Why is Türkiye keen on diplomatic thaw with Syria? Iran "rises" again

On April 3 and 4, representatives from Russia, Türkiye, Syria, and Iran met in Moscow to partake in a Kremlin-led bid to restore diplomatic ties between Ankara and Damascus after years of frayed relationships. Prior to this, a previous summit held between Turkish and Syrian defence ministers in December 2022 had been marked as the highest meeting between the two sides since the onset of the Syrian civil conflict.

Despite a shared intention to continue consultations, the outcome of the quadripartite talks held in the Russian capital has remained uncertain, as evidently, Türkiye and Syria still have many significant barriers to overcome before a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached.

Indeed, before the full diplomatic normalization, Damascus requires Ankara to cease all of its support to the main opposition forces, namely the Free Syrian Army. From the early period of the civil war, Ankara openly supported the FSA militarily and financially to overthrow the Assad's regime, though unsuccessfully. With Bashir Assad’s growing legitimacy in the Arab World, Türkiye is gradually distancing itself from the radical opposition groups.

Another important point for normalization would be Ankara-Damascus joint efforts to tackle the leading Kurdish militant groups dubbed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Unsurprisingly, the SDF activities in northern Syria are a source of concern for Ankara and Damascus.

Moreover, the bilateral diplomatic normalization of Ankara and Damascus seems impossible without the mediation of Moscow and Tehran, the main stakeholders of this long-term bloody conflict. Recently, Turkish and Iranian foreign ministries held consultations regarding the diplomatic thaw with Damascus. According to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavushoglu, the Iranian demand to join the talks between Ankara, Damascus, and Moscow was one reason a landmark meeting between the three countries' top diplomats was cancelled in mid-January.

However, Cavushoglu found it hard to assess the role of Iran in the process. However, it is fair to note that the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations under Russian auspices proceeded smoothly until Iran’s prompt intervention interrupted the process, as Turkiye expressed its willingness for full normalization with the Syrian regime due to internal reasons related to the Turkish economy.

Although Iran publicly welcomes Türkiye's opening up to Damascus, its stance differs from what it has announced. For example, earlier in April 2023, the high-level meetings were cancelled over Tehran's objections to the involvement of the United Arab Emirates, which has played a facilitator role in talks between Ankara and Damascus. Tehran sent Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to Damascus to ask the Syrian regime to raise the ceiling on demands in exchange for normalizing relations with Türkiye.

Seemingly, by pushing the Assad government for more concessions from Ankara, Iran seeks to bolster its leverage over the normalization process. As a result of continuous pressure, Damascus has been dragging its feet, pressing for a concrete commitment from Ankara to withdraw its military presence from the country’s north. In comparison, Syria's stance contradicts the agreement between Türkiye and Russia that normalization will happen without further conditions. Such a move was a signal that the diplomatic thaw between Damascus and Ankara would not be possible without Tehran’s consent.

Shortly after Tehran’s moves and statements, Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said his country welcomed Iran's participation in the ongoing talks with Syria. Undoubtedly, the statement of a high-profile Turkish bureaucrat has had a positive impact and helped to lower diplomatic tensions.

Notwithstanding, Türkiye and Russia are cautious about the role of Iran in the normalization process due to the existing rivalry between Ankara, Moscow, and Iran. There is a conviction among the Turkish leadership that Iran’s involvement in this matter will be both complex and slow, which may worry other countries in the region.

Despite the discontent regarding Iran’s involvement, neither Ankara nor Moscow cannot wholly and crudely exclude Iran, as the latter's influence and a strong foothold in Syria enables it to maintain the role of the main stakeholder. Unlike Russia, Türkiye is keen on revitalizing the relations with Syria considering the internal dynamics such as the refugee crisis and border insecurity.

As such, Iran may continue to impede the Syrian-Turkish reconciliation, but it cannot stop it. Tehran realizes that the room for manoeuvre is limited when it comes to questioning the Russian president's decisions and agreements with his Turkish counterpart.