Iran's nuclear dilemma: genuine threat or information warfare? Expert views on Caliber.Az

U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Iran's new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, is much more interested in developing nuclear weapons than his father was, The New York Times reports, citing officials familiar with intelligence analysts' assessments.

According to the officials, Ayatollah Khamenei's father, who was killed at the beginning of the war in an Israeli strike carried out with the assistance of U.S. intelligence, never publicly called for Iran to develop nuclear weapons. However, U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Mojtaba Khamenei and the more conservative government that has come to power harbour ambitions to develop such weapons.

According to intelligence assessments, Iran has moved at least some of the uranium enrichment centrifuges from its nuclear facilities that were hit by U.S. airstrikes in June 2025 to a new heavily fortified underground complex inside Mount Pickaxe in the central part of the country. It has also deployed ground forces around the site to prevent a possible U.S. ground assault aimed at destroying the facility.

U.S. officials believe this indicates that Iran is seeking to preserve its uranium enrichment capabilities. They also note that, according to U.S. intelligence, the key components required to build a nuclear bomb—most notably its stockpile of highly enriched uranium—remain intact and accessible to Tehran.

How serious is this threat? Is there anyone in the world today capable of verifying whether the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to pursue the development of its own nuclear weapons? And what should Iran's neighbouring countries make of such a situation?

Well-known regional experts shared their views on these questions with Caliber.Az.

Executive Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (Kyiv), Ihor Semyvolos, noted that when discussing the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, it is important to distinguish between intent and capability.

"While the late Ayatollah Khamenei issued a religious fatwa against nuclear weapons back in the 1990s, Mojtaba has made no such public declaration. This is a fundamental difference in approach, not merely a change in rhetoric.

At the same time, as far as is known, the United States has no evidence that Iran has resumed uranium enrichment or work directly related to weapons development since the war began. For now, the issue is the preservation of surviving equipment and expertise, rather than the continuation of an active program. In other words, we are talking about intent and potential, not a confirmed nuclear weapons development program.

Verifying whether this is indeed the case is virtually impossible. The IAEA has no access to the Pickaxe complex (near Natanz), and Tehran does not disclose such information. Since the facility is located at a depth beyond the reach of U.S. bunker-buster bombs and has been further reinforced with deployed ground forces, it is impossible to determine what is happening there—not only because of the limitations of intelligence-gathering capabilities, but also because the site is heavily protected.

Finally, regarding the last question, the logic is straightforward: uncertainty is worse than certainty. Whereas the region previously could rely on Tehran's relatively predictable position, underpinned by a clear religious prohibition against nuclear weapons, it is now dealing with a leader whose true intentions remain difficult to decipher even for U.S. intelligence, a regime that is clearly seeking to preserve its nuclear potential as a strategic reserve, and a situation that cannot be independently verified. This strengthens the rationale behind Saudi Arabia's own nuclear arrangement with the United States. In other words, an arms race is becoming a more likely response from Iran's neighbours than waiting for a diplomatic solution," Semyvolos said.

Ruslan Suleymanov, a Middle East expert at the NEST Centre, believes that any such reports, regardless of which side they originate from, should be viewed in the context of the ongoing conflict—in this case, an information war.

"It cannot be ruled out that such publications are the result of information leaks or psychological operations. Let us recall the reports published in January 2026 claiming that Ali Khamenei was allegedly preparing to flee to Russia. This was reported by the fairly reputable newspaper The Times, yet it turned out to be, to put it mildly, far from the truth.

Or consider the reports alleging that Israel had pinned its hopes on former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. That, too, was never substantiated. Therefore, we should proceed from the understanding that such reports do not necessarily reflect reality.

That said, if we address the substance of the issue, it is true that calls for Iran to develop nuclear weapons have intensified in recent times, including during the twelve-day war in 2025.

A number of political analysts, journalists, and politicians at various levels of government have urged Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as possible because, in their view, this is the only way to protect the country from future U.S. attacks. They often cite North Korea as an example.

In that sense, it seems entirely plausible that Mojtaba Khamenei, as a representative of the most conservative wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is moving in that direction. So these reports are not entirely without foundation, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, I would still treat them with extreme caution, given the context of the ongoing information war," Suleymanov concluded.