Azerbaijan-Armenia: The enduring ghastliness of cryptomnesia Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

In his latest ‘Contemplations’, Orkhan Amashov critically examines the potential practical value of what could possibly, but not necessarily, be signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia at some point before or during November 2024.

Azerbaijan and Armenia are far from concluding a proper peace treaty. What they may potentially, but not necessarily, sign before or during COP29, would be a preliminary or framework deal. Such a document has never been perceived as one putting an end to all the contentious issues between the sides; its primary function is to be an agreement on peace and normalisation, laying the true foundations for a future comprehensive treaty.

So, in some ways, we have always known that the preliminary accord would lack specifics and entail some tolerable vagueness. But still, as a bare minimum, it should be reflective of a discernible framework – contours giving rise to enhanced clarity as opposed to mere rigmarole-infused lofty aspirational principles. To be brief, it should say something of practical value.

Needless to say, all framework deals entail unavoidable ‘constructive ambiguity’, and the one in question, as we can confidently expect, will not be different. However, as Fuad Chiragov, Deputy Director of the Centre for the Studies of the South Caucasus, has recently told me, “it should not engender ‘destructive ambiguity’”, subsequently leading to incessant quarrels on semantics pertaining to precepts, but to constructive talks preparing the ground for a comprehensive settlement.

As to the principle of the mutual recognition of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other, the first three of the five basic principles offered by Baku in March 2022, which were later accepted by Yerevan, address some of the key fundamentals, and they will, in one form or another, make it to the deal. Plus, as we also know, it is already agreed that “neither party may invoke its domestic legislation for not implementing its obligations under the peace agreement”.

However, the issue regarding the territorial pretensions against Azerbaijan ingrained in the Armenian constitution is still hanging in the air. Since Yerevan argues that the new constitution will require a referendum and lengthy procedures to finalise the process, the offending ‘miatsum’ provision will remain as it is until early 2027. Simultaneously, the Armenian government is averse to the idea of acknowledging the constitutional obstacle as part of the framework deal and undertaking a written obligation to remedy this within a specified timeframe. As the key stumbling block, this is seriously undermining the prospects of an interim accord at this juncture.

In conjunction with this, there is also a question regarding the de jure disbandment of the OSCE Minks Group, which was once tasked to advance international mediatory efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This group, regarded by many as misbegotten, has been clinically dead for some time. The Minsk Group was fatally wounded in November 2020, when Azerbaijan recovered its territorial integrity via military means. And when subsequent to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the co-chairs ceased to co-ordinate with each other, it became clinically dead.

Although the Minsk Group is obsolete and irrelevant, it should be killed legally too.  This requires Baku and Yerevan to jointly apply for its dissolution. Azerbaijan believes this should and could easily happen as soon as possible, even before the framework deal. In reply to a request by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Armenian Service, the Armenian Foreign Ministry stated: “[We] may consider the issue of the continuation of the Minsk process within the context of the comprehensive settlement of relation and, first of all, the conclusion of a peace treaty”.

Well, a comprehensive deal between the sides won’t be signed for some considerable time. The inference here is that it is not just that Yerevan believes the OSCE Minsk Group should not be disbanded before the framework deal, but even for some time thereafter, technically leaving the door open for its resuscitation. For Baku, this signifies that Armenia has not yet relinquished its territorial claims to Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region, augmenting Baku’s incredulity regarding the other side’s sincerity.

It is still, however, possible that the text of the preliminary deal may include a specific provision regarding joint application to affect the Minsk Group’s de jure dissolution. However, the latest statement coming from the Armenian Foreign Ministry suggests that Yerevan is averse to this as well. 

Let us move on. As we know, the paragraph regarding the opening of communications has by now been removed, on mutual agreement, from the draft text of the framework document. In this regard, Baku has not changed its fundamental position: for as long as the Zangazur Corridor is not opened on Azerbaijani terms, the whole business of the opening of communications involving these two countries won’t happen either. 

Although the framework deal was not supposed to address this issue in its full entirety, only within its very basic contours, what is self-evident is that, since Baku and Yerevan have not even agreed on the very basic principle to guide the process, the exclusion of this very subject from the draft text was deemed as more practical in order not to complicate the conclusion of an initial accord. Nothing criminal here. It is just that the foundational role of the prospective deal as the basis for further normalisation has been somewhat diminished.

One wonders what the fate of the provision regarding delimitation and demarcation of the interstate border will be. Again, although the whole process of border delineation is a separate one and it will continue years after the conclusion of a peace deal itself, for the purpose of the framework deal, one basic provision is still required. Armenia prefers the reference to the latest 1976 Soviet maps in line with the 1991 Alma-Aty Declaration as the basis of the delimitation process within all sections of the border. The view in Baku is that a less restrictive approach, with cartographic documents emanating from earlier years being taken into account, should be employed. There is no evidence that the sides have come up with a compromise construct as of yet. In this vein, Baku and Yerevan may potentially leave the relevant provision out of the text of the framework deal too.

By and large, all things considered, Azerbaijan and Armenia could potentially sign some type of declarative accord of symbolic significance, however, the real practical value of the document in question should by no means be overestimated. On so many occasions, have Azerbaijan and Armenia reportedly been on the verge of signing a long-awaited deal, with those momenta subsequently forgotten, that it feels that we are now all subject to the enduring ghastliness of cryptomnesia. November 2024 is an artificially constructed deadline with very little connection to the actual substance of the negotiations. For the sake of sanity and cold reason, we should all be mindful that, without sufficiently tangible progress over the whole plethora of key issues, the sides will never get near to singing something of all-embracingly substantial nature.

In the case of Baku and Yerevan concluding a deal before or during the course of COP29, in the eyes of the international community, they will both look very plausible, with the US administration taking some credit for it. However, it does not seem very likely that what could potentially be signed will prove to be a proper normalisation document.

What will be then the practical use of it?  Apart from engendering positivity and goodwill, potentially contributing to mutual trust, it will be the very first bilateral document wherein Armenia formally recognises Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh.  In addition, the accord will formalise in writing some of the generic principles agreed, to date, with the parties reaffirming their commitment to conclude a comprehensive peace treaty in the near future. Is this good enough to be going on with? I am not entirely sure. Time will show.