Between two shores: Why Yerevan risks ending up nowhere Analysis by Matanat Nasibova

In the modern geopolitical landscape, particular importance is attached to states capable of skillfully maintaining a balance in relations with different centres of power, which, in their bilateral interactions, often hold diametrically opposed, if not outright antagonistic, views. However, given the current geopolitical situation, not every country has been able to achieve such a balance. Armenia is a clear example of this today.

As is known, on October 10, 2014, the Treaty on Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was signed in Minsk and officially entered into force on January 2, 2015. At the same time, Yerevan continued seeking areas of cooperation with the West. In November 2017, it signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the European Union, which fully entered into force on March 1, 2021, allowing Armenia to develop relations with Brussels without formally violating its commitments to the Eurasian Economic Union.

In 2024, the Armenian authorities began an official dialogue with the EU on visa liberalisation, while in March 2025, the country’s parliament adopted a law launching the process of joining the European Union. Following this, on November 5, 2025, the European Commission presented Yerevan with a detailed step-by-step plan for visa liberalisation.

In 2026, this process took on a new dimension. Contacts between Armenian officials and European Union representatives intensified considerably, while the first-ever EU–Armenia summit was held in Yerevan in May. In addition, Brussels significantly expanded the scale of its support, allocating a €270 million multi-million-euro socioeconomic assistance package aimed at strengthening the resilience of Armenia’s economy, supporting small businesses, and diversifying trade.

Such activity could not, naturally, escape Moscow’s attention, and signals from Russia have taken an increasingly harsh tone, reaching a peak in recent months.

In particular, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said Armenia should hold a nationwide referendum by December this year on whether to join the EU or remain a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). He warned that if the issue is postponed until the December meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the leaders of the organisation would take appropriate measures. Meanwhile, Alexey Chepa, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, also said that Moscow would revoke the existing preferential arrangements for Armenia if Yerevan continued its course toward strengthening ties with the West.

Thus, the Russian side has effectively presented the Armenian authorities with the choice in the simplest—and no less uncompromising—terms possible: either the EAEU or the EU. And this is no longer merely a matter of diplomatic rhetoric, but of the economic and political consequences of that choice.

It appears that Yerevan has heard the signal. Speaking in parliament recently, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that Armenia plans to officially launch the process of applying for EU membership in the near future, although he did not specify a timeline. At the same time, the Armenian leader had previously acknowledged that there are objective circumstances preventing Armenia from simultaneously being a member of both the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union.

And this is where a telling development comes into play: amid the confrontation with Moscow and Yerevan’s demonstrative move toward European integration, statements coming from Brussels have been anything but encouraging for the Armenian leadership.

First, the EU said that a potential Armenian application to join the European Union was not on the agenda of discussions on the bloc’s enlargement that European Council President António Costa is set to hold with EU leaders ahead of strategic debates scheduled for October this year. Then, just a day later, European Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert, while welcoming Armenia’s efforts toward European integration, stressed that accession to the European Union takes place through a “clearly defined, merit-based process.”

At first glance, nothing particularly extraordinary has happened: the European Union has always accompanied discussions about enlargement with formal caveats and references to the relevant criteria. However, in the current context, what matters is not so much the wording of the statement itself as the timing of its delivery.

Yerevan now finds itself in a situation where it particularly needs political guarantees from Europe. Not declarations of support, but an understanding that, in the event of a definitive break with the Russian integration space, the country would have a concrete and foreseeable prospect of joining a new one. And this is precisely where Brussels has chosen to put the brakes on, prompting a perfectly reasonable question: “What exactly is behind this?” In answering it, the first point to note is that the EU currently has other priorities, namely other candidate countries.

The second aspect is that, in the view of European officials, the EU is under no obligation to link its political rapprochement with Armenia to a commitment to admit the country into its ranks. For Brussels, the current situation itself presents numerous opportunities: as noted above, strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence in Armenia allows it to expand its influence across the South Caucasus as a whole while simultaneously reducing Russia’s presence in the region.

At the same time, Armenia’s full-fledged membership in the European Union would entail an entirely different level of commitments, risks and financial costs. In other words, Brussels may well benefit from Yerevan’s journey toward the “larger European family,” but that does not necessarily mean European countries are prepared to guarantee the final destination of that journey.

This creates a rather peculiar configuration. Armenia is receiving financial support, political attention, and assistance from the EU in modernising and diversifying its economy, but none of this yet amounts to securing the main political dividend — a guaranteed place within the European Union’s space.

Moreover, the formula of a “merit-based process” effectively shifts the discussion from the political level back to the technical one. In other words, the question is not when Armenia will become a member of the European Union, but whether it meets the necessary criteria at all and how much time it will take to complete all the required stages. These are fundamentally different things.

Thus, while Yerevan is betting on the political effect of its declared intention to join the EU, Brussels is demonstrating a far more pragmatic approach. Essentially, Armenia is now moving along a path where European signposts have already appeared, but the final destination has yet to be marked. This creates a real risk that, having abandoned its old chair, Armenia may ultimately find itself without a new one.