Pezeshkian's victory sparks hope for improved Iran-Azerbaijan relations Iran elects reformist president

Caliber.Az presents interview with Lana Ravandi-Fadai (PhD), senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Associate Professor of Russian State University for the Humanities’ Department of Modern East and Africa.

- Iran has elected a new president, and from the reformist camp. In the second round, Masoud Pezeshkian significantly outpaced his rival, the conservative Saeed Jalili, in the number of votes, although it was believed that the reformers had very little chance of winning. How did this victory come about?

-- Indeed, the reformer's victory in the elections was unexpected for most experts and observers, including me. It seemed to many that Jalili, and especially Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, were much better known and more popular figures than Masoud Pezeshkian, whose name has appeared in the major Iranian media in recent years much less frequently than those of these two figures.

Nevertheless, apparently the demand for change in Iranian society was so great that more than half the country voted for the little-known reformer. The Iranian elections once again confirmed their unpredictability, and the election of the reformer took place in a situation when for many years in a row only conservatives have won parliamentary and presidential elections.

If we talk about some kind of calculation of the Iranian authorities who allowed the candidacy of the reformer, then, firstly, it can be remembered that Pezeshkian declared his loyalty to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, so the highest authorities were sure of his loyalty on the main issues.

Secondly, with the help of a reformist candidate, the authorities may have wanted to significantly increase the turnout (which only succeeded in the second round) and strengthen the somewhat shaken legitimacy of the political regime in the eyes of the population by creating the impression of a competitive political struggle.

- Masoud Pezeshkian is an ethnic Azerbaijani. What could Iran's policy towards its neighbors become under his leadership?

- Masoud Pezeshkian is a cardiac surgeon by speciality, and the bulk of his work has been devoted to medicine and health care in one way or another. During the war with Iraq (called the "imposed war" in Iran), he worked as a military doctor. From 1994 to 1999, Pezeshkian was rector of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. He then became deputy minister of health in Mohammad Khatami's reformist government from 1997-2001.

Under the same government, he served as Minister of Health from 2001 to 2005. This was the end of his medical career and the beginning of a purely political one: he was elected five times to the Iranian Majles (parliament), where from 2016 to 2020 (under the government of the pragmatic centrist Hassan Rouhani) he served as the first deputy speaker of parliament.

He made several pro-Azerbaijani statements during this period. More recently, however, there has been another telling fact. After his election, Pezeshkian called Pashinian and reaffirmed Iran's commitment to the existing agreements between Iran and Armenia. In my opinion, we can predict certain changes in foreign policy towards greater cooperation with Azerbaijan, but I would not expect a radical turn in policy towards a complete withdrawal of support from Armenia and an explicit alliance with Azerbaijan.

In general foreign policy, Pezeshkian will try to strengthen relations with the West (but while maintaining good ties with Russia, China, India, Türkiye and other major Eurasian countries). However, Pezeshkian, as I said, has pledged to be loyal to the Supreme Leader on major issues, including foreign policy. And the Supreme Leader, as we know, does not trust the West. Therefore, serious breakthroughs in relations with the West are unlikely - if only in the trade and economic sphere and in the sphere of Western investments.

However, there will definitely be a significant easing of tensions in relations with the US and the EU, as Pezeshkian has established himself as a cautious, pragmatic, non-confrontational person with moderate rhetoric. But in relations with Israel, tensions will continue. Pezeshkian recently assured Hezbollah of his full support in confronting Israel. But this is to be expected: in Iran, even the reformists have a very negative view of Israel and accuse it of constant crimes against the Palestinians.

- Will Pezeshkian's arrival affect the internal situation in Iran? 

- It is worth saying that Iranian Azerbaijanis literally all as one voted for Pezeshkian. In the second round, the turnout in Azerbaijani-speaking provinces increased very much compared to the first round - from 40-50 per cent to 60-65 per cent. In East Azerbaijan province, Pezeshkian won 6 times more votes than Jalili. Approximately the same situation in Ardabil province, where Pezeshkian was 5 times more popular than Jalili. It should be taken into account that these are general data on all residents of provinces, and if we take ethnic Azerbaijanis, the gap between Pezeshkian and Jalili may be even greater. This means that Iranian Azerbaijanis have placed very high expectations on their fellow countryman Pezeshkian, and he will try to justify them.

In his election campaign, Pezeshkian paid great attention to the rights of national minorities, including Azerbaijanis. He promised to organise the teaching of local languages in schools (not just Persian) and to promote media and book publishing in local languages. It is to be hoped that he will be able to put these promises into practice, which would reduce inter-ethnic tensions in the country.

- Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was one of the first to call Pezeshkian and congratulate him on his victory. Can we hope that the negative page in the history of relations between Baku and Tehran will be finally turned and their positive status will only increase?

- Indeed, even at the end of the late President Ebrahim Raisi's rule (starting around the summer of 2023), relations between Baku and Tehran began to slowly but steadily improve. The same trend will certainly continue under the new president, although, as I mentioned above, relations with Armenia also remain a priority for Tehran. However, I am not yet willing to predict changes on some key issues of concern to Azerbaijan, such as the Zangazur corridor.

Pezeshkian might be willing to meet Baku's demands, but in Iran, to change the official position on such important issues, one needs the consent of the parliament and the Supreme Leader's administration, which is dominated by conservatives, some of whom are still not in favour of a close rapprochement with Azerbaijan. The coming months will show how Iranian-Azerbaijani relations will develop under the new president, but my outlook is generally positive.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that Pezeshkian promised in his conversation with Ilham Aliyev that he would make every effort to develop relations with Azerbaijan in all spheres in the future. And such statements in the dialogue between the leaders are certainly encouraging.