Russia is losing ground in South Caucasus in 2023 The dust of war in the Caucasus has not settled

The ongoing protests of Azerbaijani eco-activists on the Lachin road in Karabakh entered the first month, which triggered sentiments in the Armenian political establishment. While the Russian peacekeeping contingent appeared unable to intervene in the process and address the concerns of both ethnic Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenian communities in the region caused outrage in both societies. As a result, anti-Russian protests kicked off in Armenia's second-largest city Gyumri, where the Russian military base and personnel are deployed. Several hundred people took part in the demonstration on January 8, which was organised by the National Democratic Pole Party, a nationalist, anti-Russia opposition party formed with the merger of Sasna Tsrer and several other minor parties.

The main narrative of Armenian opposition forces is that the Russian peace mission deployed in Karabakh is failed to fulfil its even basic obligations, such as ensuring the safe passage of Armenians from Karabakh to Armenia and vice versa, as well as exerting more power on Azerbaijani side, which in fact is completely irrelevant given the mission's role and status. As a result, 65 people were detained during the demonstration near the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri. Around 100 protesters are said to have marched to the barracks, where up to 3,000 of Moscow's troops are stationed, close to the border with both Turkey and Georgia. It is noteworthy that some demonstrators even demanded the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Gyumri base, citing inaction and ignorance toward ethnic Armenians in Karabakh. 

Indeed, heavy tactical losses in the Ukraine war heavily damaged Russia's image as a critical regional stakeholder and security guarantor in the post-Soviet region. The severe human losses put additional pressure on Russia’s stagnating economy and deepened political dissent at home. Moreover, the looming war forced Moscow to re-route all its resources and get mobilised against Ukraine while neglecting the ongoing process in the Caucasus and Central Asia. As such, critically important regions gradually witnessed the declining Russian influence that paved the way for establishing interregional bilateral and multilateral cooperation formats.

The Kremlin’s large-scale war against Ukraine has vividly demonstrated various weaknesses of the Russian military. Russia maintains two military (7th and 4th) bases in the secessionist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow has occupied since the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Hence, Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of "volunteers" from the post-Soviet region's breakaway regions, such as occupied South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Luhansk and Donetsk, to fight in Ukraine. Simultaneously, earlier reports suggested that Russia deployed additional military staff from its bases in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.

Interestingly, Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war in Ukraine stirred debates even in friendly post-Soviet states regarding its destructive role and ambitions. The current conditions explicitly demonstrate the worsening image of Russia not only in the Western world but also in Armenia, which has long been the main strategic partner of Moscow and its protégé in terms of security. As such, one of the main criticism points in the recent anti-Russia protests in Armenia was Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine. Gagik Sarukhanyan, one of the organisers of demonstrations in Gyumri, called the Russian government a "terrorist regime" that wages war in Ukraine.

Russia's long-term monopoly in Armenia's security sector undoubtedly ignited official Yerevan, particularly in the aftermath of the Velvet revolution in 2018. Since then, more vocal criticism toward Moscow occurred in statements of the ruling government that reached the peak point in the post-Karabakh war in 2020.

Although the Kremlin sought reconciliation with official Yerevan in 2022, the latest press conference of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held on January 10, 2023, where he repeatedly emphasised Russia's inability to ensure the safety of the Lachin road, suggests that the bilateral relations have fluctuated. Moreover, amid rising discontent, Armenia officially rejected to take part in the upcoming joint military drills of the Collective Security Organization Treaty (CSTO), the Russia-led military bloc, referring to the situation in Karabakh. Hence, PM Pashinyan's press conference will raise more questions than answers to existing questions in Armenia and Russia.

In this context, one should acknowledge the fact that the diminishing role of Russia in the South Caucasus promises to create a security gap, simultaneously opening new horizons for non-regional actors like the European Union (EU) and the US to be engaged with the process more. Considering Moscow's unproductive role as a mediator in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, it is likely that the US will push further for a leading role in the process to ensure a breakthrough in the stalled process. Such a move will further alleviate Russia's role as a main regional stakeholder amid the offensive in Ukraine and enable regional states, including Baku and Yerevan, to seek more effective mediation in the post-war period.