The Middle East on a fault line  Can Trump prevent a new war?

Hamas has warned the U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, about a possible collapse of the ceasefire in Gaza.

According to Al Arabiya, at least nine people were killed and several injured in Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, local health authorities reported. Witnesses and medical personnel said the first strike hit a vehicle in the densely populated Rimal area, causing it to catch fire. It is unclear whether the five fatalities were inside the car or were bystanders. Dozens of people rushed to put out the fire and help the victims.

Shortly after the attack on the vehicle, the Israeli Air Force carried out two airstrikes on homes in Deir al Balah city and the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza. According to medical sources, at least four people were killed and several injured.

On its side, the Israeli military stated that an armed individual entered Israeli-controlled territory in the Gaza Strip and used a “humanitarian road in the area through which humanitarian aid enters southern Gaza.” The statement called this a “blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement.” The Israel Defense Forces claimed that strikes were carried out on targets in Gaza in response.

Following recent events, Hamas warned U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff about a possible collapse of the ceasefire in Gaza. “[Hamas] is ready to fight,” sources told a Saudi publication, emphasising that the ceasefire must be mutual and that “Gaza will not become another Lebanon.”

An American source told Walla that “Hamas has not given up yet, but has made it clear that it will not be able to accept any more Israeli attacks. Gaza will not be Lebanon for them, and I hope we can contain the situation.”

Another source told the Jerusalem Post: “The US is aware of the Israeli attacks and certainly understands Israel's need to protect its soldiers in Gaza after they were attacked,” adding, “Hamas told us, 'It is better for us to fight and let a thousand be killed by fire under Israeli attacks than by inaction.'”

Earlier, Al Arabiya reported that Abu Abdullah Al-Hudaydi—the commander of the operational headquarters of the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, the so-called “military wing” of Hamas—was killed in an IDF strike in Gaza on November 22. Against this backdrop, it becomes clearer why Hamas references Lebanon in its statements.

Gaza and Lebanon: neither peace nor war

On his side, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that Washington intends to pursue the full disarmament of Hamas. He made the remark during a meeting with New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani on November 21. “We are pushing forward total disarmament of Hamas,” the American leader noted.

The fragile ceasefire in Gaza, brokered on October 9 with Trump’s mediation, is regularly being violated. In recent weeks, Israel has repeatedly carried out strikes in the Strip, claiming that Hamas fighters crossed the “yellow line”—a notional boundary between IDF and Hamas-controlled zones—or were planning attacks against Israeli units and were therefore targeted.

Currently, Hamas controls 47% of Gaza’s territory, where 97% of the population lives. The remaining 53% of the territory is under IDF control.

Hamas has stated that it has no intention of disarming, while Israel emphasises that it will not leave Gaza until the movement’s fighters lay down their arms. Meanwhile, the IDF continues to carry out strikes in the Strip—less intense than those before October 9 but still deadly.

At present, the Israel Defense Forces have abandoned the use of the “Dahiya Doctrine” in Gaza, named after the Shiite suburb of Beirut, where the pro-Iranian and Israel-hostile group Hezbollah is strong. This doctrine involves the total destruction of both civilian and military infrastructure, including residential areas.

Similarly, after the ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah last November, Israel no longer applies the Dahiya Doctrine against Lebanese towns. However, the IDF continues to conduct precise but powerful strikes on Hezbollah military targets every few days, even though Hezbollah does not return fire. A similar tactic is being used against Hamas fighters in Gaza.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to call the situation a “ceasefire.” It is clear that, if the current balance of forces persists, the situation will sooner or later escalate again toward full-scale war.

The Lebanese government reacted sharply to a recent incident in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces killed a Lebanese civil servant. Even the current cabinet—mostly composed of parties critical of Hezbollah—ordered the army to return fire against Israeli forces. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, which has effectively established its own state with armed formations in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, declared its readiness to resist any Israeli incursion alongside the army.

If the Lebanese Armed Forces do offer resistance—which seems unlikely given their extremely weak condition and low combat capability—it could be the first time a unified front of the army and Hezbollah emerges against Israel.

Trump’s plan for Lebanon and Gaza envisions the gradual disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah—groups closely linked to Iran and part of the pro-Iranian “Axis of Resistance,” which opposes American and Israeli influence in the Middle East.

However, neither Hamas nor Hezbollah intends to disarm. Both groups remain confident: Hezbollah continues to receive significant military and financial support from Tehran, while both organisations are actively rebuilding their capabilities following losses sustained in clashes with the IDF over the past two years. Moreover, both movements understand perfectly well that, if they were to disarm, they would likely become targets for their adversaries.

Finally, it remains unclear what Donald Trump’s next move will be. He could give Israel the green light for full-scale military action against Hamas and Hezbollah—that is, against Gaza and Lebanon. But such a step would inevitably lead to the renewed application of the Dahiya Doctrine, mass civilian casualties, and growing doubts among both voters and the American establishment about Trump’s ability to achieve peace—a capability he has consistently boasted about.

This means that the U.S. president’s ability to disarm Israel’s opponents is seriously limited. By granting Israel permission for large-scale operations in Gaza and Lebanon, Trump risks undermining his own influence both domestically and internationally.

For this reason, Trump continues to restrain Israel. Observing this, Hamas and Hezbollah refuse to disarm, interpreting Washington’s caution as a sign of weakness. Israel, for its part, continues to strike Hamas and Hezbollah positions—not as extensively as before, but enough to prevent them from fully rebuilding their capabilities. This dynamic inevitably heightens tensions: sooner or later, they are likely to respond.

The U.S. president is wavering. He speaks of the need to disarm both groups, but apparently lacks a clear toolkit to achieve this goal. He is hesitant to allow Israel to launch a full-scale war while simultaneously restraining Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from doing so. The paradox, however, is that this very “restraining” policy is gradually pushing the situation toward a new full-scale conflict. This raises a natural question—why, while avoiding escalation, is Trump not prepared to fully prohibit Israel from striking Gaza and Lebanon?

As a result, the situation in Gaza and Lebanon remains dangerously uncertain, with a growing likelihood of renewed escalation between Israel and its adversaries. This complicates the implementation of Trump’s peace plan, which envisions the deployment of International Stabilisation Forces (ISF) in Gaza to maintain order and security.