Between missiles and negotiations: what awaits the Middle East? Foreign analysts on Caliber.Az

Recently, the American–Israeli–Iranian confrontation has entered another stage of escalation that could plunge the Middle East into the depths of a new full-scale war.

On the evening of June 7, Tehran launched ballistic missiles at northern Israeli bases in response to actions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon and Beirut. The Israeli side, in turn, responded immediately: the country’s Air Force carried out airstrikes on military targets in central and western Iran, and a petrochemical complex in the city of Mahshahr in Khuzestan province was also attacked.

Then, following an incident involving an American helicopter in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. Army, on the orders of President Donald Trump, struck Iranian targets: at least 49 Tomahawk missiles were launched, hitting around 20 targets in southern Iran and in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. As a retaliatory measure, Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf and Jordan. At the same time, despite these developments, negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic are continuing, according to CNN, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the situation.

So, in what direction will events in the Middle East develop further? Should the international community expect another large-scale war in the region, the consequences of which could lead to new global problems, or does a chance for a diplomatic outcome still remain? Foreign political analysts and Middle East experts shared their views on this topic with Caliber.Az.

In particular, Israeli journalist and publicist Rostislav Goltsman, head of the International Relations Commission of the Union of Journalists of Israel, believes that everything was already clear when Trump gave Iran a deadline to make a decision on the deal.

“All key points were agreed from the outset: there would be no agreement other than one based on the complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear programme and its missile development programme, as well as the unconditional removal of all enriched uranium from Iranian territory. The terms also included monitoring of facilities working with nuclear fuel that could genuinely serve peaceful purposes, including electricity generation. For example, there are two nuclear reactors in Bushehr, and they must be under full IAEA control. If someone hoped that Iran would once again be selling even not ‘last year’s’ but ‘the year before last’s snow,’ they miscalculated. In the end, all deadlines expired, and we are back to the previous situation where everything will have to start from scratch,” said Goltsman.

In turn, Israeli analyst and orientalist Michael Borodkin believes that the escalation of tensions in the conflict zone is driven by the current logic of events: the parties in the negotiations have failed to achieve anything, and therefore pressure needs to be increased in order to break the deadlock. This is one aspect.

“The second factor is a consequence of the strengthened confidence of the Iranian regime in its own capabilities. The new leadership, formed after the elimination of Ali Khamenei and consisting mainly of IRGC generals, is no less radical in its views. Moreover, they are less cautious than the previous authorities and more inclined to take risks if they believe that the opponent’s response will not be large-scale.

Based on this, Tehran decided to try to change the formula of actions in the Middle East and launched a strike on Israel, explaining it as an attempt to protect its proxies in Lebanon — the Hezbollah group. In addition, Iran in this way tried to convince the United States to agree to extend the ceasefire agreement to Lebanon as well. The Israeli retaliatory strike makes it possible to hope that this plan has not worked, but repeated attempts are likely if the negotiations continue to stall,” he noted.

According to the analyst, the United States also chose to demonstrate resolve by striking Iran, in a move not directly linked to the Iran–Israel escalation: “Thus, we are witnessing a process of managed escalation, where the parties do not want a full-scale war to resume, but aim to gradually increase pressure on the opponent. Tehran holds the Strait of Hormuz, attempting to sustain a crisis in energy resources, aluminium, fertilisers, and helium. The United States is blocking Iranian ports in order to drain the Iranian economy. The situation remains extremely unstable, and such flare-ups will continue in the future, especially as the global shortage of strategic raw materials grows,” the analyst said.

Meanwhile, Associate Professor at the Department of Modern East and Africa of the Russian State University for the Humanities and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Lana Ravandi-Fadai, expressed the view that the new escalation is not related to the United States attempting to conduct negotiations through military pressure, which is unacceptable for Iran.

“Tehran responds with strikes, but it has not yet closed the door to mediators — Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan: a Qatari delegation has indeed arrived in Tehran to discuss regional issues and the diplomatic process aimed at ending the confrontation. From Iran’s perspective, the current escalation is linked to two aspects. First, Tehran believes that the main problem today is not the content of the negotiations, but a crisis of trust. The Iranian leadership sees serious contradictions between Washington’s statements and its practical actions — that is, on the one hand, there are statements about the successful progress of negotiations and readiness for a diplomatic solution, while on the other hand, strikes continue, military pressure increases, and regional escalation expands.

In the Islamic Republic, such signals are interpreted as evidence of inconsistency, which is why there is an increasing emphasis on the need for international guarantees, mediators, and external witnesses to any agreements. The logic of the Iranian authorities is simple: if political statements can change depending on the internal political situation in the United States, then the durability of any agreement must be ensured not by promises of individual politicians, but by international control mechanisms and enforcement guarantees.

The second point is the Israeli factor. In Tehran’s view, Israel does not act separately, but as part of a unified US–Israeli strategy of pressure; therefore, a strike on this country’s territory is not only a military response, but also a signal that Iran will not allow negotiations to proceed while the war against its regional security system is simultaneously expanding.

How will the Islamic Republic act now? I believe Iran’s current logic is as follows: responding to strikes is mandatory, but without completely burning the diplomatic channel. In other words, Tehran will combine four instruments: a limited military response against US interests and Israeli military facilities in order to demonstrate that pressure does not work; maintaining negotiations through mediators — primarily Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan; exerting influence through the Strait of Hormuz — not necessarily full closure, but increased control, warnings to shipping, and higher risk premiums; and linking all fronts, meaning it will insist that any deal is impossible without a halt to strikes on Lebanon and without guarantees of regional security,” concluded Ravandi-Fadai.