Why does Iran mount tensions with Azerbaijan? Is Tehran flexing muscles?

On October 30, the Iranian Foreign Minister initiated a phone conversation with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov to discuss regional issues and gave an exact day of the Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammed Bagir Ghalibaf’s official visit to Azerbaijan. According to Iran, the speaker’s visit would positively affect the bilateral relations between the two states. Though Ghalibaf’s upcoming visit seems as Tehran’s move for gradual de-escalation with Azerbaijan amid mounting diplomatic tensions, official Baku seems unenthusiastic to give any concessions to Iran in exchange for soft rhetoric.

Azerbaijan does not hide the fact that it is unsatisfied with the recently launched military drills at its southern borders with Iran. On October 20, 2022, the ground forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched massive military exercises in the immediate vicinity of the border with Azerbaijan. While the current exercises coincided with the massive military drills of Iran conducted in October 2021, official Tehran states that “the drills are not directed against neighbouring states,” adding that the Azerbaijani authorities have been informed regarding the upcoming exercises to be held near the Aras River.

The bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have undergone acute tension and conflict since the end of the second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. The main reason for the deepening turbulence between Baku and Tehran was the former's close partnership with Israel, an arch-foe of Islamist Iran. Obviously, in the post-war period, Azerbaijan-Israel strategic partnership entered a new phase becoming explicitly visible, unlike in the pre-war period, when Baku used to delicately balance between Tel-Aviv and Tehran in order not to anger the latter. Indeed, Tehran's decision to amass a vast number of troops at the border with Azerbaijan and the usage of pontoon bridges, simulating the passage of military equipment along the Aras River, stirred public debates in Baku, including state officials.

Hence, the frequent large military drills with the participation of a large number of ground forces and other military equipment are demonstrative by design to showcase Baku Tehran's sensitivity to what it perceived as the Azerbaijani side crossing several "red lines." However, seemingly the growing harsh rhetoric of Tehran toward Azerbaijan, Israel, and to some extent Türkiye, another powerful geopolitical rival, backfired as Türkiye’s and Israel’s engagement with Azerbaijan has grown significantly since 2021 with the Israeli Defense chief Bennie Gants visiting Baku on October 3 to foster defence cooperation between the two states.

Hence, as a logical continuation of the strained diplomatic relations, the Azerbaijani authorities began loudly speaking about the necessity of opening an embassy in Israel. Arzu Naghiyev, a member of the Azerbaijani Parliament, in his recent interview, stated that "a decision has already been made to open the embassy in Israel, and it can be delayed only for technical reasons.” The statement should not come as a surprise since Baku's long-term strategy of balancing between Israel and the Muslim world now seems less relevant at a time when numerous Arab states established diplomatic relations with Israel based on the Abraham accords and normalization process between Israel and Türkiye.

Although Iran’s earlier warnings and military drills at the doorstep with Azerbaijan were motivated by deepening Baku-Tel-Aviv and Baku-Ankara cooperation formats, the current diplomatic escalation appeared to be motivated by Azerbaijan's intentions to open a new transit link connecting Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan with the Azerbaijani mainland, a route that Baku calls the Zangezur corridor. The proposed route passes along Armenia's border with Iran and offers economic benefits to all participating parties, including Armenia while making Iran a bystander.

The uncertain consequences of the proposed route to its national interests and diminishing influence in regional affairs push Tehran to take more radical steps and obtain aggressive rhetoric against nearly all Azerbaijani-Turkey-led regional. Hence, amid rising diplomatic tensions, Iran clearly stated that “it will not permit the blockage of its connection route with Armenia, and in order to secure that objective, the Islamic Republic of Iran also launched a wargame in that region.”

Iran, which missed a chance to act as a mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia during the war and in the post-war period, eyes new means of influence over the regional states referring to national interests and security concerns. Thus, on October 20, the Iranian Foreign Minister demonstratively inaugurated a new consulate in Kapan, in the flashpoint province of Syunik, which borders Azerbaijan and Iran. The decision was a retaliatory move against Türkiye’s decision to set up a consulate in Shusha city.

Notwithstanding Iran's aggressive rhetoric toward Azerbaijan, official Baku appears to feel more confident in the post-Karabakh war and Russo-Ukrainian war periods, as the long-term status quo and balance of power in the region has shifted, creating more manoeuvring space for Azerbaijan. Under the new realities, Iran's open threats toward Azerbaijan raise eyebrows but do little in terms of shifting Azerbaijan's foreign policy priorities. On the contrary, Tehran's gambit with military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan in 2021 resulted in a similar kind of Turkey-Azerbaijan joint exercises in Nakhchivan, and the current muscle show of Iran in 2022 in the border area will likely result in the establishment of an embassy of Azerbaijan in Israel.

Nevertheless, Azerbaijan signals that there is still space for a diplomatic solution to the current diplomatic crisis between Baku and Tehran, referring to the successful history of long-term partnership within various regional cooperation formats encompassing nearly all regional states.

Fuad Shahbazov