Why is Iran interested in SCO membership? Aligning with Russia-China, and distancing the West

India hosted the last summit of leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), made up of India itself, Russia, China, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and very recently Iran, which admitted as a new full member of the organization after several years of negotiations.

Created in 2001, the SCO, which brings together more than half of the world's population, focuses on regional security, the fight against regional terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism.

While the SCOs possess a limited influence in the region despite its huge ambitions, for Iran, the new membership is another step toward tackling international isolation amid growing pressure. The membership comes as Iran seeks better ties with Russia, China, and Central Asia to break international isolation and sanctions from the United States and Europe. To this end, Iran's non-oil trade with SCO member states rose 31% to more than $17 billion from March to August of last year.

Unlike Central Asian nations, Iran seeks new ways of deepening engagement with Russia and China, while others prefer to keep some distance from Moscow in light of its invasion campaign in Ukraine and international sanctions.

In fact, Tehran has made some political moves in recent times to overcome this political isolation, such as exerting some influence on the most radical Palestinian Shiite groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad in order to get them to relax their hostility towards Israel, Iran's arch-rival, and agreed to de-escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia in a China-brokered agreement in March 2023. As a result, Tehran managed to ease regional tensions, improve ties with the immediate neighbourhood, and focus on new angles of partnership.

Since its creation, the SCO has offered Russia and China a central diplomatic platform. From the outset, the convergence of its member states, notably around the notion of multipolarity, was a response to NATO’s enlargements in the 2000s. However, it is not a counterpart to NATO.

The SCO is indeed more diversified in its actions, ensuring, in particular, infrastructure projects. In contrast, security cooperation is limited by the principle of non-intervention. It is also devoted to the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

The SCO has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. Thus, the SCO can accommodate competitors like Pakistan and India. Considering that the SCO is functioning smoothly with India and Pakistan, Iran's membership would soon pave the way for Saudi Arabia's possible inroads into the organization.

Since 2019, the Saudi kingdom has significantly shifted its traditional U.S.-oriented policy, gradually bolstering ties with Russia and China despite Western objections. Therefore, Riyadh's potential membership will ease Beijing’s efforts to manoeuvre between Iran and Saudi.

Moreover, China's vocal criticism of Western-imposed sanctions against Iran adds more value to the integration within the organization. Furthermore, China's economic power enables it to bring generous economic opportunities to all member states.

The country has established a unique facility named China-Shanghai Cooperation Organization Local Economic and Trade Cooperation Demonstration Area in Qingdao, east China's Shandong Province, to stimulate economic linkages and investment.

Even so, differences between member states have constrained the bloc’s policy coordination and regional integration since its inception. This is partly due to its insufficient bureaucratic capacity and its institutional design. As such, such a low perspective prevents the organization from developing into a vehicle with tangible benefits for Iran.

Indeed, Iran has greater expectations from the SCO membership regarding economic and trade benefits. However, amid security cataclysms, it is noteworthy that Tehran is willing to boost defence ties with the Russia-China duo for a more sophisticated arms supply as the primary privilege of the membership.

Despite Iran's enthusiasm and high expectations, some SCO member states, like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are sceptical regarding the organization's abilities and global ambitions amid Russia’s failures in Ukraine and the very recent military mutiny of Yevgeni Prigozhin, Kremlin-linked oligarch and Wagner PMC chief. Simultaneously, Astana and Tashkent feel comfortable taking a critical stance toward Russia and diversifying their partnership with non-regional actors like Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the EU.

However, unlike those countries, Iran’s diplomatic abilities to reach out to other non-member states for a comprehensive partnership are limited at this stage, mainly due to its close alignment with Russia in Ukraine's invasion. Iran's membership in the SCO will boost its regional influence, but unlikely add additional value to the role it assumed. At this stage, Iran needs the SCO more than it needs Tehran, as it will give Iran another platform to voice concerns and gain more support amid political and economic instability.