The post-war future of the Persian Gulf Redefining security and strategy

Most experts, when discussing the current war in the Middle East, focus primarily on the material damage caused by the bombings to the Persian Gulf states and their infrastructure. While the direct consequences of Iranian strikes are undoubtedly important, it should be noted that, in the long term, a far more significant issue will be the reassessment of the entire strategy of the regional countries, which has been based on American security guarantees. This will affect both economic matters and various aspects of political development.

Until recently, the Gulf countries have been making their plans based on the expectation of long-term geopolitical stability. An example of such a long-term strategy is Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” programme, aimed at reducing dependence on oil, diversifying the economy, and developing public healthcare, education, infrastructure, recreational sectors, and tourism. The authorities planned to create free economic zones, remove bureaucratic barriers, and provide incentives for foreign companies, which was expected to attract new investment. Qatar pursued a similar policy.

The current crisis is radically different from previous upheavals: the attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil processing facilities in 2019, the crises surrounding the Abraham Accords, the bombings in Qatar, and so on. Now, almost all countries in the region have been affected: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. In these states, the events are generating deep mistrust both toward Iran and the United States, in which they had recently pledged to invest $3.4 trillion. After all, it turns out that the opposing sides are completely ignoring the security concerns of their allies, neighbours, and partners.

All of this forces a revision of projects like “Vision 2030.” It and its equivalents will have to be adjusted to achieve strategic autonomy and security as the foundation of state survival. In many ways, this objective conflicts with the original openness to investment built into these plans, and this tension will shape the policies of the Persian Gulf states over the next decade.

The Gulf states had built their plans for a “post-oil era” based on the assumption that the region, no longer merely an energy supplier, would become an indispensable hub of global capital, tourism, and diplomatic mediation—a kind of Swiss model for Europe. For many years, the countries of the region invested significant resources in strengthening this identity, which was destroyed in just a few months. Restoring it is a far more complex task than reconstructing bombed oil refineries and storage facilities.

Kings and emirs do not know what to tell their partners in sovereign and investment funds, CEOs of multinational companies, or international investors. Rebuilding the lost reputation of a “safe haven” cannot be achieved with press releases. The problem can only be solved through a new security policy, the path to which is fraught with numerous obstacles and difficulties—many of which are still hard to anticipate.

“Vision 2030” and similar projects were based on the assumption that the state should redirect its revenues from military spending to investments in human capital, culture, and innovation. This was a strategic choice that involved a significant reduction in the defence budget. The outbreak of war has effectively turned these priorities upside down.

The most striking example is that Saudi Arabia, while cutting the budget for NEOM—the region’s ambitious futuristic megaproject fully powered by renewable energy—is now forced to increase allocations for Patriot batteries and the expansion of missile defence systems. At the same time, the Gulf states cannot publicly acknowledge changes to their plans, as this would undermine investor confidence. Apparently, they will attempt to “manage tensions” as quietly and discreetly as possible, which will significantly slow the implementation of all programmes overall.

At the same time, Washington—intentionally or not—has effectively accelerated the processes of multipolarity, which it verbally opposes. It is important to emphasise that the question now being asked in the foreign ministries of the Persian Gulf states is no longer “should we diversify security relations?”—that decision has effectively already been made. The key question now is whether this diversification will evolve into an institutionalised position of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or develop into a series of separate agreements that Washington can selectively manipulate.

This choice will be decisive. It will shape how the Gulf states are perceived in the coming years. Different forms of bilateral cooperation—Saudi–Chinese energy pacts, UAE–Russian financial corridors, Qatar–Turkish defence agreements—are, in reality, variants of political models designed primarily to balance American influence. A new institutional and collective security doctrine within the GCC, in turn, would reposition the region on the international stage in ways that no single U.S. administration could reverse.

Within the corridors of power in the Gulf states, there are still technocrats, financiers, and security officials with close ties to Washington, as well as a broader circle of influential figures who, albeit somewhat uncertainly, believe that proximity to American power still provides some measure of protection. One cannot say their position is irrational, since maintaining institutional ties with the global hegemon can be seen as rational pragmatism. However, the dramatic events unfolding before our eyes are undermining the position of this camp on a daily basis.

As for Iran, a strategy of “institutional containment” will be applied. This will be a long-term, multi-step, carefully planned policy that does not entail a complete break in relations. Everyone understands that abandoning diplomacy comes at a high cost. Part of this strategy will include the procurement of Turkish drone systems, strengthening ties with Pakistan—which possesses nuclear weapons and serves as a bridge to Southeast Asia—and increasing control over maritime routes via Egypt, among other measures. All of this will limit Iran’s room for manoeuvre and place its ambitions under the supervision of its neighbours.

In the emerging post-war order, the traditional regional architecture—based on American supremacy combined with the loyalty of the Gulf states—is giving way to a more fragmented and multipolar system. While the Persian Gulf will not be swept by a wave of anti-American sentiment, it is no longer submissive. This will influence everything: energy pricing, arms purchases, choice of international mediators, and so on. However, this independence comes at a cost. The budgets allocated to NEOM and the spending on Patriot systems come from the same treasury. For this reason, the Gulf states will have to learn for a long time how to balance growing defence expenditures with the need to invest in the region’s future.