US policy on Ukraine may set the stage for domino effect in East Asia Maxim Petrov's scenario

The US, not only and not so much Germany, has blocked tank deliveries to the AFU for a year, arguing that US Abrams tanks, developed during the Cold War to fight Russian tanks in Europe, cannot be used... to fight Russian tanks in Europe. But now there are reports that the tanks (both Abrams and German Leopards) will nevertheless be delivered. The media, which until now had been telling an unbelievable story about the Abrams being incapable of fighting in Europe, turned on a dime - it turns out that there are no unsolvable problems.

The real reason for this policy was a reluctance to anger the Kremlin and increase the threat of its nuclear response, as reported by some leading US outlets, such as the New York Times. After such a refusal by the Americans, the Germans, who tied their arms deliveries to the position of their senior NATO partner, also refused to supply their Leopards. Now the situation has started to change.

Charles Reeve, Franco-Portuguese publicist, social researcher, and critic of modern Western society wrote that the Russian ruling class, losing the economic competition with the West, decided to resort to force, relying on the fears and weaknesses of the US and the European Union, but the costs of this decision were great. Doubts arise as to whether the predominant part of the rich and powerful benefits from what is happening. They have lost money because of the sanctions. According to predictions by some renowned economists, most notably Sergei Guriyev, Russia may not reach its pre-February 24 level of development until 2030 and will become dependent on China - economically, politically, and technologically. No matter how the conflict ends, sanctions will not be easily lifted from Russia, so China will become the main source of capital and technology. This will allow Beijing to impose its own conditions on Moscow.

But looking at the weakness of the United States and Germany, which blocked the supply of their tanks to Ukraine at a crucial point of the conflict, it comes to mind that the Kremlin may not have been too wrong about them - they are indeed afraid of Moscow.

The American blocking of tank supplies deprives the AFU of the possibility of conducting major offensive operations or sharply reduces this possibility. Therefore, a long conflict for many years is very likely, like Afghanistan or, rather, Korea. Perhaps this is the goal of the United States. Perhaps they would be satisfied with Ukraine following the Korean path - a hypothetical gradual attenuation of the conflict (as the parties' forces are exhausted) along certain lines formed during the clashes.

And yet, the US position may be changing for two reasons. First, as the fear of Moscow's red lines subsides (as reported by leading US outlets, citing anonymous senior officials), the US is increasing arms supplies, so that perhaps sooner or later tanks, combat aircraft, and missiles with a range of 300 km will also arrive.

Secondly, in a globalised world, everything is affected. Many eyes are watching the situation today. US weakness could push China to annex the island of Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of China. If Washington fears Moscow, it should all the more fear Beijing. By 2027, China's military and, among other things, nuclear power will greatly increase. If the US is prepared to give Russia a fifth of Ukraine's territory rather than provide it with the required number of tanks, aircraft, and long-range missiles, it could signal China to begin attempting to take control of Taiwan.

Alon Pinkas, an Israeli analyst who is a former adviser to numerous Israeli governments, notes that the US has turned Ukraine into a demonstration ground for the PRC, saying: 'This is what awaits you if you come to Taiwan'. In this way, according to Pinkas, the Joe Biden administration was trying to solve the puzzle by simultaneously holding back Moscow and Beijing. But if Russia manages to retain what it took after the February 24 conflict, by contrast, this showdown may convince Beijing that it is capable of taking Taiwan under its own control.

Of course, this would still be a difficult and risky operation and one that China may not dare to undertake. After all, many problems remain, from the threat of sanctions (to which China is sensitive, given the enormous volume of exports to the US and the European Union, and given the importance of US technology shipments to China) to military issues related to Taiwan's weaponry and topography.

Nevertheless, if US weakness persists, the chances of China trying to annex Taiwan greatly increase. For the Chinese leadership, the issue of Taiwan is pivotal. China will not tolerate any separatism, and if the situation is favourable for a Chinese special operation, Beijing may resort to it.

The Sinologist Alexander Gabuyev has pointed out that if Taiwan were to fall, a number of East Asian states would go under Beijing's control, having seen how unreliable US protection and commitments are. This could mean a huge strengthening of China. In other words, the US position in Ukraine has the potential to cause a domino effect - first pro-American Taiwan would collapse, and then all American influence in East Asia would be undermined.

These considerations could cause the US to start supplying tanks and combat aircraft to the AFU, or to put enough pressure on Germany to start doing so. Most likely, the US hesitation reflects the position they find themselves in. They fear a victory for Ukraine and fear its defeat.

There has clearly been a breakthrough in recent days. Reports have emerged of deliveries of American Abrams tanks (presumably about 40) and German Leopards-2s (presumably about 100) to Ukraine. At the next meeting in Ramstein, the sides will discuss deliveries of F-16 combat aircraft, with the Netherlands already showing its readiness to provide them. Ukraine will also receive 600 high-tech British air-to-ground Brimstone missiles, as reported by the media.

If the supply of modern Western tanks and aircraft proves to be significant, by the time they are received and mastered (presumably in summer), the AFU could be qualitatively reinforced. But on the other hand, US hesitation, postponement, or minimisation of deliveries make any predictions difficult. Obviously, a few dozen tanks cannot change the situation on the front.