Political scientist: Kazakhstan defiantly supported Azerbaijan in 44-day war Caliber.Az interview with Saken Mukan

Caliber.Az interviewed political scientist Saken Mukan, a professor at the Department of Media Communication and History of Kazakhstan at MUIT.

- Kazakhstan has experienced a major shift in its political agenda over the past year. What is Kazakhstan's new political and economic strategy in general?

- The strategy in this direction has only strengthened the advancement of national interests in the context of changing geopolitical realities. The difference, perhaps, is that there are current challenges to which Kazakhstan has to respond quickly and adequately. The challenges and opportunities in which Kazakhstan finds itself, and its foreign policy orientations define the contours in which Kazakhstan diversifies its multifaceted cooperation with all actors. Today's Kazakhstan pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, trying to maintain a balance of interests both with its strategic partner Russia and with the OTS (Organization of Turkic States). As you know, Kazakhstan also plays a key role in the formation and development of the OTS. I would like to note that within the framework of the "balance of interests" strategy in its foreign policy direction, Kazakhstan has gained great positive experience within the UN charter and other international legal acts for the last 30 years.

- The recent statement on Kazakhstan's foreign economic policy that the country will not impose sanctions against Russia, but will not help to circumvent them, raises many questions. What does this strategy look like in practice?

- In some areas, strategic relations with the Russian Federation are even strengthening, as was the case during the "Nazarbayev era". As far as the declared new "neutral" policy of Kazakhstan towards Russia is concerned, for example, according to the statistics of the MFA of Kazakhstan over the last 9 months, 21 foreign companies have relocated from Russia to Kazakhstan. Therefore, in economic terms, Kazakhstan has certain benefits in attracting additional investment flows. Here is another example: the Russian Sberbank in Kazakhstan at the end of spring was bought by Kazakhstani investors and rebranded. Relocation of western companies from the Russian Federation to Kazakhstan mainly takes place in the light and food industry, while at the moment there is no talk of relocation of large European multinational companies. Due to Kazakhstan's close integration into the global economy, mutual benefit is in the interests of both parties.

Another thing is that there are EAEU principles that hamper logistics deliveries of finished products to the Russian Federation. Therefore, Kazakhstan is in search of alternative ways to supply goods through China, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. This applies not only to oil but also to other mass-consumption goods, in the production of which there is a Western investment.

As for the specific benefits received by foreign companies that relocated their offices and production from Russia to Kazakhstan, they are tangible. Firstly, it is access to Chinese markets through Kazakhstan; secondly, labour is cheaper than in Russia; thirdly, preferential tax treatment; fourthly, convertible currency; fifthly and most importantly, it preserves the image and complies with sanctions.

As for relocates - Russian citizens who work in Kazakhstan: many of them work remotely for the benefit of the Russian economy, taking into account that they have the right to stay in Kazakhstan for up to 3 months without registration, and those who have a contract with a Kazakh employer, pay taxes to the Kazakh side and legally carry out their activities.

Kazakhstan's new economic strategy is working on a bilateral basis, both with Western countries and with the Russian Federation within the EAEU. In other words, Kazakhstan is not withdrawing from Russia and the EU. Moreover, recent visits of high-ranking Europeans to Kazakhstan are an example of that. These are the visits of Charles Michel, president of the European Council, and Annalena Baerbock, the German foreign minister, as well as the visit of Tokayev after his re-election to Moscow and Paris. Thus, I can surely say that Kazakhstan skillfully displays its multi-vector foreign policy concept in practice. In this context, I would like to remind the words of Mukhtar Tleuberdi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs: "In February 2023 Kazakhstan and the EU will celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Looking back over the past three decades, we can rejoice in the solid foundation we have laid for cooperation. Looking ahead to the next 30 years, I have every reason to believe that both sides will only benefit from further developing relations based on trust, dialogue, and partnership."

- How are things shaping up for Kazakhstan's energy exports to Europe? Is Moscow still creating obstacles for Kazakhstan's foreign policy?

I think the likelihood of Kazakhstan joining the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is very high, as previously, since the launch of BTC in 2006, Kazakh oil was delivered to the pipeline by tanker from Aktau port, while at that time the port infrastructure was not designed for large volumes of oil shipment for delivery to BTC. The cost of such transit was very expensive for Kazakhstan, so eventually, the transfer of oil to BTC was discontinued. Now, due to improvements in the transport logistics system over the years, this route is again seen as relevant and more cost-effective than before.

- What are the other promising points, apart from energy, political and economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for example, in the framework of the Middle Corridor, the GTC, the Silk Road concept, and cultural ties?

- Kazakhstan's plans for political and economic cooperation with brotherly Azerbaijan are multifaceted. For instance, trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan amounted to 10.28 per cent of Azerbaijan`s total trade with all CIS states, a rather record-breaking figure. This suggests that the two countries are interested in multifaceted cooperation, both in the economic and political spheres. If only because, as I said above, the geopolitical location of Azerbaijan arouses the interest of Kazakh politicians in terms of supplying Kazakh oil to Europe.

At the same time, Azerbaijan needs eastern markets, primarily China, where Kazakhstan also guarantees to provide preferential treatment to Azerbaijani entrepreneurs in exporting their products. Thus, within the Middle Corridor, the ideas of the Silk Road are being developed in practice, in line with the trust and strategic partnership of our countries.

I would also like to highlight another of the 10 documents signed during Tokayev's visit to Baku - a protocol on twinning between the cities of Turkestan and Shusha. It confirms the fact that Kazakhstan has defiantly supported Azerbaijan's victory in the 44-day war. It is also known that there are plans to build facilities in Shusha with Kazakh investments.

As far as Kazakhstan's cooperation with brotherly Turkic states within the OTS framework is concerned - it has become very significant for our country's foreign policy agenda in the light of recent geopolitical turmoil. Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan are taking joint steps to overcome economic and political challenges by strengthening the boundaries of the organization. In this regard, the same cooperation within the framework of the Middle Corridor, the Silk Road, is of great interest to Azerbaijan and Türkiye. And Tokayev's visit to Azerbaijan in August 2022 cemented the implementation of cooperation within the OTS in these areas.