A European stumbling block to peace The EU mission as a destabilising factor

Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, while in Strasbourg, stated that certain functions of border management could be transferred to the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA). “We also understand that time has passed, and now we do have peace. We should think about how this mission can continue to support our internal—maybe some border management—capacities, and maybe others [as well],” the minister said during a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

The Armenian minister did not specify which state’s border representatives of the mission would be deployed to, meaning it is not excluded that they could “manage the border” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This, in turn, raises a number of questions. For example: how does the desire to transfer border management functions to an EU mission align with the clause of the already initialled peace agreement, which states that the parties will not deploy the armed forces of third parties on the border with each other? Does this mean that for Yerevan, hosting European units on the border with Azerbaijan is more important than peace with the country? Should we infer from this news that Armenia does not need to end its isolation and engage in regional projects? And what exactly is this obsession with the idea that the “mission can continue to support us”? Support in what?

The European Union mission appeared in Armenia by a decision of the EU Council at the beginning of 2023. Subsequently, through the efforts of several countries, the EU mission in Armenia essentially turned into a NATO mission, and in Baku, this was seen as a step toward the militarisation of the region. On January 30, 2025, the EU Council decided to extend the mission’s mandate until February 19, 2027. The very fact of this mandate extension already raises questions in Baku regarding the mission’s activities in the context of progress in the peace process and the future of peace.

In response to these questions, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated on November 5 last year that after the conclusion of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, changes in the format of EUMA’s activities might be possible. And although this sounded ambiguous, there remained hope that such changes would be directed toward weakening, rather than strengthening, its role.

However, the latest statement by Armenia’s foreign minister shows that, on the contrary, Armenia intends to strengthen the EU’s military factor in its policy. Notably, Mirzoyan did not even specify the duration of EUMA’s presence under such a possible status. For example, if he had said that they would be on the border only until the signing of the peace treaty, that could still fit within the logic of seeking some security guarantees. However, the statement refers to an indefinite arrangement. What is this, if not a direct challenge to the peace process!

Thus, the issue of the EU mission—if its future operations are intended on the border with Azerbaijan—is gradually turning into an analogue of the OSCE Minsk Group question, if not a more dangerous version of it. While the Minsk Group was purely a political institution, EUMA shows all the characteristics of a military organisation with the potential to expand its functions. Consequently, the mission’s activities could become not just a symbolic but an actual obstacle to the full resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. If maintaining the Minsk Group implied a reluctance to let go of the idea of reviving the Karabakh case diplomatically, then transforming EUMA into a border-guarding body demonstrates an intention to keep the peace process suspended in midair.

In Yerevan, it is evidently expected that, now that the United States and President Donald Trump personally have become actively involved in the peace process, Baku will have no choice but to continue the process out of concern for contradicting Washington. This, in turn, is seen as the ideal moment to leave loopholes for future attempts at revanchism. This is a mistaken, if not outright dangerous, calculation. First, Azerbaijan always acts primarily in accordance with its national interests. Second, the U.S. administration has a clear understanding of who has been the aggressor and the obstacle to a just peace for many years. This was most clearly demonstrated by President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, who in November last year, during his speech at a business forum in Miami, cited Trump’s question to President Aliyev: “Why did you stop? You had victory, you have a large army.”

Thus, the situation with the EU mission—which risks becoming a long-term stumbling block on the path to signing a peace agreement—is highly likely to prompt Washington to exert pressure on Yerevan. This is all the more plausible given that the Trump administration generally views European foreign policy ambitions with considerable scepticism.

It is also possible that, by generously funding the Armenian state, the EU is leaving Yerevan with no choice but to accept its conditions regarding EUMA. In this case, Armenia, instead of having one military base, effectively gains another. This seriously undermines Pashinyan’s course toward enhancing Armenia’s agency and jeopardises the prospects for regional cooperation. Meanwhile, had Yerevan pursued timely normalisation, it would not have needed to fall into dependence on European grants and, consequently, on Brussels’ interests.