2023 – another year of high expectations in Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process? Averting war in South Caucasus

For Azerbaijan and Armenia 2023 has started with a new round of diplomatic standoff and mutual accusations of torpedoing the peace process amid Azerbaijani civilian protests on the Lachin road in Karabakh. As a result, the peace process stalled, which shows no sign of easing. Although 2022 was a year of high expectations in terms of the peace process between Baku and Yerevan, it swiftly became a year of diplomatic rifts and renewed clashes between the warring parties.

In 2023, the civilian protests organised on the Lachin-Shusha road caused some Western countries' condemnation of the Azerbaijani government, which urged Baku to restore free movement via the road. However, those countries' statements largely failed to address the reason behind the occurrence of such civilian protests in the region. The failure of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to prevent what Baku calls the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Karabakh outraged the local government and increased public criticism on both sides toward the Russian contingent deployed in the region since 2020.

The Azerbaijanis connect the protest to the exploitation of the natural resources of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is legally recognised as being Azerbaijani territory. But the most important catalyst behind Baku's harsh criticism is likely the arrival in Karabakh of the Russian-Armenian business tycoon, Ruben Vardanyan, who quickly stepped in as a "state-minister" of the de-facto separatist regime and obtained bellicose rhetoric. The year 2022 also was notable for the EU's active involvement in the peace process between Baku and Yerevan to draft the final peace document, albeit unsuccessfully.

Although the Brussels format of negotiations appeared to be effective in facilitating dialogue, it did not yield the expected positive results. Hence, Azerbaijan distanced itself from pro-Armenian Western groups, instead focusing on internal security-related issues and countering new security dilemmas. Given Russia's brutal military campaign in Ukraine and impotence to properly fulfil duties in Karabakh, it is unlikely that Moscow would be able to intervene in the negotiations and offer something new to both parties. Nevertheless, official Baku kept a dialogue window open with the West and Moscow for a possible revival of the stalled negotiations.

Therefore, it is fair to note that the EU still holds the upper hand in the process. As such, on January 13, 2023, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier called Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and emphasised that Germany supports the European Union-Azerbaijan-Armenia trilateral format conducted with the direct participation of the President of the European Council Charles Michel. In response, President Ilham Aliyev also expressed Azerbaijan's commitment to the process of discussions within the European Union-Azerbaijan-Armenia trilateral format. Indeed, President Steinmeier's call was a clear demonstration that Berlin wanted to build its relations with Azerbaijan and keep Baku in the Western orbit.

Despite Berlin's and Brussel's balanced approach to the peace process, Azerbaijan seems bothered mainly by the position of the French government's staunch pro-Armenia position. Shortly after the French National Assembly's anti-Azerbaijani resolution, president Aliyev stated that France was excluded from the negotiation process due to its biased position. Ironically, the Western countries’ critical statements toward the process on the Lachin road do not contradict the main thesis of Azerbaijan regarding its territorial integrity. For example, on January 13, 2023, the speaker of the National Assembly of France, Yael Braun-Pivet, said that France could not recognise the independence of Karabakh as it is against international law.

While the current state of the peace process does not add optimism, the process on the Lachin road will likely continue for a while unless additional guarantees are granted to Azerbaijan regarding its natural resources exploitation and full access to all mines in Karabakh for routine on-site monitoring.

Moreover, for Azerbaijan, the presence of Ruben Vardanyan in Karabakh smells of a Kremlin plot, which is aimed at inflaming tensions more and preventing face-to-face communication with the ethnic Armenian community. In this vein, Baku will keep pushing further for Vardanyan's departure from Karabakh as one of the main options for reviving the Moscow/Sochi negotiation format. Undoubtedly, the hopes in Karabakh about Vardanyan’s abilities to rescue the region quickly vanished, as he has proven unable to resolve the situation on the Lachin road for more than a month.

The stalled peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia will undergo a tough process in 2023, though there is still some limited space for diplomacy. The EU could revive the process if it intervenes swiftly and addresses the concerns and interests of both parties to ensure a smooth peace process.