Beijing–Taipei: Soft power and economic leverage “A journey for peace”

The recent visit of Kuomintang (KMT) leader Cheng Li-wun to Beijing can rightly be described as sensational, as she became the first sitting leader of Taiwan’s opposition to visit mainland China in the past 10 years.

Background: The Kuomintang was the ruling party in mainland China from 1928 to 1949. It was founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 (reorganised in 1919), but is most closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek, who governed mainland China from 1928 to 1949, and later Taiwan from 1949 to 1975.

The Kuomintang’s political platform advocates a peaceful settlement and supports dialogue, as well as the “1992 Consensus” between Beijing and Taipei, which has served as the foundation for semi-official relations across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, it rejects any transfer of “authority” to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this context, it can be assumed that during her talks with Xi Jinping in Beijing, Cheng Li-wun adhered to this line.

There are currently two main opposing political forces in Taiwan — the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). While the former advocates sovereignty and distancing from China, the latter supports closer economic ties with Beijing and adheres to more conservative views. Importantly, Li-wun’s visit took place solely at the initiative of the Kuomintang, rather than the “authorities” of Taiwan.

Beijing, for its part, labels the current Taiwanese “president” from the DPP, Lai Ching-te — who has officially described China as a “hostile foreign force” and strengthened national security measures “in the face of growing threats” — as a separatist. It refuses to engage in dialogue with him and, in recent years, has increased pressure on Taiwan, consistently demonstrating that it regards the island as an integral part of the People’s Republic of China and does not rule out the possibility of a military operation to achieve reunification.

However, let us return to Cheng Li-wun’s visit and the statements made during the talks. According to the Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping stated at the meeting with Cheng Li-wun that “regardless of how the international environment and the situation in the Taiwan Strait may change, the overall trend of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will not change, and the prevailing trend toward closer ties between compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will not change.”

For her part, Cheng Li-wun called for efforts to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, to build a bright future for these ties, and to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. She also stressed that “opposition to Taiwan independence, which is one of the political foundations of both the Kuomintang and the ruling Communist Party of mainland China, is one way to avoid war.” Thus, from the statements of both sides, one key positive takeaway can be identified: each demonstrated a willingness to engage in dialogue.

At the same time, from a geopolitical perspective, Li-wun’s visit primarily highlighted the effectiveness of Beijing’s “soft power” policy. By placing its bet on Taiwan’s opposition, China has chosen a strategically calculated approach, as such a move could undermine the unity of Taipei’s position by intensifying political polarisation. This is the first point.

The second aspect is that China’s ideological strategy is aimed at reducing tensions through economic means. In essence, this is a key feature of Beijing’s approach — one that has once again proven effective.

However, this does not mean that the visit of the Kuomintang leader to Beijing should be interpreted solely in China’s favour. It can be assumed that this development in itself may significantly enhance the image of Taiwan’s opposition as a “party of dialogue,” capable of minimising the risk of a war scenario—especially at a time when the PRC has considerably increased military pressure on the island.

This is also evidenced by large-scale military exercises conducted by Beijing, which experts increasingly view as preparation for a possible invasion in 2027. Such assumptions were further reinforced following the large-scale drills held in late December 2025. As Xinhua reported at the time, the exercises, codenamed “Justice Mission 2025,” were described by a representative of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a serious warning to Taiwan’s separatist forces and external interference.

Continuing on the theme of a potential military confrontation, it is worth recalling Xi Jinping’s recent statement that “the reunification of mainland China with Taiwan is historically inevitable.”

In reality, however, a direct invasion of the island by Beijing appears less likely than pressure exerted through trade and economic means. According to economists, the damage to the global economy in the event of a military scenario could reach around $10 trillion—approximately 10% of global GDP.

Most likely, Beijing will continue to actively rely on its “soft power” policy toward Taiwan as an alternative to war. This is indirectly confirmed by the historic visit of Cheng Li-wun to Beijing, which she herself described as a “Journey for Peace.”