From “Trump Route” to “Putin Road”? Article by Vladimir Tskhvediani

On May 20, 2026, at the international conference “Russia and the World: Dialogues — 2026. A New Reality,” held in Moscow, Vladislav Gasumyanov, Director of the National Research Institute for the Development of Communications (whom we have previously mentioned), proposed the creation of a “Putin’s Road” through Georgian territory to Armenia. He compared this project to the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), an agreement that was signed in Washington on August 8, 2025.

“If there is a ‘Trump Road’ from Azerbaijan to Türkiye, then why can there not be a ‘Putin Road’ from Russia through Abkhazia and Georgia to Armenia?” Vladislav Gasumyanov explained.

The conference “Russia and the World: Dialogues — 2026. A New Reality” was officially attended not only by representatives of the separatist Abkhazia and the so-called “South Ossetia,” but also by representatives of the so-called “Transnistria.” All of this indicates that Moscow is still not fully accepting the “new reality” and is attempting to restore the “old one” — in its own understanding, with support for separatist projects and the redrawing of borders. However, the era of the previous policy, which led Russia into its current geopolitical dead end, is irrevocably over.

It is symbolic that on the eve of the conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree simplifying the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of the separatist “Transnistria.” This decree in some ways resembles similar decisions on the accelerated distribution of Russian passports in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali before the August 2008 war.

However, the current decree on the distribution of Russian passports has provoked not so much fear of the prospect of “Russian military expansion” into Moldova, but rather irony.

It is widely understood that Russia has little chance of “breaking through” to the separatist region on Moldovan territory by military means. The era of separatists there is irreversibly over, and the local population mostly holds multiple passports — sometimes as many as five: Moldovan, Romanian, Ukrainian, Russian, and the separatist “Transnistrian” passport.

In these circumstances, the very holding of the conference with the participation of separatist “ministers,” as well as the proposal by Vladislav Gasumyanov — who still refers to occupied Abkhazia as an “independent state” — demonstrate that Moscow has not yet realised the need for a fundamental revision of its previous approaches to maintaining Russian influence in the post-Soviet space.

The proposal for a “Putin Road” clearly came in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Republic of Armenia. Moscow, it appears, is betting on removing Nikol Pashinyan from power and bringing back its “old partners” from the “Karabakh clan.”

In order to encourage Armenian citizens to vote for Moscow-oriented forces, Russian officials in recent days have been reminding them of how much Armenia receives from Russia and what it owes to it, implicitly suggesting that all of this could be lost if Nikol Pashinyan is elected instead.

Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu, criticising Nikol Pashinyan’s policies, stated that cooperation with Russia is the main engine of Armenia’s economy, and that “it is difficult to argue with this fact.”

According to him, Russia supplies Armenia with natural gas, flour, grain, fertilisers, and petrol at prices three times lower than market rates; up to 98% of Armenia’s agricultural exports and 78% of its alcohol exports go to Russia; Armenian citizens working in Russia without quotas, patents, or work permits transferred almost $3.9 billion back home in 2025.

He also noted that in 2025, 40% of tourists visiting Armenia came from Russia, thereby supporting the country’s economy through their spending.

However, alongside reminders of what Armenia is already receiving from cooperation with Russia, Moscow has apparently also decided to hint at new incentives in the event that Yerevan, after the parliamentary elections, once again opts for closer alignment with the Russian Federation. Most likely, it was precisely for this purpose that the proposal to open railway transit through occupied Georgian Abkhazia and further into Armenia was voiced.

The idea of a possible imminent opening of a “Putin Road” through Abkhazia will, in all likelihood, be used by pro-Russian political forces in Armenia in their election campaign, contrasting this project with the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), which is being subjected to fierce criticism from their side.

The “Trump Route” is intended to unblock regional transport communications — the road is expected to pass through the Zangezur region and connect mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. To ensure transit security and infrastructure development, Yerevan is granting the United States exclusive development rights over the transit zone for a period of 99 years.

By analogy, Moscow would like Tbilisi to “formally” transfer similar “rights” over Abkhazia in order to open transit routes. In this way, Russia could effectively continue the occupation, but formally — with the “consent” of Georgia itself, ostensibly for the purposes of ensuring transit and developing the corresponding infrastructure.

Before August 2008, both Abkhazia and much of the Tskhinvali region were also de facto under the control of Russian forces. However, at that time Moscow officially recognised the territorial integrity of Georgia. In the separatist territories, Russian troops were present in the status of “peacekeepers,” with the formal consent of Tbilisi, and thus, at least formally, Moscow was not in violation of international law.

After the 2008 war, Russian forces have remained in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in violation of all international norms. They were supposed to be withdrawn in accordance with the Medvedev–Sarkozy agreement, but, as is known, Moscow has not been in a hurry to do so.

Without the de-occupation of these territories, Georgia categorically rejects the very possibility of transit, even though in 2011, under pressure from the United States, it agreed to conclude an agreement on so-called “customs corridors” through the occupation zone to facilitate Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

If Moscow had proposed a plan involving a “Putin Road” to Tbilisi prior to February 2022, such an offer could theoretically still have been considered. Of course, this would have required the prior withdrawal of recognition of the so-called “independence” of the separatist territories and the return of refugees.

However, today the geopolitical reality has changed dramatically, and a railway transit project through Abkhazia is not feasible without the full de-occupation of Georgian territory.

Having become mired in the war in Ukraine, Moscow has effectively acknowledged the weakness and shortcomings of its policy of “biting off” parts of neighbouring states. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, accompanied by the expanding geography of Ukrainian strikes, also raises serious questions about transit security.

The railway route to the South Caucasus along the Black Sea coast passes through Tuapse — a city that was recently subjected to mass drone attacks. If Russian military presence remains in Georgian Abkhazia, and Russia is responsible for the functioning of transit infrastructure, it would be unable, by definition, to guarantee the security of such transit under the current geopolitical conditions.

In addition, the Georgian authorities are regularly subjected to criticism and pressure over alleged “pro-Russian” policies. Georgia’s Western partners, as well as the international community as a whole, would not accept a situation in which Russia is officially allowed not only to organise direct railway transit to the South Caucasus, but also to be responsible for its security, while simultaneously maintaining its military presence on Georgian territory. This would be especially problematic if Russia does not bring its war in Ukraine to an end or at least “freeze” it.

Undoubtedly, there would be no obstacles to the opening of railway communication through Abkhazia in the event of its de-occupation and the return of refugees. It is in Russia’s own interest to initiate this process as soon as possible, since otherwise all hopes of maintaining geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus and participating in international transit projects will become increasingly illusory.

By Vladimir Tskhvediani, Georgia, exclusively for Caliber.Az