Pashinyan in Astana and Trump’s new plan on Ukraine Caliber.Az weekly review

The Caliber.Az editorial team presents the latest edition of the programme Events with Murad Abiyev.

Azerbaijan – Armenia

The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has for the third time taken part in the seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in Tashkent. Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of the summit was the unanimous recognition of Azerbaijan as a full-fledged participant in this format. This decision is a logical continuation of the ongoing political and economic convergence between the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. From now on, in the context of these regional processes, Azerbaijan cannot be separated from Central Asia.

Meanwhile, Armenia is slowly but steadily joining in as well. Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Astana, the documents signed during the trip, and the statements adopted there collectively demonstrate Yerevan’s course towards strengthening cooperation with the Central Asian region. And this, let me remind you, is impossible without normalising relations with Azerbaijan. A simple example: it was precisely the progress in the settlement process achieved in Washington in August that led Baku to lift its ban on the transit of goods to Armenia through Azerbaijani territory. In early November, trains carrying Kazakh and Russian grain had already reached Armenia via Azerbaijan.

Undoubtedly, the beginning of the unblocking of communications should also boost Pashinyan’s ratings ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections. This has become the second significant factor—after calm on the border—that the incumbent prime minister can add to his, excuse the involuntary tautology, current political assets. For the first time in thirty-five years, the Armenian people can tangibly feel the benefits of peace — in this case, in the form of grain wagons from Kazakhstan and Russia.

Indeed, all this is now starting to play a role in the election campaign. Recently, Pashinyan’s party secured a victory not just anywhere, but in the stronghold of his main opponent — Catholicos Garegin II. The Civil Contract party won an absolute majority in the enlarged Vagharshapat community of the Armavir region, which includes the centre of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the residence of Garegin II, Etchmiadzin. This success suggests that, overall, the Armenian electorate is favourably inclined towards Civil Contract and Nikol Pashinyan.

Meanwhile, a delegation of representatives of Armenian civil society has arrived in Baku as part of confidence-building measures. Caliber.Az will continue to cover the details of this visit in our subsequent reports.

Ukraine – Russia

The main event of the outgoing week in the context of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is linked to Donald Trump’s new peace plan, consisting of 28 points. The project was leaked to the global public by the well-known portal Axios. So, here are some of the key elements: the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdraw from the part of Donbas controlled by Kyiv, where a demilitarised zone is to be created; the United States recognises Crimea and Donbas as part of Russia; NATO pledges not to deploy troops on Ukrainian territory. At the same time, the US and NATO would provide security guarantees to Ukraine. The Russian language would receive official status in Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia would be gradually lifted, and the country would return to the G8. Donald Trump all but confirmed the existence of this plan by giving Kyiv until 27 November to approve it.

At first glance, the plan appears to fully favour Moscow’s interests and reflect its successes on the battlefield. However, things are not so straightforward. The reaction of Vladimir Putin is particularly noteworthy. At a meeting of Russia’s Security Council, he stated that the United States had not discussed Trump’s peace plan with Moscow in any substantive manner, but that it could serve as a basis for resolving the conflict. This can be considered a historic statement, as it is the first time Moscow has officially signalled a departure from its earlier demands — namely, that Kyiv surrender all four regions that Russia has claimed as part of its territory. Moscow has now publicly confirmed the position that American media have been reporting for the past six months: the Kremlin would be satisfied with the full transfer of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to its control. In this sense, one can say that American pressure on Russia is having an effect, and Moscow has, for the first time, acknowledged this.

Accordingly, one can understand the irritation in Kyiv and among European leaders. They sense that the Americans could, hypothetically, continue to apply pressure on Russia — but are choosing not to. Yet this is actually easy to explain. Trump has no need to humiliate Russia, nor does he need to create a situation where uncertainty becomes the decisive factor, as that would entail excessive risks. Trump needs predictability — both in Russia and in Europe — in order to shift his focus to China. To do that, he needs the war to stop. Hence, he is exerting parallel pressure on both Moscow and Kyiv to bring them to a ceasefire. And now we see that Moscow is moving towards what it considers to be a compromise.

The problem is that what Moscow views as a compromise is unacceptable for Kyiv. This is not only about ceding territory. It also concerns Zelenskyy’s personal fate. Any act of capitulation signed by him would automatically spell not only the end of his political career, but also a threat to his personal safety. And beyond that, it is unlikely that any Ukrainian politician would be willing to sign a document relinquishing territory.

Thus, Zelenskyy appears prepared only for a freeze along the current line of contact. However, he did not dare to reject Trump’s plan outright. The Ukrainian leader understands perfectly well that the corruption scandal initiated by agencies accountable to Washington also served the purpose of undermining his position. Zelenskyy will now try to avoid any abrupt moves. He has already stated that he will not allow Ukraine’s enemies to accuse Ukrainians of refusing peace, and has declared that he will work with the United States in search of a constructive solution.

As the most feasible compromise on Zelenskyy’s part, one could assume his potential agreement to withdraw troops from Donbas on the condition that neither the US nor its allies officially recognise the region as Russian territory. In that case, all sides would be able to claim victory: Russia — the so-called “complete liberation” of Donbas; Ukraine — the absence of capitulation after four years of unequal struggle; and Donald Trump — the resolution of the most difficult conflict in his foreign-policy portfolio.

However, even this scenario is hard to believe. Most likely, Zelenskyy will now begin to play for time and fight for his approval ratings. Ukraine will frantically look for an asymmetrical way to inflict maximum damage on Russia; Europeans will increase assistance within the limits of what is possible; the Americans will intensify pressure on Kyiv; and the Russians will step up strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure to create the harshest winter in modern Ukrainian history, with all the resulting consequences. And although in this configuration Ukraine appears to be the weak link, the factor of uncertainty — as always in history and in war — still remains.

The Middle East

The UN Security Council has approved the American peace plan for Gaza. The resolution authorises the transition to the second phase of the US president’s 20-point plan. Among its provisions are the creation of International Stabilisation Forces to demilitarise the territory of Gaza and the establishment of transitional governing bodies.

It is noteworthy that neither Russia nor China chose to veto the resolution, limiting themselves instead to abstaining. And indeed, why enter into confrontation where the United States is already playing first fiddle? On the other hand, why escalate further when the situation on the ground is far from as clear-cut as Washington would like?

Meanwhile, it has emerged that Hamas has rejected Trump’s plan. According to the group, granting international forces governing authority in Gaza would turn them into a party to the conflict supporting the occupation. In short, Hamas refuses to disarm. In Israel, officials are already saying that they will return to the area controlled by Hamas and resume military operations against it.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Washington, where a formal dinner was held in his honour. And indeed, the two sides had something to celebrate. Following the talks, they concluded a series of agreements in various fields, including civil nuclear cooperation, minerals, and the development of artificial intelligence. Crown Prince bin Salman announced that the volume of Saudi investment in the United States would increase from $600 billion to $1 trillion. Donald Trump declared a historic decision — Washington has agreed to sell Riyadh an undisclosed number of F-35 fifth-generation fighter jets, along with three hundred Abrams tanks.

All of this, however, remains at the level of declarations. A number of serious legal procedures still lie ahead before any of it can be implemented, including approval by the US Congress. It is reasonable to assume that the Americans are tying the execution of this decision to Riyadh’s readiness to normalise relations with Israel. In turn, Saudi Arabia has made the creation of a Palestinian state a precondition. Incidentally, the American peace plan contains a rather vague formulation of this point — “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.”

Yet even this vague formulation, combined with the agreements between the US and Saudi Arabia, has caused considerable concern in Israel. Experts and political circles perceive these developments as a threat to their country, which has long been Washington’s priority ally in the region, and fear that the new geopolitical configuration in the Middle East may, in the long run, carry no fewer risks than the old one — which, with great difficulty, had only just been dismantled.