The Balkan knot: Can Vučić outmanoeuvre the West and the streets? Analysis by Matanat Nasibova

Serbia’s protracted political crisis, unfolding against the backdrop of an ongoing nationwide protest movement, has forced the government of Aleksandar Vučić to call early parliamentary elections. On September 9, 2026, the Serbian leader dissolved parliament and scheduled elections for the National Assembly for October 25, although the regular elections were not due until December 2027. Aleksandar Vučić has served as Serbia’s president since 2017, following three years as prime minister, and his second and final presidential term expires in 2027.

Given that the country has been rocked by mass protests for almost two years, triggered by the tragic collapse of a canopy at the railway station in Novi Sad in November 2024, the decision to call early elections looks like far more than a routine reshuffling of parliament. Rather, it appears to be an attempt by Vučić to overcome the most serious political crisis of his rule.

For the Serbian president, the move carries a dual significance. On the one hand, he is seeking to renew and reaffirm his legitimacy through the electoral process, while the Serbian Progressive Party has already nominated him as its candidate for prime minister. On the other hand, early elections give Vučić a strategic advantage: he gets to choose the timing of the vote while opposition forces are still struggling to form a united political front.

These circumstances turn the upcoming election into something of a referendum on Vučić’s political future. A convincing victory for the ruling party would demonstrate that the president has not lost public support and that the protests have failed to undermine his political foundations. If, however, the ruling party suffers a significant electoral setback, it would signal the beginning of a transition. Moreover, any weakening of the authorities under pressure from the streets would inevitably raise the risk of splits within the political elite, as some members of Vučić’s inner circle begin looking for ways to manoeuvre politically in anticipation of what lies ahead.

According to analysts, despite the severity of the crisis and growing competition, the chances of the Serbian Progressive Party, led by Aleksandar Vučić, winning the October 25 election remain very high. Recent opinion polls, including those conducted by the Faktor Plus agency, show that around 47% of voters are prepared to support the ruling party — a highly encouraging figure that puts it well ahead of any of its individual opponents.

The incumbent authorities’ main advantage lies in the fragmentation of their opponents: the pro-Western opposition, conservative movements and student protest groups are entering the election separately. Their inability to form a common coalition and put forward a single leader is leading to the fragmentation of the protest vote, depriving Vučić’s opponents of the opportunity to turn the election into an uncompromising referendum on his rule.

Against this backdrop, the president’s carefully crafted coalition strategy becomes particularly evident. While the opposition remains divided, Vučić’s party has traditionally built a broad alliance around itself. At its core is a standing electoral coalition bringing together the “Serbia Must Not Stop” bloc and “United Serbia”. The alliance consistently includes the Social Democratic Party of Serbia, led by Rasim Ljajić, a centre-left force with a strong influence among the moderate Muslim population in the Sandžak region, as well as the Party of United Pensioners for Justice and Development, which provides the coalition with disciplined support from older voters. Also aligned with the coalition are the left-wing, pro-Russian Movement of Socialists, led by former BIA intelligence chief Aleksandar Vulin, the Serbian People’s Party, and the right-wing conservative Serbian Renewal Movement.

The main strategic partner in government, however, remains Ivica Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia. Even if the Socialists run on a separate list in parliamentary elections to maximise the overall result among the ruling bloc’s loyal electorate, they invariably form part of the governing majority and support Vučić’s political course.

Another key element of the Serbian leader’s strategy is to neutralise threats from the right by bringing even those forces that formally stand to the right of his political course into his orbit. These include Vojislav Šešelj’s ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, with which the Progressives have already joined forces in local elections as part of the “Belgrade Tomorrow” coalition. A similar fate befell the right-wing “Oathkeepers” party, led by Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski, which had previously positioned itself as a staunch opposition force but later entered into an alliance with Vučić and secured a ministerial portfolio.

Such a strategy not only deprives the fragmented opposition of potential allies, but also allows Vučić’s coalition to portray itself as the only centrist force capable of guaranteeing political stability.

The European Union views the upcoming election as a key moment in determining Serbia’s future geopolitical direction and its genuine commitment to European integration. Brussels stresses that the country’s European future depends on the choice of the Serbian people themselves and their commitment to democratic values.

However, the EU is deeply concerned that the Serbian leadership continues to skilfully balance European integration with maintaining close ties with Russia and China. This was also underscored by recent remarks from European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos in an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. According to Kos, EU officials face a fundamental question: does Serbia still meet the criteria for EU membership? She stressed that Serbia is at a crossroads, as the accession process requires not only coming to terms with the past and genuine reconciliation but also strict adherence to the rule-of-law principles. The country’s strategic orientation itself is at stake, and Brussels needs to determine how sincere Belgrade is about its European choice.

Several obvious conclusions can be drawn from these remarks. Brussels is openly questioning the sincerity of the Serbian leadership’s intentions and its willingness to carry out far-reaching reforms. The emphasis on “strategic orientation” directly points to the EU’s dissatisfaction with Serbia’s attempts to sit on two chairs, with Belgrade being expected to make an unequivocal choice in favour of Europe. At the same time, Brussels’ longstanding and stringent demands concerning domestic reforms and the resolution of the Kosovo issue remain the main sticking points. Thus, for the EU, this election is not merely a domestic political event, but a test of whether Serbia will continue its path towards the European family or ultimately cement its model of balancing between the West and the East.

The most likely outcome of the election remains a victory for Aleksandar Vučić’s party. Despite the wave of anti-government protests that has continued since the tragedy in Novi Sad, the incumbent authorities rest on a formidable and resilient political foundation. This includes strong support among conservative, rural and lower-income voters, for whom the image of a “strong leader” serves as the main guarantee of stability. The decision to dissolve parliament has shown that in times of crisis, Vučić skilfully uses early elections to consolidate his power and regain control of the political agenda.

Nevertheless, even with the ruling political machine’s formidable resources, the October 25 election carries serious risks if the protest movement manages to overcome its internal divisions. In such a scenario, voters could well turn the ballot into an instrument for a fundamental change in the political system. For these reasons, the upcoming election will be more than just another electoral milestone; it will be a severe test of the viability of Vučić’s political system itself amid deep-seated public demand for change.