Will opening of Azerbaijani embassy in Israel stir up tensions with Iran? An alliance in search of renewal

In light of the mounting tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, Israeli media reported that Azerbaijan to open an embassy in Tel-Aviv soon. The renewed diplomatic tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan that occurred since early October 2022 will likely de-escalate gradually in a few weeks, though the quick reproachment between Baku and Tehran would take longer. Amid political unrest at home, a stagnating economy, and mounting international pressure on Tehran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) demonstratively initiated large-scale military drills by deploying a vast number of Soviet-era weaponry at its northwestern doorstep with Azerbaijan, simultaneously issuing threats against Israel and Azerbaijan.

Two years ago, Tehran's war games at its border with Azerbaijan and bellicose rhetoric would have become a source of concern in Baku. However, with the current post-Karabakh war realities in the South Caucasus region and Azerbaijan's official alignment (politically and militarily) with Türkiye, and Iran’s attempts to put pressure on Baku quickly backfired as, on October 24, an Azerbaijani parliament member Arzu Naghiyev stated that "there is already a decision" and that "technical reasons can only delay the opening of Azerbaijan's embassy in Israel."

Beyond strategic partnership

For many years Israel and Azerbaijan enjoyed cordial relations and strategic partnership, particularly in the defence industry field, though Azerbaijan abstained from opening an embassy in Tel-Aviv, referring to its relations with Muslim countries and the Iranian factor. Nevertheless, seemingly the Azerbaijani authorities decided to shift their stance on the issue in the wake of deteriorating relations with Iran and the Türkiye-Israel reconciliation process. It is noteworthy that in the last two years, official Baku has been silently promoting and fostering the diplomatic normalization process between Ankara and Tel Aviv in order to create a relevant counterbalance in the South Caucasus region. Indeed, Iran steadily becomes a destabilizing factor in its immediate region and beyond by supplying its long-term ally Russia with kamikaze drones to be used against Ukraine, thus becoming a conflict party.

In this vein, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz’s unexpected visit to Baku on October 3 should not come as a surprise, as Tel-Aviv is highly interested in assisting Azerbaijan to preserve its long-term stability and countering any regional threats, including those stemming from Islamist Iran. According to the Israeli media, the defence chief's visit was “dedicated to security and policy issues” without further clarification. While meeting with the Azeri officials, Gantz “emphasized the importance of maintaining strategic relations between the State of Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan and continuing to work towards regional and global peace and stability.”

An anxious Iran

Given the successful history of strategic partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan, Iran has been accusing its northern neighbour of enabling the Israeli intelligence forces to monitor the Iranian border through Azerbaijani territory, though Tehran failed to present any evidence of it. In 2021, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Jabrayil district, a few kilometres away from the Iranian border, and responded to Tehran's accusations: “Let them open their eyes and look. Where do they see Israel here? Not a single person lives here. There is not a single building here. Is there proof? No.”

Obviously, Azerbaijan-Israel engagement angers not only the Iranian authorities at home, but also abroad. A better explanation of this attitude may be attributed to the recent tweet post of the Israeli ambassador in Azerbaijan George Deek pictured with the book titled Magic Tales of Tabriz. In response, the Iranian ambassador in Azerbaijan Abbas Mousavi called Deek "the First Evil Zionist" who "is going to be buried by the zealous people of Tabriz," referring to a city in northwestern Iran, which is home to a large Azeri minority.

Although the earlier diplomatic tensions between Baku and Tehran were motivated by the Baku-Tel-Aviv-Ankara axis, the renewed war of words and war games were motivated by Azerbaijan’s attempts to open a land route connecting Nakhchivan exclave to the mainland through Armenia's Syunik province, thus linking Azerbaijan and Turkey directly. As such, the Iranian MFA unexpectedly issued a statement claiming that Tehran considers Armenian security as its own national security, which caused an outrage in Azerbaijan. Hence, shortly after this statement, the Iranian Foreign Minister held a phone conversation with Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov reiterating that “Iran considers Azerbaijan's security its own security and is opposed to the stationing of foreign forces in the region,” making one step forward for de-escalation.

Notwithstanding Iran's stance on the Azerbaijan-Israel partnership, Tehran prefers to turn a blind eye to Armenia, dubbed as its strategic partner, the establishment of an embassy in Israel in 2020 and a Russian military base on its soil. Apparently, Yerevan's critical partnership with Russia and, to some extent, with Israel does not pose any threat to Tehran, while Azerbaijan, with its joint regional infrastructure and investment projects with Iran, seems as a source of concern for Iran.

Nevertheless, unlike previous years, Azerbaijan, which strengthened its positions and consolidated military power in the post-Karabakh war, seemingly is not interested in giving any concessions to Iran amid the latter's unjustified accusations and fulfil the so-called requirements to "cease all ties with Israel."

What to expect?

While the ongoing Baku-Tehran diplomatic standoff leads nowhere, there is still limited space for a diplomatic solution. Iran apprehends that it lost the most potent means of pressure on Azerbaijan, the Karabakh issue in 2020, and it has no real mechanisms to revert Azerbaijan’s plans regarding establishing a diplomatic presence in Israel. Therefore, it is most likely that Tehran will accept the reality of growing Israeli influence in Azerbaijan and more engagement within the Baku-Tel Aviv-Ankara cooperation format. As for Azerbaijan, the country would expect more vocal support of Iran to Armenia as a retaliation to the upcoming embassy project in Tel-Aviv, though Baku is confident that internationally-isolated Tehran has little to offer Armenia being under an economic blockade.

Unlike Tehran-Yerevan cooperation, the Baku-Tel Aviv cooperation format looks more promising in terms of economic, military, energy, and tourism fields. The recently ratified agreement on air communication between the two states is another serious milestone as it will increase the number of passengers, luggage and cargo transits through countries’ territories bringing the two nations closer.