Armenian paradoxes, or a feeling of impeding nightmare Maxim Petrov's scenario

Armenia's problem is that while remaining an economic satellite of Russia and being under its military protection, it went through a "color revolution" which is intolerable for Moscow. This fact dramatically reduced the Kremlin's desire to defend it and created a political window for Azerbaijan, which used troops in 2020 to retake Karabakh. The Kremlin did not and never will trust Pashinyan, as he is seen as the spawn of forces alien and dangerous to Moscow.

And besides, today Russia is busy with the events in Ukraine and cannot afford a new armed conflict. It counts, not without reason, on a political and economic partnership with Türkiye (which is especially important amid the confrontation with NATO), while Türkiye is in a bloc with Azerbaijan.

Finally, the Armenian army has not even recovered from the defeat in the 44-day war, in which it lost more than half of its armored vehicles (and that is far from all that it lost), and Azerbaijan continues to rearm, preparing for a possible conflict.

Taken together, there is nothing good for Armenia. No one in the world has recognized Karabakh as Armenian, and will not recognize it, it's completely impossible because even Armenia itself hasn't done it. Serzh Sargsyan, the former president of Armenia, when asked about the reasons for the non-recognition of "Karabakh's independence" by Yerevan, said: "...It's a compromise from our side. If Armenia recognized the independence of Karabakh, it would mean our refusal from negotiations on the settlement of the conflict. If we recognize independence, then what else can we negotiate about? That is why we do not recognize it, so as not to complicate the situation further".

Armenia's main allies, Russia and Iran, are considered toxic in the West, and this dramatically reduces the West's desire to support Yerevan. And even France will not help it, because it has no capacity for war with Türkiye and is not interested in such a war (let's call things by their proper names). The West can restrain Azerbaijan for a while, but no more than that.

Also, we should not discount Iran, which fears the strengthening of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus. In addition, it does not like the close cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel, as the latter is perceived by the Iranian regime as the main enemy. Finally, there are tens of millions of Azerbaijanis living in Iran, just in the region of the border with Azerbaijan and Armenia, many of whom are dissatisfied with the situation inside the country and occasionally participate in protests. The strengthening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc on Iran's border is a challenge for it, as is the very existence of independent northern Azerbaijan.

However, the Iranians are hardly ready for military operations against Azerbaijan, as it would mean dragging them into a war with Türkiye, and modern Iran, with its relatively outdated military technology and in conditions of internal conflicts, is probably not ready for such a war.

Armenia could, theoretically, move to a peaceful state only by renouncing its claims to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and by changing some accents in foreign and domestic policy. But this, too, is impossible at the moment. The national ideology of present-day Armenia is based on the idea of "miatsum". And Pashinyan's government cannot simply withdraw from Karabakh, because for Armenian society, or more precisely for its majority, this is unacceptable, and civil society in Armenia is strong enough to influence the situation. The socio-psychological state of modern Armenia is such that it does not allow giving up Karabakh.

Some Armenian political analysts are aware of the reality that Armenia has no chance of winning back the Karabakh situation. But Armenian civil society does not understand this, because it has been formed by the idea of "miatsum" and seems unthinkable for it to accept the reality. And it is easiest for those forces which control civil society to rely on these sentiments.

At the same time, there is a part of society in Armenia which considers it possible to retreat from Karabakh, but it is not predominant. On the other hand, the same Armenian political analysts say: "Let's give up Karabakh, but the story will not end there, they will take Zangazur away from us too". It seems to me that the problem here is not only military and political but also social and psychological. Armenian society, as well as the Armenian state, as well as the national psychology within this state, are formed by the idea of confrontation with Türkiye and generally separating themselves from the peoples of the Middle East, including Iran, an important ally of Armenia these days. This is an unrealistic concept since Armenia is in a "stone bag" and surrounded by four countries, two of which consider themselves a single Turkic nation and immeasurably stronger militarily and economically, the third is relatively loyal to Türkiye, and the fourth is an unpredictable Iran hit by the riots.

I wrote three years before the 44-day war that Armenia's geopolitics were extremely flawed and would lead it to disaster. Today, after its defeat in the 44-day war, the remnants of the separatist entity are already blocked. The Armenian nation-state concept could only be realized so far with reliance on Russia, whether "Soviet" or "post-Soviet." In the lack of such support, even if only partially, then the very structure, model, and national idea of the Armenian state are hanging in the air, devoid of hold.

I do not know how all this will end, hopefully not with a new war, but there is a sense of a grim nightmare approaching Armenia. The only way to stop it is to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan and make peace with Türkiye.