Russia warns Armenia of Western support's volatility Lavrov intimidates Yerevan with America
On May 16, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to the Tsargrad TV channel. The questions of the host mainly concerned the confrontation between Russia and the West. During the interview, Russia's top diplomat made a number of inappropriate statements about German and French leaders, which, according to the interlocutors, were prepared and justified by the first question of the host concerning a sharp decline in the level and quality of diplomatic etiquette in the Western world.
It seems more important for us to consider Lavrov's thoughts on relations with Armenia, which he stated in a broader context of the West's actions to shatter the situation in the former Soviet republics. The Russian foreign minister said verbatim the following: "We were ready to help a CSTO member such as Armenia in the same way (as Kazakhstan - Ed.). And last fall, a document on the deployment of a CSTO observer mission on the Armenian territory in accordance with the request of our Armenian allies was prepared for the CSTO summit in Yerevan.
The document was fully agreed upon at the level of the Foreign Ministers. Then at the last moment, at the summit itself, our Armenian friends asked us to postpone its adoption. To this day, it remains on paper and cannot be implemented. But if Yerevan had confirmed what had already been agreed, I am convinced Armenia would have won and would have a more stable situation".
Voicing (once again) what is called "disposition" in legal language, the Russian diplomat did not fail to formulate a possible sanction: "They (the Americans - Ed.) want to and are actively engaged in it (shattering - Ed.). I know that they call Armenians (we have such information) to take their side, drive the Russians away from their territory, the border guards too, remove the military base, and the Americans will help to ensure security... Moreover, we see how the West behaves with those on whom it has placed some bets in the past. They abandoned Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak...".
So Lavrov has warned the Armenian side about the volatility of US support, which is certainly something to be wary of. On the one hand, the very possibility of such a hint from Moscow is certainly an unpleasant fact for Armenians. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Russia's chief diplomat has not even hinted at Russia's own alleged actions, confining himself to an indirect threat through the actions of an adversary. Whether this means that Moscow is unable to impose any serious sanctions against its vassal on its own, or that it is still temporarily reluctant to do so because it has more important things to do, remains unclear.
Usually, when Yerevan makes a leap towards the Western format of a peace agreement, Moscow hastens to remind it that it is actually offering the best option for it, involving a postponed decision on some kind of status for the Karabakh Armenians. This was the case both at the end of October last year when Putin voiced this idea at the Valdai Forum and in January this year when Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova made similar theses.
However, neither after the Washington round nor after the meeting of the heads of state in Brussels, did Russia make similar statements. This is somewhat explained by the fact that Moscow will host the next round of the Russian track on May 19 and does not feel the need for additional prodding from Yerevan.
On the other hand, the Kremlin has probably already decided that Russia's constant pushing of the issue of the status of the Armenian community against the background of such far-reaching statements about the mutual recognition of territorial integrity by the parties is starting to sound quite silly.
To paraphrase a popular expression, Russians cannot be more monophysite than the Armenian Catholicos. Finally, Azerbaijan's changing reality on the ground leaves too little room for such speculation for Moscow, effectively turning such initiatives into a diplomatic anachronism.
Interestingly, almost simultaneously with Lavrov's speech, the Armenian Foreign Ministry reported that the issue of Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO was not on the country's agenda at the moment. On the surface, it looks as if Pashinyan is ready to consider the deployment of CSTO forces on the conditional border. Does this also mean that Pashinyan is inclined to roll back the Brussels agreements in favour of the Russian option? It is also good to understand what this Russian option is now.
As we have already said, the issue of Karabakh's "status" is becoming an anachronism. If Moscow could return this agenda, it would only do so after changing the situation on the ground, i.e. in Karabakh. Given that Moscow's main attempt by Vardanyan to prevent Azerbaijan from reintegrating the Karabakh Armenian community into Azerbaijani society has failed, and that there is simply no time for new attempts before negotiations, it seems more likely that Moscow has changed its position and will present some form of settlement based on recognition of the territorial integrity of the parties. Simply put, it will steal the peace process from under the noses of the West.
It should be noted that the signing of a comprehensive peace is very advantageous for Russia in terms of image. With the ongoing aggression in Ukraine, Russia can present itself as a peacemaker in the South Caucasus. In addition, Moscow is well aware that the two-thousand contingent in the foothills of the Lesser Caucasus, "encircled" on four sides not only by the corps of the Azerbaijani army, but no less importantly, by the powerful modern infrastructure of the Azerbaijani state - is geopolitical "dead weight" that sooner or later must be dropped, or better sold at a higher price, while they can still get something.
Perhaps the moment has arrived. In this case, we will pretty soon find out what proposals Azerbaijan will receive. However, we are sure that if the price is too high, Baku will not agree, and will solve all the issues on the spot and in the context of national interests. As it has been doing so far.