Armenian ex-president's back-door games may put an end to Pashinyan's political career
Over the recent days, Armenian TG channels have been intensively circulating certain insight from Iran. It is about the details of the Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan's visit to Tehran last week and his meeting with his Iranian counterpart Ali Shamkhani.
Orientalist and political analyst Andranik Hovhannisyan was the first to break the news on his TG channel on April 16. "According to my Iranian colleagues, during his latest visit to Tehran, at a closed meeting with the Secretary of Iran's Supreme Security Council Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of Armenia's Security Council Armen Grigoryan made a rather loud statement that Moscow mounts pressure on Yerevan to provide a corridor through the territory of Sunik (Zangazur - Ed.) to establish a land link between Russia and Türkiye through Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nakhichivan (Nakhchivan - Ed.). According to the same reports, the Iranian authorities were ambivalent about Grigoryan's words, perceiving them as an attempt by the West, through individuals under its control in the Armenian authorities, to drive a wedge into relations between Tehran and Moscow," he wrote.
What is strange about this news is that the consultations at the level of the heads of the security councils testify to very trusting relations between the countries. And suddenly, against this background, the Iranian representative suspected his Armenian colleague of being insincere and rushed to tell the whole world about it. It appears that the latter came to the neighbouring country with an urgent problem, one might say to ask for help, while the one who could provide it not only did not offer his hand but even kicked the beggar.
In our view, among several possible reasons for this information leakage, we should go into details of two.
The first version is that Iran has tacit agreements with Russia, including Moscow's obligation towards Tehran not to accelerate the implementation of the Zangazur corridor project. However, despite this agreement, Russia is still trying to push through its profitable plan. In the case of the project's implementation, Russia will be able to boost turnover with Türkiye. And Tehran, which sees in the corridor a threat to its status as a regional power, exposes Moscow's intention and thus a priori "delegitimizes" it. At the same time, unwilling to get into a confrontation with Russia, Iran leaves it an opportunity to save face by blaming it on the West's intrigues.
We should say at the outset that this version seems unlikely to us. Iran, a country with a thousand-year tradition of statehood and diplomacy, would surely have found a more solid way of expressing dissatisfaction with Russia's actions than to use such a dubious way. Foreign Minister Abdollahian could have, say, called his Moscow counterpart Lavrov. It is unlikely that these two powers communicate with each other via Armenian bloggers, who are hardly known in Russia.
Version two: Iranian sources did not share anything with anyone. At the same time, information about Grigoryan's complaint against Russia may or may not have taken place. Something of this kind must have happened since slandering is a trademark style of the Armenian side. But even if such a situation did not take place, Hovannisian could well have been instructed to invent it. He does not represent an official news outlet, so the Iranian side is unlikely to prosecute him for slander.
Andranik Hovhannisian more than once voiced anti-Western and pro-Russian statements, which gives reason to suspect him of having ties with the second Armenian President Robert Kocharian. The fact that the bombastic article was spread by all Armenian pro-Russian Telegram Channels only confirms this suspicion. The main subscribers of the provincial political analyst are Armenians, as noted above. Hence, the addressee of this sensation is the Armenian society.
The aim of the whole operation was to deliver another media strike against Pashinyan's team and facilitate the downgrading of his rating. The Iranian issue is a very good ground for that.
Russia's credibility in Armenia has been badly damaged after its formal non-interference in the Second Karabakh War. The Russian president's signature under the Trilateral cease-fire declaration of November 10, 2020, which actually assumes the exterritoriality of the Zangazur corridor also does not add to Armenians' sympathy towards Russia. Add to this Moscow's refusal to intervene militarily in periodic escalations on the notional Azerbaijani-Armenian border over the past two years and we conclude that Kocharian's chances of coming to power legally are still very, very slim.
Against this background, Kocharian's entire media machine works to manipulate the patriotic sentiments of ordinary Armenians, using every opportunity to portray Pashinyan as a traitor to the nation. Russia's reluctance to "help" Armenia is attributed to Pashinyan's "inherently criminal anti-Russian policy".
In this sense, the case of the EU mission, whose representatives refused to come to the site of the recent escalation near the village of Dygh, was very fortunate. Naturally, the incident was immediately used by the Kocharian media as an example of Pashinyan's failed foreign policy.
That is, Kocharian's propaganda team works to hit any gap that is found. Creating gaps is Pashinyan's special talent. Here too, it is likely that, as mentioned above, Grigoryan did indeed complain to his Iranian counterpart about Russia, which may well have become known to someone else. Kocharian's team had only to invent a reaction from the Iranian authorities to rock the Armenian boat.
Against the background of Russia's reluctance to stand up for Armenia and the unexpected "timidity" of European cops, the only country which in the eyes of Armenians is ready to act as their defender is Iran. Iran is rattling the sabre, threatening Azerbaijan with various punishments, and even carrying out hostile acts against our country. Naturally, all these actions make ordinary Armenians sympathize with their southern neighbour. The ruling group, on the other hand, is trying to get the best out of the situation. We have already written about the level of cooperation between these countries. Here too, Pashinyan's team is on thin ice balancing between the West and a subsanctioned Iran (who knows if the EU mission's "lethargy" is due to jealousy over Armenia's rapprochement with Iran?).
Thus, an alliance with Iran is likely to be among the main factors keeping Pashinyan's rating afloat for the time being (which has a clear downward trend amid a host of unresolved problems, including peace with Azerbaijan).
And here the "cunning" Kocharian found nothing more sophisticated than to concoct a fake story presenting Pashinyan as cheating on Armenia's main ally. Not in the eyes of Iranians, of course, but in the eyes of Armenians - the main audience of this fake.
Curiously, the orientalist concludes his post: "I am aware that my publications are being closely watched in a number of Armenian state structures, including the Foreign Ministry, so I hope that in the shortest possible time they will publicly refute this information or explain the motives behind the actions of Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council, if, of course, they are agreed with the country's top leadership and not with other states."
That is, according to Hovannisyan, "state institutions, including the Foreign Ministry" (no matter what country) are simply obliged to comment, answer and refute every clever blogger, especially when such a "serious issue" is raised. But if they do not answer, it means that it is "just as I said".
Don't you think that this phrase alone has a color of Armenian nonsense, which rules out any seriousness of "insight"?
At the same time, as they say, a river cuts through rock. Given the instability of Pashinyan's foreign policy, there will be more and more of this kind of information. And when they reach a peak, the situation for the Armenian PM may take a very serious turn.