement touches on two points. First, the necessity of thoroughly studying the issue, and second, the suspicion that the events of 1915 have become a subject of political and ideological manipulation. Taken together, this is, it must be said, a bold step, striking at one of the central pillars of Armenian identity and politics. It’s reasonable to assume that this issue was also raised by the Turkish side as something important for the normalization of relations. Clearly, normalization with Türkiye remains a key foreign policy priority for Pashinyan’s government, as he is willing to take the risk of losing support within Armenia.

On the other hand, no clear, viable competitor to Pashinyan has emerged, meaning he has a certain leeway to promote less popular narratives. And, as he pointed out in the interview, "We have no plans to call for early elections."