North Korea’s nuclear shadow A delicate balance and a security dilemma

North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state — and a persistent threat to stability in East Asia — is forcing regional countries to search for new mechanisms to safeguard their security.

A recent example of this is South Korea’s appeal for the European Union to act as a mediator in opening dialogue with Pyongyang in an effort to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The proposal was put forward by South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong Young, reflecting Seoul’s continued interest in diplomatic channels despite ongoing hostility with the DPRK.

However, while Seoul has opted for a somewhat unexpected yet still conciliatory approach to managing the crisis, neighbouring Japan has reaffirmed its preference for a tougher diplomatic stance toward North Korea, relying more heavily on pressure coordinated with its allies.

Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi recently emphasised the serious threat posed by Pyongyang to Japan’s national security and pledged that Tokyo would continue close cooperation with the United States, South Korea, and other partners in implementing UN Security Council sanctions, according to Japan Today. He also noted that Japan considers North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs to be a threat not only to its own security but also to international security.

These statements by the Japanese minister came against the backdrop of reports of a series of tests which, according to North Korean state media, included the launch of a ballistic missile equipped with a cluster warhead as well as other weapons systems. The South Korean military, in turn, also reported detecting additional ballistic launches by North Korea toward the Sea of Japan.

At the same time, this is the fourth such incident since the beginning of 2026. As can be seen, North Korean ballistic missile launches toward Japan have become more frequent, and the main trigger for this appears to be statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who, at a military parade held after the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party, announced plans to develop more powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles and strike systems using artificial intelligence and unmanned aerial vehicles.

“We will focus on projects to increase the number of nuclear weapons and expand nuclear operational means,” he emphasised at the time. And, judging by current developments, his words are not at odds with actions, which causes justified concern among neighbouring states, first and foremost Japan, which, in this context, is strengthening its defence capabilities, including expanding missile defence systems, and is relying on pressure from the international community on Pyongyang through UN Security Council resolutions.

Meanwhile, the answer to the key question—“How feasible is Japan’s main demand toward North Korea for complete denuclearisation?”—remains rhetorical, mainly because the Land of the Rising Sun does not possess effective instruments that could compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons.

According to international experts, from an ideological perspective, Japan adheres to a “maximum pressure” approach, which leaves little room for compromise. However, in practical terms, it is only capable of imposing unilateral economic sanctions, extending bans on imports and exports with North Korea. Yet, since Pyongyang conducts virtually no direct legal trade with Tokyo, these measures have little impact on the North Korean economy.

Partly for this reason, Japan has begun to consider the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons. Discussion of this issue in Japanese political circles intensified from the end of 2025, driven both by the increasing frequency of North Korean ballistic missile launches and by concerns over the reliability of security guarantees within its existing alliance with the United States. These concerns were further fueled by statements from President Trump, who argued that the security treaty between the two countries is not fair, as it obliges the United States to defend Japan while placing no reciprocal obligation on Tokyo.

However, it is premature to speak about the actual development of nuclear weapons by the Land of the Rising Sun due to the following reasons. First, the country is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and violating it would entail serious reputational costs.

Second, there is little doubt that Washington would not allow Tokyo to acquire its own atomic bomb: on the one hand, a nuclear-armed Japan is not in the United States’ interest; on the other hand, its development of such weapons of mass destruction could trigger a chain nuclear reaction in the Asia-Pacific region, which would also be disadvantageous for the United States.

Thus, it is unlikely that North Korea will heed Japan’s demands or agree to any meaningful compromise regarding the dismantlement of its nuclear program. The only state capable of exerting effective pressure on Pyongyang in the nuclear sphere is China. If Beijing concludes that Pyongyang is creating risks of war near its borders, it could reduce its economic support for North Korea and tighten control over trade.

Accordingly, taking the Chinese factor into account, the likelihood of Pyongyang initiating an armed conflict in East Asia appears extremely low. A more realistic scenario is one in which North Korea keeps South Korea and Japan in a state of permanent tension, carrying out ballistic missile launches to remind them of its status as a nuclear power seeking to assert influence in the strategically significant East Asian region.