European advices to Armenia: Live fast, die young Sensational data about the EU mission in Armenia

Seemingly, the rock-n-roll principle, which was put in the title of the article, quite accurately reflects the self-destructive course of post-war Armenia. In recent months, the South Caucasian republic has been reminiscent of a steam boiler into which stokers keep throwing coal, deliberately raising the pressure. In the role of stokers - Pashinyan and Co., led by the instructions of the European Union (EU) Mission. We want to talk about the latter once again, in particular, since the editorial office of Caliber.Az received interesting information about this mission from reliable sources.

The fact is obvious that this mission is not a civilian one, but of a military-intelligence nature, as we already wrote. A careful analysis of the very personality of the mission's head, Markus Ritter, an experienced intelligence agent under police cover, whose track record includes the duty as chief of staff of the UN mission in Kosovo (2004-2005), the chief of staff of the UN observation mission in Georgia (2007-2008), Head of Programming and Operations of the EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan (2012-2013), and Head of the EU Advisory Mission in Baghdad (2017-2019). As you may know, the implementation of such responsible tasks requires special training. This, as well as other data, which will be discussed below, indicates the seriousness and long-term intentions of the European mission.

A curious phrase voiced by Ritter in a recent infamous interview with Deutsche Welle, namely: "We are not those who can intervene, we only have binoculars and cameras," is nothing more than an elegant and at the same time cynical clue that points to the true nature of the mission's activity - to watch and peep. By the way, speaking of cameras, the German intelligence officer withheld one juicy detail. According to exclusive data obtained by the editors of Caliber.Az, the EU mission, in partnership with the Armenian special services, organized covert video surveillance in the brothels of Gyumri, which helped collect compromising evidence on Russian military personnel to further induce them to cooperate. At the same time, local residents, recruited by the Armenian special services, lure the married Russian servicemen into intimate video chats - while their records, of course, are stored and transferred to the appropriate authorities. Fortunately, the operation goes seamlessly - obviously, the sad experience of the hero of Russia, General Matovnikov, did not become a lesson for the Russian military. The orchestrator of the Caucasian peep show is the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, a native of the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Until recently, the efforts to collect compromising evidence were successful, if not for the disastrous case of a Russian lieutenant colonel at the end of February, who faced elements of blackmail and ran to the command of the 102nd Russian base for help.

These details portray the whole process in a fairly tragicomic way. Having learned about this hostile act, the Russian special authorities have already banned their military personnel from leaving the base for non-official purposes. Thus, a small Gyumri cauldron is threatening to appear inside the large Armenian cauldron. Maybe the treacherous Europeans are counting on a senseless and merciless Russian revolt? We will certainly continue to follow the development of the Gyumri sexual crisis, which seems to gain more momentum. To further develop the activities of the European guests, the already mentioned Armen Grigoryan recently met in one of the Yerevan restaurants with the leadership of the EU mission - Ritter and his French deputy responsible for military intelligence. It's no secret that an informal sitting is often the best way to discuss serious plans. There is no doubt that the main voyeur of Armenia was instructed by Herr Ritter with all German thoroughness under the encouraging smile of his French colleague.

All relevant working conditions have been created for this military intelligence mission. Retired and current Armenian military and intelligence officers are involved as "local personnel" and consultants. They help to channel the Armenian soldiers who were trained in Russian military schools into the mission’s scope. Through them, in turn, contacts are established with their former classmates who are members of the Russian Armed Forces to obtain information on the situation in the Russian army and Ukraine, which is then transferred to NATO. It is noteworthy that Western diplomats at meetings with foreign colleagues do not even hide the fact that the EU mission in Armenia officially shares all the information it has collected with NATO. It has also surfaced that near the ill-fated base in Gyumri, GSM and Internet Communication Intelligence systems are equipped - tactical ground platforms Butzbach, Langen and Rheinhausen, used to intercept the conversations of Russian military personnel, their direction-finding, as well as the analysis of incoming and outgoing traffic. In addition, state-of-the-art signal decoding systems are used in certain locations. It should be added here that similar equipment is also installed on the conditional border with Azerbaijan to wiretap the Azerbaijani military. In this regard, it is extremely important for our Armed Forces to take measures to completely exclude telephone conversations, including the seizure of mobile phones from soldiers.

The probable medium-term goal of such vigorous EU endeavours is the withdrawal of the Russian base from Gyumri, and in general, squeezing Russia out of the region, and later (in 2025) also the transfer of a Western mission (EU, OSCE or UN) to Karabakh to replace Russian peacekeepers. For these purposes, anti-Russian sentiments are systematically inflated in Armenia.

The Kremlin, which is well aware of the activities of the EU mission, has so far lost in horizon either in bewilderment or in a bid to catch the most suitable moment. The paradox is that Russia cannot today capture Armenia, since it has already captured it a long time ago. The base stood as it stands. The Kremlin cannot build up its power, let alone carry out large-scale operations, for well-known reasons (the war in Ukraine). Therefore, all moves probably toward regression. Maintaining the status quo against the backdrop of the tricks of the ubiquitous Europeans is becoming increasingly difficult. Yes, the economy is in the hands of Russian state-owned companies. However, Moscow is not particularly in a hurry to leverage economic pressure methods, because each such step will further alienate the Armenian society from Russia... In this regard, the Kremlin has so far limited itself to half measures, including a ban on the import of dairy products from Armenia.

Amidst Azerbaijan's progressive fortification of sovereignty over its territory, which is in the zone of temporary responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping mission (RPM), and the impossibility of active operations in Karabakh due to the position of the Azerbaijani side, Moscow does not have multiple choices for manoeuvres. The Kremlin is seemingly going to try to negotiate with Baku an extension of the peacekeeping mandate for another five years in exchange for active assistance in the reintegration of Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijan. But in this scenario, there are no guarantees that Armenia will already come out in favour of extending the period for RPM’s deployment in Karabakh. As already mentioned, it will actively seek to replace Russian peacekeepers with Western ones. In this near stalemate, Moscow will likely try to use its entire intelligence assets in Armenia to counter the European onslaught and keep Armenia within its orbit. It would be naïve to believe in some results without serious clashes ...

Meanwhile, the "Karabakh" vector in the political and diplomatic dimension is led by the Special Representative of the European Union for the South Caucasus, Estonian national Toivo Klaar. His task is to prepare the ground for the deployment of the military mission of Western countries in Karabakh. To this end, French proxies, such as the Sasna Tsrer party are supported, revanchist sentiments are fueled in Armenia, and the idea of “miatsum” is still breathing. Simultaneously, Western organisations are actively financing civil society in Armenia.

By the way, Klaar’s appointment, too, is not accidental. The Baltic (Estonia) and Polish intelligence services are at the forefront of cooperation with the Armenian intelligence services, providing technical and advisory support to the emerging Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service. Considering that the Baltic countries and Poland form the pro-American intra-European opposition to France, and the mission is led by a representative of Germany, which also competes with France for leadership in Europe, it can be concluded that the United States directly controls the mission, and is not so naive as to transfer this function to the French as the latter certainly would not turn it down.

As you can get from the abovementioned facts, the EU mission in Armenia is divided into three camps. The Baltic-Polish camp is responsible for working with Russia, the German one is mainly for the Turkish direction, and the French are mainly instructed to establish ties with Iran, as well as throw weight behind internal Armenian revanchist forces.

Thus, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran, also known as SEPAH in Persian, which introduces itself as “irreconcilable” to what it calls the “devilish” West, is, in fact, quite open to cooperation with the EU mission. The reason is Tehran’s big concerns stemming from the Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance, the expansion of which the Islamic Republic sees a huge threat to itself, given the factor of South Azerbaijan. However, this tactical vision of Iran in the future will lead to even greater problems, since at the very first signal from the United States, the mission may redesign its activities against Tehran. The extent to which the French can be trusted in this light can be seen in the example of the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi ...

As for the Turkish direction, it is not surprising that Germany, where the Turkish diaspora of two million people resides, has an extensive network of contacts in this leading European country. Such an important task as gathering facts about the intentions of Azerbaijan's closest ally is thus under the direct control of Mr Ritter.

In a nutshell, such a zealous activity of the EU mission indirectly indicates that, in principle, the Armenian society and Prime Minister Pashinyan himself were ready for a big peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The incoming data indicate that revanchist sentiments are artificially and skillfully pumped from outside. Indeed, besides Russia, the West has another enemy - the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem and the Turkic world as a whole. The West is well aware that Armenia’s incorporation into the orbit of the Turkic world will forever cut the tangle of contradictions coiled for centuries. An acute desire to prevent such a scenario makes dubious allies - the Germans and the French – team up in a single front. Neither the Russian nor the Western project in the region is beneficial for Azerbaijan, and even more so any form that could offer both in a single box. The task of Azerbaijan, using the mutual interests of each of the parties, is to achieve the neutralisation of actions hostile to itself. The two parties with which we have at least, if not zero, common interests are France and Iran. It is no coincidence that they work in tandem. Baku needs to convince the US and Germany to take Iran out of its partnership with the EU mission in Armenia. In any case, the fate of Armenia, which has turned its territory either into a training ground or into a booth, hangs in the balance. If it dies itself, it can cause trouble for the entire region. Our goal is to get out of this situation not only without losses but also with maximum benefit. To do this, we have a strong army, advantageous positions on the ground, and the diplomatic skill of the highest leadership. The great gamble in the Caucasus keeps on.