Türkiye’s growing role in Caspian Sea region may expose Russia’s fears Is it time to shift dominant positions?

The newly unstable security environment that emerged in the wake of the Russo-Ukraine war has created an array of challenges for Eurasia in general and for the Caspian Sea region in particular.

Nowadays, the Caspian region has its own specific security-related issues, such as the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea or continuing disputes over the offshore cross-border oil and gas deposits, which could also cause a number of complications. Nevertheless, the Caspian littoral states attempted to build a fruitful cooperation format in the region to eliminate political disputes and build an environment of mutual trust.

The security factor has been a key factor in the Caspian basin and therefore pushed the littoral states to establish their small navy forces to tackle possible threats. For many years, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla has been dominant on the waters of the inland sea for so long that many are inclined to ignore the fact that, in recent years, it is far from the only national navy that matters. Moscow’s long-term influence in the post-Soviet region became the main reason for the regional states to maintain a limited military presence in the Caspian Sea.

The littoral states, namely Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, used their national flotillas as coast guards to support search-and-rescue efforts or to protect offshore drilling platforms and pipelines rather than for more conventional defence. Although the Caspian Sea is a closed basin for foreign navies, the current regional dynamics and balance of power made the emergence of stronger navies for regional states necessary.

As such, Kazakhstan, and to some extent Turkmenistan, took a step forward and adopted a different approach that not only builds on coastal defence but also focuses on sea corridors through increasingly shallow waters. With Russia’s waning influence, Astana sought a larger role in the Caspian Sea and expanded its flotilla. As such, its Zenith factory signed an agreement with Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group to build naval vessels in Uralsk.

Until recently, Russia-based factories were the main contractors for Kazakhstan’s ships. Such a move will sideline Russia’s efforts to maintain the role of the leading Caspian navy power. Moreover, the other two Turkish companies will take part in the implementation of Kazakhstan's Caspian project, which will begin with the construction of the shipyard.

As for Türkiye, the country will further expand in the Central Asian region and deepen military ties with Kazakhstan, thus marginalizing Russia even more. Moscow officials are increasingly taking notice of these developments, with some warning that other littoral states may follow Kazakhstan in naval matters.

For example, prior to the Astana – Ankara agreement, Turkmenistan established a partnership with Türkiye to build a tugboat named Gudrat in 2014. Tugboats ensure the safe passage of dry cargo ships, tankers and passenger ships via a navigable canal and their mooring.

Ankara’s growing footprint in the Caspian basin triggered alarm in Moscow as some conservative politicians in Russia urged the government to take adequate measures to boost the Kremlin’s influence in Central Asia. Ankara has found a way around the restrictions on introducing foreign navies on the Caspian.

The Turkish government’s efforts to assume a leading role in the development of the Central Asian states’ militaries, as was outlined in the case of Kazakhstan during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Turkey in May 2022, right after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolded.

In this spite, it is fair to note that Ankara's partnership with Kazakhstan regarding shipbuilding is a part of its extended vision regarding its historical ties to the Central Asian region. Consequently, Türkiye made additional inroads into the region through the South Caucasus region, the southern borders of Russia, particularly after the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020.

As a result, Azerbaijan became an ideal platform for the geopolitical expansion of Türkiye in the Caspian region. As a natural ally of Ankara, Baku also took the opportunity to upgrade its Caspian navy with support from the former.

Such a policy perfectly explains the intensive Azerbaijan-Türkiye-Kazakhstan cooperation format that gained momentum in the last two years. Notwithstanding Astana’s strive toward Türkiye, it will maintain trade and military partnership with Russia due to the long-existing record for nearly three decades.

Moreover, Ankara is still far from being the only dominant power in the Caspian Sea as it very much clearly hopes to be. Indeed, building ships and military contracts are insufficient to push Moscow out of the region. Otherwise, the Caspian Sea region could easily trigger a wider competition between various regional actors, including Russia, Türkiye, Iran and the West.