The gilding of geopolitics France repatriates gold reserves from the United States

Recently, French President Emmanuel Macron completed a large-scale operation to repatriate the remaining portion of the national gold reserves from the United States. The process took about six months and was carried out through 26 consecutive transactions, which made it possible to avoid sharp market fluctuations and unwanted attention.

The passage refers to 129 tons of gold previously held in vaults of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) in New York. These bars were mostly in non-standard forms from the pre-war and post-war periods. France’s total gold reserves amount to about 2,437 tons, the majority of which has long been stored in underground vaults of the Bank of France in Paris.

The operation was structured as a financial-technical process: the old bars were sold through the infrastructure of major banks such as JPMorgan Chase and HSBC, and the proceeds were almost simultaneously used to purchase new gold of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) standard.

At the same time, the physical volume of reserves did not change — only their form, jurisdiction, and standard were altered. However, due to the rise in gold prices, the Bank of France recorded a significant financial gain of around €12.8–13 billion, which allowed it to sharply improve its financial statements and move from losses to profits. Starting in 2026, France has effectively fully localised its gold reserves: now every ounce of sovereign gold is under national jurisdiction.

Formally, the Bank of France’s actions can be explained by the need to standardise assets and optimise its balance sheet; however, in reality, the operation carries a much deeper meaning. Gold is not just an asset, but a measure of trust. If a country keeps its reserves abroad, it signals confidence in its partner; if it brings them back, it suggests that this trust has been exhausted. In this context, Paris’s actions appear to be a signal—one that is not only financial, but also geopolitical.

Similar actions have already occurred in France’s history. In the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle converted dollar reserves into gold and repatriated it from the United States and the United Kingdom. This process became one of the factors that undermined the Bretton Woods system and led U.S. President Richard Nixon to abandon the dollar’s gold convertibility in 1971. At the time, France not only brought back a significant portion of its reserves but also demonstrated its political ambitions by withdrawing from NATO’s military structure.

Against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s policies, which include pressure on allies, a reassessment of military commitments, and the use of financial tools as leverage, European countries have begun to reassess the economic and geopolitical risks associated with various forms of dependence on the United States.

France has become the first major EU country to fully bring its gold under national control, which immediately raises the question of who might be next. For example, Germany holds around 1,300 tons of gold in the United States—ten times more than France—and in the context of growing uncertainty in future relations between EU countries and the U.S., this is increasingly shifting from a matter of convenience to a potential risk.

In theory, such moves by allies are a concerning signal for the United States. If the process of gold repatriation becomes widespread, it could undermine the country’s status as a global custodian of reserves. If allies no longer trust it to hold their assets, this would indicate a change in the very logic of the global financial system. And if this is combined with Europe’s growing military autonomy, then we are no longer talking about a simple adjustment of balance, but rather a challenge to Washington’s hegemony.

However, things are not so simple. The current crisis, on the one hand, is pushing Europeans further away from the United States, while on the other, it is intensifying competition for leadership within the European Union. The growing mistrust among European states resulting from this competition, in turn, makes some of them more cautious in assessing the prospects of a “divorce” from the U.S. After all, even de Gaulle’s more radical steps, mentioned above, failed to position France as an independent geopolitical centre capable of influencing other countries. Incidentally, in the 1960s, de Gaulle’s idea of a complete rejection of the dollar and a return to the gold standard was not supported by other Western countries. Moreover, in 2009, France returned to NATO’s military structure, concluding that staying outside such a powerful alliance deprived it of leverage over the policy of the collective West.

Given this experience, it is difficult to believe in the long-term effect of Macron’s actions, the essence of which comes down to symbolic steps that are unlikely to carry any significant geopolitical or geoeconomic substance.